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Abstract
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part explores the difficulties of
bootstrapping and maintaining a security infrastructure for military Mobile Ad Hoc
NETworks (MANETs). The assumed absence of dedicated infrastructural elements
necessitates, that security services in ad hoc networks may be built from the ground
up. We develop a cluster algorithm, incorporating a trust metric in the cluster head
selection process to securely determine constituting nodes in a distributed Trust
Authority (TA) for MANETs. Following this, we develop non-interactive key dis-
tribution protocols for the distribution of symmetric keys in MANETs. We explore
the computational requirements of our protocols and simulate the key distribution
process.
The second part of this thesis builds upon the security infrastructure of the first
part and examines two distributed protocols for MANETs. Firstly, we present a
novel algorithm for enhancing the efficiency and robustness of distributed proto-
cols for contacting TA nodes in MANETs. Our algorithm determines a quorum of
trust authority nodes required for a distributed protocol run based upon a set of
quality metrics, and establishes an efficient routing strategy to contact these nodes.
Secondly, we present a probabilistic path authentication scheme based on message
authentication codes (MACs). Our scheme minimises both communication and com-
putation overhead in authenticating the path over which a stream of packets travels
and facilitates the detection of adversarial nodes on the path.
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Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Organisation of thesis and summary of contributions . . 18
1.3 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
In this chapter we provide an overview of the thesis as a whole. We discuss the
motivation for our research and describe the contributions of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Network security has been an extensively studied field of research for over 40 years,
but still raises new possibilities and challenges. Today’s mobile phones, laptops and
even cars can be equipped with network hardware that allows any of them to directly
communicate with other devices. The resulting networks are mobile, decentralised
and appear “ad hoc”, hence the moniker Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs).
A Mobile ad hoc Network is an autonomous network comprised of free roaming
nodes which communicate wireless by radio transmission. MANETs are already
ubiquitous and their range of use will spread in the near future. For example, car-
to-car communication will allow up-to-date traffic information exchange, informing
a car about a nearby accident at the moment of impact. Additionally, emergency
16
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response and military organisations are promising future avenues for this technology.
However, all these new possible deployments enabled by MANETs come at the
risk of an insecure wireless communication and thus with the challenge to provide
algorithms for secure and reliable communication on resource-constrained devices.
One of the main challenges in MANETs is the design of efficient and light-weight
security algorithms, that can be handled by devices with limited computational
capabilities. Efficiency, reliability and security are (competing) design goals for
algorithms suitable for MANETs. Many protocols neglect at least one of these goals:
While cryptographic algorithms are typically provable secure and reliable to the
extend that lost messages are simply handled with retrials, they marginally consider
communication costs. Many state of the art algorithms have a computational and
communicational complexity that exceeds the capabilities of resource-constrained
MANETs. To overcome these efficiency barriers, new protocols need to be developed
that exploit the specific infrastructure as provided by the MANET. Especially pre-
configuration of a MANET or a recurring back-link to an infrastructure network may
allow the design of more efficient security protocols by equipping the MANET nodes
with additional keys or certificates prior to deployment. In contrast to cryptographic
protocols, the emphasis of most network protocols such as routing and clustering is
not on security. Efficiency and efficacy are the major design goals for these protocols,
while security against a plethora of often unpredictable attacks and reliability under
abrupt topology changes are up-to-date research problems.
In complex and dynamic networks, the outcome of network protocols such as
routing protocols is unpredictable and requires simulations for verification. While
network simulators have been used for the simulation of wireless and mobile net-
works for about 10 years, essential parts such as the mobility modelling are still
quite rudimentary. Modelling of the physical layer, which includes mobility and
the transmission of wireless signals, is the most crucial part of network simulators.
17
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All mistakes made in the physical layer can be amplified in upper layers and con-
sequently yield wrong results. The development of tools that allow researchers to
base their simulations on more realistic simulation scenarios started to gain more
attention in the recent years.
1.2 Organisation of thesis and summary of contributions
The remainder of this thesis starts with two introductory chapters. The first of these
chapters, Chapter 2, provides an overview of state of the art research in the area
of secure protocols for MANETs. In the second introductory chapter, Chapter 3,
we extend the network simulator NS-2and define simulation scenarios that are used
in the remainder of this thesis. The remaining chapters are divided into two parts.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a discussion on future work.
In Chapter 2 we give an overview of distributed security protocols in MANETs.
This chapter provides introductory material for the remainder of the thesis. We
identify the category of protocols that we investigate in this thesis, and discuss cryp-
tographic techniques that are available for the design of distributed protocols. We
give an overview of existing work, and highlight the specific challenges of distributed
protocols for MANETs. Furthermore, we categorise different types of MANETs and
identify the specific properties and constraints of MANETs that we study in this
thesis.
In Chapter 3 we provide an overview of the techniques used to model wireless
transmission in network simulations. We highlight the weaknesses of Open Source
network simulators and develop new models to simulate mobility in MANETs and
wireless transmission, as well as mobility in urban environments. Urban environ-
ments provide the most challenging simulation scenarios since communication links
18
1.2 Organisation of thesis and summary of contributions
are likely to be spontaneously interrupted by obstacles. The simulation environment
developed in this chapter is used to investigate network protocols in the remainder
of this thesis.
Part I:
In Chapter 4 we study the use of cluster algorithms to establish a distributed
Trust Authority (TA) in MANETs. We investigate security threats of cluster algo-
rithms, and demonstrate that existing cluster algorithms quickly consume the entire
battery power of small mobile devices. We modify an existing cluster algorithm, ex-
tensively improving its efficiency and making it configurable to suit desired security
and efficiency needs. This chapter concludes with an examination on the useability
of cluster algorithms in MANETs.
In Chapter 5 we propose two schemes for hierarchical non-interactive key distri-
bution. We prove the resilience of both schemes against a large number of malicious
nodes and investigate their feasibility for MANETs regarding computation and com-
munication costs.
Part II:
In Chapter 6 we explore the reliable execution of distributed security protocols
under a dynamic network topology. We propose an algorithm that facilitates the ef-
ficient and reliable execution of distributed protocols within a given time-frame. Our
algorithm determines a quorum of trust authority nodes required for a distributed
protocol run based upon a set of quality metrics, and establishes an efficient routing
strategy to contact these nodes.
In Chapter 7 we develop a probabilistic path authentication scheme to detect and
diagnose routing misbehaviour in MANETs. Its efficiency and short tag size makes
19
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it suitable for MANETs. The scheme builds on symmetric keys whose distribution
is analysed in Chapter 5.
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows:
• We introduce our Coalition Mobility Model (CMM), software for the genera-
tion of group mobility files in urban environments for NS-2and other network
simulators.
• We develop a cluster algorithm to dynamically bootstrap a distributed trusted
authority in MANETs. The novelty of our cluster algorithm is the incorpora-
tion of a trust metric, providing robustness against an active adversary.
• We investigate the distribution of symmetric keys in MANETs based on non-
interactive key distribution protocols.
• We present a novel algorithm for enhancing the efficiency and robustness of
distributed trust authority protocols for MANETs, reducing the communica-
tion overhead of small tactical networks (consisting of 50 to 150 nodes) by
approximately 32 % over naive broadcast-based approaches.
• We develop a probabilistic path authentication scheme for MANETs, mini-
mising both communication and computation overhead in authenticating the
path over which a stream of packets travels while facilitating the detection of
adversarial nodes in the path.
1.3 Publications
This thesis contains material that was previously published with S.D. Wolthusen
[116, 117, 118], material that is under submission with S.D. Wolthusen and P. Ebi-
nger [114], material that was published with S.D. Wolthusen and S. Balfe [119],
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material that was published with M. Srivatsa [115] as well as material that was
published with R. Gennaro, S. Halevi, H. Krawczyk, T. Rabin and S.D. Wolthusen
[57]. These publications form a basis of Chapters 3 through 7 as follows:
• Chapter 3: [114] and [118];
• Chapter 4: [116] and [117];
• Chapter 5: [57];
• Chapter 6: [119];
• Chapter 7: [115].
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In this chapter we identify the challenges of designing secure distributed protocols
for MANETs, and give an overview of the respective areas of research. Key aspects
are the management of cryptographic keys, the provision of a trusted third party and
attacks on security protocols.
To secure MANETs against a plethora of often unpredictable attacks, secur-
ity protocols are required that take the specific constraints and characteristics of
MANETs into account. Efficient and light-weight security protocols are needed that
can be handled by devices with limited computational capabilities. On the one
hand, the requirements on efficiency and security are high, but on the other hand
the devices’ capabilities and bandwidth provided by the communication channel is
limited. To this end, protocols must be designed to optimally exploit the available
infrastructure and possibilities for pre-configuration of the respective MANET.
In Section 2.1, we start this chapter by defining Tactical MANETs, the type of
MANETs this thesis focuses on. We continue with a discussion on symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography in MANETs in Section 2.2, followed by an overview of
key management in MANETs in Section 2.3. Cryptographic keys form the basis
for secure protocols; we discuss the benefits of symmetric versus asymmetric keys
in MANET security protocols. MANETs especially lack a central Trust Authority
(TA), that can be used for key and certificate management. An overview of ap-
proaches to overcome this lack of a central TA is given in Section 2.4. Section 2.5
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then introduces the concept of secret sharing, which provides the basis for the de-
velopment of secure distributed protocols, and gives an overview of distributed pro-
tocols for MANETs. In Section 2.6 we discuss attacks on cryptographic primitives
and distributed network protocols. We conclude this chapter with Section 2.7.
2.1 Tactical mobile ad hoc networks
A MANET, as described by the Internet Engineering Task Force MANET working
group, is a temporary or permanent autonomous network comprised of free roaming
nodes. The nodes within these networks are wireless communication devices [39]
and are typically described by the following characteristics:
• nodes move autonomously resulting in a dynamic network topology;
• nodes may be powered by limited energy source and may have constrained
physical security [39];
• messages between nodes are typically routed in a multi-hop fashion;
• communication links between nodes may be bandwidth-constrained.
MANETs can further be categorised by their specific network size (number of nodes
in the network), the respective mobility patterns and the capabilities of the mobile
devices. In addition to this, dedicated infrastructural elements within a MANET
may be not present, ephemerally available, or need to be built from the ground up.
In this thesis we focus on Tactical MANETs, which we specify regarding topology,
device characteristics and available infrastructure, in the remainder of this section.
We primarily deal with military networks but we note that other Tactical MANETs,
as can be found in emergency responce settings, have similar characteristics.
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2.1.1 Network topology
We assume a Tactical MANETs to consist of 10 to 150 nodes. These networks, as
can be found in military and emergency response networks, distinguish themselves
due to their structured mobility patterns. In emergency response networks for ex-
ample, nodes are likely to follow the same paths again and again (bringing people
from one rescue station to another, or constantly checking patients’ conditions). In
military networks, nodes typically move in groups following formations. The cru-
cial differences between the occurring mobility patterns in Tactical MANETs and
networks with randomly moving nodes are that they provide a more predictable
topology but often a sparsely connected network.
2.1.2 Device characteristics
We assume that Tactical MANETs primarily consist of mobile-phone-sized devices
that can easily be carried by humans. State of the art handhelds such as the
iPhone1 have a processing power of approximately 700 MHz. State of the art mili-
tary handheld-sized devices are still limited to radio frequency phones2, but as soon
as MANETs are secure and reliable enough, commercial products can be adapted
to military applications to allow data exchange including video material between
handhelds. Second class of devices used in cars and tanks are laptops3 that can
communicate with handheld devices via radio communication, and potentially have
a back-link to an infrastructure network.
We assume that the devices carried by humans are equipped with omni-directio-
nal antennas and have a propagation power that is limited to 100 mW, thus limiting
1http://www.apple.com/iphone/
2http://www.rfcomm.harris.com/7800V/
3http://www.rfcomm.harris.com/7800I/
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the communication range to 100 m [4]. Gerharz et al. [59] have shown how in-
terference effects can be minimised by assigning appropriate individual transmission
powers to devices in a MANET. Such methods can help to optimise data throughput
in communication-intensive protocols such as routing between several communica-
tion partners. However, we assume that all devices use the same transmission power,
as we are not focusing on communication-intensive protocols in this thesis.
We assume that nodes communicate in a bandwidth between 2 GHz and 5 GHz.
The battery of an iPhone allows 6 hours Wi-Fi Internet use, 7 hours of video playback
or 24 hours of audio playback. As the duration of a mission might exceed a few
hours or a day, it becomes obvious that security protocols need to keep the use of
both computation (as represented by video and audio playback) and communication
intensity as low as possible.
2.1.3 Network infrastructure
A primary assumption, that substantially influences the design of cryptographic
protocols, is the existence/absence of a back-link to a dedicated infrastructure. We
therefore categorise MANETs in the following classes:
• Self-organised MANETs without pre-configuration These MANETs
have no back-link to an infrastructure network whatsoever and no pre-shared
keys or any other pre-established infrastructure. The nodes in the network
come together as a group of strangers (for a common purpose), and from
thereon establish trust relationships, keys and all necessary security associa-
tions and infrastructure. While these MANETs are the most challenging ones,
tactical networks or any other networks where security is a major issue, will
typically not be deployed without any pre-configuration. This thesis therefore
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does not deal with this kind of MANET.
• Self-organised MANETs with pre-configuration These networks have
no back-link to an infrastructure network whatsoever, but are to some extent
pre-configured to accomplish a certain operation. The nodes in the network
have operational acquaintances and trust each other from the outset, possibly
share keys and benefit from an additional pre-configuration. This kind of
network presents one typical class of Tactical MANETs. For example, imagine
a military scenario where a platoon is deployed in an area without dedicated
infrastructure. The mobile devices used by the soldiers in the platoon will
be pre-configured at the base, but from the time of deployment, a back-link
might technically not be possible or not permitted for security reasons . Self-
organised MANETs with pre-configuration are therefore a type of network that
we will focus on in this thesis.
• Back-link-supported MANETs These networks have a permanent or re-
curring back-link to an infrastructure network. Nodes can be pre-configured at
the beginning of an operation in the same way as for self-organised MANETs
with pre-configuration. Furthermore, a permanent or recurring back-link can
be used to refresh keys or adjust the network configuration. Back-link-suppor-
ted MANETs (especially with a recurring back-link) are also considered in this
thesis.
2.2 Symmetric and public key cryptography in MANETs
Symmetric and public (asymmetric) key cryptography provide a huge variety of
protocols, e.g., for encryption, signatures and authentication, which are suitable for
different applications due to their specific requirements . In Section 2.1 we have
defined the specific constraints and characteristics of Tactical MANETs. In this
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section we discuss the use of symmetric and public key cryptography in MANETs.
2.2.1 Symmetric key cryptography
In symmetric key algorithms, two or more parties need to share a common key with
a size of typically 128 bits or more. When a party wants to send a message that
only the owners of this key can read, it encrypts the message either bit by bit using
a stream cipher, or it encrypts the message in blocks of fixed size (e.g., 128 bits)
using a block cipher. The primary advantage of symmetric key algorithms is their
efficiency. The fact that hardware implementable bitwise XOR and AND operations
are used for encryption and decryption, makes symmetric key algorithms suitable for
devices with very limited computational capabilities. The major drawback however
is the requirement for a shared key. This might either be critical due to the lack of a
secure method to exchange such a key, or when the number of keys required exceeds
a devices’ storage capabilities.
Symmetric key cryptography in Tactical MANETs Once shared keys have
been exchanged and stored, symmetric key cryptography is the desired choice to
encrypt/decrypt data in networks with limited computational capabilities. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.1, we assume small mobile-phone-sized devices for Tactical
MANETs which are indeed constrained in their processing power. The major is-
sue in using symmetric key algorithms for Tactical MANETs is the storage of the
keys and the exchange of the keys in the absence of a trusted authority.
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2.2.2 Public key cryptography
In public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, the key used to
encrypt a message differs from the key used to decrypt it. In public key cryptography,
a user has a pair of cryptographic keys, a public key and a private key. The public key
can be distributed freely, while the private key is kept secret. Messages are encrypted
with the public key, and can consequently be encrypted by everyone. Only the entity
in possession of the corresponding private key can decrypt the message.
Private and public key pairs are mathematically related, but it is computation-
ally impossible to derive the private key from the public key. The mathematical
techniques required to fulfil such properties include multiplications and modulo op-
erations of numbers that are too big to be factorised. The time required for these
multiplications and modulo operations on a state of the art laptop is in the range
of milli-seconds or fractions of milli-seconds. An extensive use of public key cryp-
tography in an algorithm can therefore quickly impose computation times of several
seconds. The big advantage of public key cryptography compared to symmetric key
cryptography is that shared keys are not required. However, the computationally
expensive operations restrict the use of public key cryptography to devices with
sufficient computational capabilities.
Besides encryption and decryption, public key cryptography can be used for
publicly verifiable digital signatures. If a node signs a message with its private key,
each node knowing the public key can verify the authenticity of the signature. This
concept of public verifiability is a useful feature of public key cryptography that
cannot be realised with symmetric key cryptography.
Public key cryptography in tactical MANETs The fact that public key cryp-
tography imposes a critical computational overhead to mobile-phone-sized devices,
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as used in Tactical MANETs, does not mean that it should be ignored. Firstly,
there is no known way to realise algorithms such as publicly verifiable signatures
with symmetric key cryptography. Secondly, combinations of public key and sym-
metric cryptography might facilitate more efficient algorithms than pure public key
or symmetric key solutions alone. An example is the one-time generation of a shared
key with public key cryptography (see Section 2.3), which is then used to run sym-
metric key algorithms. Thirdly, the capabilities of batteries and processors will con-
tinue to increase in future, allowing more complex computations on mobile devices.
We therefore consider public key cryptography as a suitable, albeit carefully used,
operation in Tactical MANETs, while symmetric key cryptography is the choice for
frequently repeated and real-time computations.
2.3 Key management in MANETs
As discussed in Section 2.2, symmetric key algorithms are computationally very
efficient and are therefore of high interest for MANETs. However, as previously
stated, the major challenge in using symmetric key cryptography in MANETs is the
secure exchange and efficient storage of symmetric keys. Any data exchange over a
wireless channel is initially unauthentic, making it almost impossible to exchange a
key without a back-link or pre-configuration. In this section we discuss these issues
and give an overview of current research.
2.3.1 Online key exchange
Imagine two parties A and B in a wireless network that want to securely communi-
cate which each other, and for this purpose establish a shared secret key. We assume
that A and B are not strangers to each other, i.e., they have some association with
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the other party’s identity that goes beyond the radio signal they receive.
A protocol that facilitates this pairwise key exchange over an insecure communi-
cation channel is the Diffie-Hellman protocol [121]. Since an insecure channel does
not provide authenticity of the communicating parties, this protocol is vulnerable to
a man-in-the-middle attack. To avoid a man-in-the-middle attack, the identities of
A and B need to be linked to the messages they send. The easiest method to link a
message with an identity is to communicate over a secure side-channel, which could
be provided by an electrical contact as proposed in Stajano’s and Anderson’s paper
[129].
In the absence of a secure side-channel and without physical contact, A andB can
only prove the authenticity of their messages using a third party. This third party
can be one mutual “friend” or a TA to which A and B communicate over a secure side
channel, or the combination of two “mutual friends”. Capkun et al. have investigated
these different possibilities to establish the required security association between A
and B [139, 26]. To provide ubiquitous solutions (also for nodes without “friends”)
for establishing a security association between two nodes (i.e., to authenticate each
others’ public keys), the management of a TA in MANETs has been extensively
studied in the literature [153, 146, 147, 148, 14, 82]. In Section 2.3.2 we give an
overview of TA-based and alternative approaches for public key management in
MANETs.
Up until now we have discussed the exchange of pairwise keys between two nodes
in a network, which typically establish a shared key when required. Some protocols,
however, assume shared keys between many or all pairs of nodes in the network.
In this case it is more efficient to use a global scheme that distributes shared keys
between any pair of nodes with minimal communication overhead. In Section 2.3.3
we give an overview of a number of such schemes proposed in the literature.
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2.3.2 Public key management
In the example of two nodes A and B who want to exchange a symmetric key, we
have seen the need for a linkage between a public key and an identity. This linkage
(also known as a security association) can be provided by a certificate, which proves
that a certain public key belongs to a given identity. In this section we give an
overview of techniques to issue certificates in MANETs. Most of these techniques go
back to the management of a certification authority (CA), which is a trusted entity
assigned to manage all certificate issues.
Central certification authority If a back-link to a trusted infrastructure net-
work exists (“Back-link-supported MANETs” from Section 2.1), this back-link pro-
vides the secure communication with a central TA. In this case, the management of
the CA is not an issue of the MANET but can be provided oﬄine by a traditional
trusted authority.
Partially distributed certification authority One of the first approaches to
solve the key management problem in MANETs was proposed by Zhou and Haas
[153]. Zhou and Haas designed a distributed CA for MANETs, where the power of
performing security critical computations is distributed between a set of nodes by
letting the nodes share the system secret. The distributed CA signs a certificate by
producing a threshold group signature (see Section 2.5.1 for threshold secret sharing
schemes). Each server generates a partial signature using its private key share, and
submits the partial signature to a combiner. The combiner can be any server and
requires at least k + 1 shares to successfully reconstruct the digital signature.
The system proposed by Zhou and Haas requires an oﬄine trusted third party to
bootstrap the distributed CA. This approach from Zhou and Haas was later extended
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by Yi and Kravets [146, 147, 148]. They abandon the need for a combiner and call
their CA a MObile Certificate Authority (MOCA). While Zhou and Haas did not
specify a protocol for the communication of non-CA nodes with nodes from the CA,
the MOCA framework concentrates on non-MOCA to MOCA-node communication
protocols. Recent improvements of upper schemes include the work from Xu and
Iftode [145] and Wu et al. [143].
Partially distributed certification authorities provide a promising instrument for
“Self-organised MANETs with pre-configuration” (see Section 2.1). The CA can be
assigned as part of the pre-configuration to avoid an expensive bootstrapping of the
CA within the network.
Schemes to dynamically set up a threshold secret, as typically required by a
distributed CA, were proposed by Pederson [101] and later by Gennaro et al. [58].
In “Self-organised MANETs without pre-configuration”, or in MANETs with pre-
configuration, where single nodes of the CA might run out of battery power, there
is a need to dynamically bootstrap a CA. The dynamic bootstrapping of a trusted
authority, that can act as a CA in MANETs, is discussed in Section 2.4.
Fully distributed certification authority Kong et al. [78], Luo et al. [87] and
Joshi et al. [73] proposed public key management solutions, based on the approach
originally presented by Zhou and Haas [153]. They distribute the CA over the whole
network, i.e., all nodes can act as CA nodes.
The challenges in designing a fully distributed CA are similar to those for partly
distributed authorities. Depending on the capabilities of the nodes and the topology
of the network, either a partially distributed or a fully distributed approach can be
the better choice. In a fully distributed CA, the chance to contact a required number
of CA nodes is higher than in a partly distributed CA. Some of the CA nodes might
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be several hops away, imposing a higher communication overhead to obtain service
than using a partially distributed CA. However, an online bootstrapping of a fully
distributed CA imposes high communication costs and is therefore infeasible for
larger networks.
A fully distributed certification authority might therefore be favourable in small
networks, and when an online bootstrapping of the CA is not required. This can be
the case if i) the network can be pre-configured and a later re-establishment of the
CA is not required, or ii) the network can be pre-configured and has a recurrent or
permanent back-link to an infrastructure network.
A further assumption for a fully distributed CA are homogeneous network nodes,
with regard to individual nodes’ computational capabilities and trustworthiness. If
certain nodes in the network have a higher risk to get compromised or very limited
processing power, they should not be part of the CA. In Tactical MANETs, nodes
are not necessarily homogeneous; some might be embedded in tanks or carried by
soldiers on foot.
Certificate chaining-based key management Capkun et al. [27] proposed the
concept of certificate chaining to manage certificates without a trusted third party.
As part of their scheme, nodes issue their own certificates to other nodes and thus do
not rely on a centrally managed CA. Each node keeps a limited certificate repository
comprising certificates for nodes in its local neighbourhood. When a node wishes to
sign the certificate of another node, it simply combines certificate repositories and
attempts to find a chain of valid public key certificates between them.
However, apart from the potential benefits of this approach, there is the dan-
ger that an attacker can control the signing process by compromising only a small
number of nodes. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and even a single
34
2.3 Key management in MANETs
compromised node might weaken many certificate chains. As all nodes may be part
of certificate chains, this scheme requires that all nodes in the network are equally
trustworthy, similar to a fully distributed certification authority.
Identity-based key management Shamir was the first to introduce the concept
of IDentity-based Public Key Cryptography (ID-PKC) [127] in 1984. However, it took
nearly twenty years until an efficient and provably secure Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [24]. By allowing public keys
to be derived from a combination of public system parameters and information that
uniquely identifies a subject, such as an email address, ID-PKC obviates the need
for certificates.
Identity-based schemes require a master secret that must be protected by a TA.
This TA acts as the private key generator. Based on the master secret and on input
of an identity, it generates the personal private key for a given identity. To make this
approach suitable for MANETs, Khalili et al. [75] combined identity-based crypto-
graphy with a distributed private key generator, i.e., the master secret is protected
by a distributed TA. Identity-based key management therefore changes the role of
the TA from that of the CA seen in certification authority-based approaches; the TA
is not used anymore to certify public keys, but to provide private keys for identities.
The security of identity-based key management therefore relies on the security of the
distributed TA. Further identity-based protocols such as encryption and signature
schemes are discussed in Section 2.5.
2.3.3 Symmetric key agreement protocols
In Section 2.3.2 we gave an overview of the literature on public key management
in MANETs. We showed that existing approaches require a (distributed) CA to
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certify public keys. Authentic public keys can be used for the exchange of pairwise
keys, using the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [121]. Using this method, the
establishment of pairwise symmetric keys between each pair of nodes in a MANET
would cause an enormous communication overhead. Non-interactive key agreement
protocols provide an alternative to equip each pair of nodes with a shared key in a
more efficient way. These protocols require pre-configuration or a recurring back-
link to set up the required system parameters and to provide each node with a secret
key. These schemes are ideally
• non-interactive: any two nodes can compute a unique shared secret key with-
out interaction;
• identity-based: to compute the shared secret key, each node only needs its own
secret key and the identity of its peer;
• hierarchical: the scheme is decentralised through a hierarchy where interme-
diate nodes in the hierarchy can derive the secret keys for each of its children
without any limitations or prior knowledge on the number of such children or
their identities;
• resilient: the scheme is fully resilient against compromise of any number of
leaf nodes in the hierarchy, and of a threshold number of nodes in each of the
upper levels of the hierarchy.
One elegant scheme that has the above first three properties (but weaker secu-
rity guarantees) was proposed by Blundo et al. [22], following the earlier work of
Blom [21]. The work of Blundo et al. [22] mainly deals with the non-hierarchical
setting, but they also discuss an extension to the hierarchical case. In this scheme
each node has a secret polynomial (in place of a secret key). A shared key between
two leaf nodes is computed by evaluating the polynomial held by one node at a
point that corresponds to the identity of the other. An alternative approach to
36
2.3 Key management in MANETs
build a hierarchical scheme was proposed by Ramkumar et al. [109], who extended
the scheme from Eschenauer and Gligor [50] for the hierarchical case.
Both hierarchical schemes [22, 109] guarantee security only as long as not too
many of the leaf nodes are compromised. Once the number of compromised nodes
grows above some threshold, an attacker can learn keys of uncompromised nodes,
and may even learn the master secret key of the whole system.
A different approach, that is closer to the idea of an identity-based CA, is the
identity-based key agreement scheme of Sakai et al. [123]. It provides resilience
against the compromise of any number of leaf nodes, but it requires a central au-
thority to hand out keys to each and every participant in the network, including any
participants joining the network at a later point.
2.3.4 Summary
We have reviewed different techniques for public key management in Section 2.3.2.
certificate chaining-based key management appears to be the only technique that
does not require a distributed TA. However, this approach requires further investi-
gation to explore under what constraints it provides sufficient security in MANETs,
e.g., it is unclear how many chains a certain number of malicious nodes can control.
The remaining approaches for public key management require a partially or fully
distributed CA. Techniques for the organisation of a distributed TA which can act
as a CA are discussed in Section 2.4.
Symmetric keys can either be exchanged by the Diffie-Hellman protocol (if au-
thenticated public keys are in place), or by a non-interactive protocol as reviewed in
Section 2.3.3. Such non-interactive key distribution can either be performed during
pre-configuration of the network or also requires a TA.
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As our discussion in this section has shown, most approaches to key manage-
ment that are purely performed within the network require a (distributed) TA. The
management of a distributed TA induces a significant communication overhead as is
discussed in Section 2.4. However, protocols avoiding the use of a TA (such as the
Diffie-Hellman protocol for symmetric key exchange) also impose a large communi-
cation overhead. For a key management solution that is purely performed within a
MANET, a significant communication overhead appears to be unavoidable, and the
lesser evil of the existing protocols needs to be chosen according to the requirements
of the respective MANET. However, things change, as a MANET is not totally left
without external support. Non-interactive key agreement protocols as discussed in
Section 2.3.3 give one example of how communication overhead can be minimised
by exploiting the possibility of network pre-configuration.
2.4 Bootstrapping a distributed trust authority
Trusted authorities are an essential element in Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) to
issue certificates and to manage keys. As our discussion in Section 2.3 has shown,
TAs remain an important element for key management in MANETs, even though it
is hard to implement a TA in a MANET. The natural approach here is to distribute
a TA within the MANET, i.e., to replace the oﬄine TA by an online TA. While
protocols for distributed key management were discussed in Section 2.3, this section
deals with the actual bootstrapping of the set of nodes that act as the distributed
TA in the network.
We focus on TAs that are a subset of all nodes in the network. Using a subset of
the MANET as TA is in general favourable over using the whole network as a TA, for
two reasons: Firstly, managing a TA with a large number of members might exceed
the capabilities of the MANET. This problem was discussed in Section 2.3 in the
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context of fully distributed certificate authorities. Secondly, nodes in a MANETs
are likely to hold different roles and capabilities, and therefore show a different
robustness against compromise.
Choosing a subset of nodes as the TA allows a network to elect the most robust
and trustworthy nodes in the network. This subset can either be determined during
the pre-configuration phase (if applicable), or can dynamically be established by the
nodes in the MANET themselves. Pre-assigning the nodes that form the TA makes
the network security dependent on these nodes. If they are compromised or run out
of battery power, the security infrastructure of the network is destroyed. However,
in certain military scenarios, pre-assignment of a distributed TA might be the best
choice. For example, one can imagine soldiers on foot that are supported by some
tanks that are in a relative central position. The battery lifetime of the tanks is not
an issue, and depending the mission’s security on the security of the tanks might be
deemed reasonable.
While a dynamic election of the TA members runs the risk of choosing already
compromised nodes as TA nodes, the benefits of this approach especially in networks
with homogeneous nodes, are:
• TA nodes that run out of battery power can be replaced by other nodes.
• Advantegeous situated nodes (with many nodes within direct communication
range) can be chosen as TA nodes to reduce the average cost of other nodes
to contact the TA.
• More TA members can be assigned when needed, to allow a network partition-
ing with two independently functioning TAs.
To react spontaneously to dynamic network changes, the subset of nodes that builds
the TA can be re-elected with a certain frequency. Algorithms that undertake the
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task of establishing such a subset of nodes are cluster algorithms. Typically, cluster
algorithms are used to partition the network into clusters, where each cluster is
assigned to one cluster head (CH). We now give an overview of existing cluster
algorithms in the literature.
2.4.1 Cluster algorithms
Cluster algorithms have been widely used in MANETs to determine subsets of nodes
for saving energy [36, 33], enhancing routing protocols [7], finding efficient flooding
[80, 105], and broadcasting [52], or to generally build low-cost backbones [141].
Clusters have also been applied in recent research on distributing TAs in ad hoc
networks [14, 82]. These cluster algorithms build one-hop clusters, i.e., the nodes
in a cluster are in direct communication range with their CH. The first cluster
algorithm for d-hop clustering was proposed by Amis et al. [3].
Bechler et al. [14] established a security architecture using clustering and (k, n)-
threshold cryptography. In each cluster, exactly one distinguished node, the CH,
is responsible for establishing and organising the cluster. Clusters are formed as
geographically needed: If nodes cannot find existing clusters, they create clusters
themselves, with existing clusters being merged and split on demand.
A major drawback in Bechler’s work is the significant relevance of gateway nodes
which act as connectors between neighbouring clusters. As Bechler’s simulation
results illustrate, 34.2 % of the overhead traffic is produced by the gateway nodes,
whereas the cluster heads only produce 47.5 % of the overhead traffic, although they
incur the management of the security shares.
Conventional clustering is heavily influenced by the initial topology of the net-
work, typically resulting in a central node of the cluster becoming the CH. An ap-
40
2.5 Secure network protocols
proach that does not take any properties of nodes into consideration, but that assigns
cluster heads in a probabilistic way, was proposed by Zongpeng and Baochun [155].
Here, every node participates in a communication backbone with a certain proba-
bility dependent on the number of its neighbours. Although this approach is designed
to create an energy-efficient backbone, it does not consider the energy and depletion
levels of the nodes. Furthermore, the probabilistic assignment of nodes leads to
undesirable “bunching” of cluster heads, or leaves large areas without any cluster
head (both with certain probability).
From a security perspective, both deterministic and probabilistic cluster algo-
rithms may allow malicious nodes to assign themselves as CHs. In a probabilistic
cluster algorithm, such as the one proposed by Zongpeng and Baochun [155], it is
impossible to say whether a node cheated to become a CH. All of the reviewed
deterministic cluster algorithms choose nodes with the most neighbours as CHs;
here nodes could roughly monitor their neighbours’ number of neighbours to detect
cheating. However, this monitoring mechanism would require additional commu-
nication and has not been explored so far. We conclude that none of the existing
cluster algorithms in the literature meets the security requirements in MANETs,
i.e., remains secure in a meaningful adversary model (see Section 2.6). In Chapter 4
we develop a secure cluster algorithm for the establishment of a distributed trust
authority, the development of a provably secure adversary model for this kind of
protocol is discussed in Chapter 8.
2.5 Secure network protocols
In this section we introduce the concept of secret sharing, the basic technique for
the design of distributed cryptographic protocols. As discussed in Section 2.1, dis-
tributed protocols are attractive for MANETs due to the lack of a central trusted
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authority. Distributing the power to perform security-relevant computations de-
creases the risk that a small number of malicious nodes can control the computation.
Distributed protocols are mostly used in MANETs for group access control and for
signatures. After giving an overview of the concept of secret sharing, we discuss
state of the art protocols for group access control and signatures in MANETs. We
do not give a concise overview of the theory of secret sharing, rather we focus on the
distribution of the secret shares in a MANET, i.e., how secret sharing schemes can
be deployed in MANETs. Furthermore, we give an overview of secure distributed
networking protocols such as routing and clustering.
2.5.1 Secret sharing
A secret sharing scheme allows a so called dealer to distribute a secret among n
parties, where at least k + 1 ≤ n of the parties need to collude to reconstruct the
secret; k or less secret shares do not reveal any information about the secret.
One of the first secret sharing schemes is the (k, n)-threshold scheme proposed
by Shamir in 1979 [126]. This approach is based on the property, that a polynomial
of degree k can be described by k + 1 data points.
Protocols for distributed key generation without a dealer, based on univariate
polynomials were proposed by Pederson [101] and later by Gennaro et al. [58]. These
protocols require secure channels between the nodes to submit parts of secret shares
secretly, and a broadcast channel for the dissemination of public parameters which
are used to validate the correctness of the submitted secret shares. The communica-
tion overhead of these schemes, that do not rely on a trusted dealer, is high. Since
each of the n nodes needs to send a secret message to each of the other nodes, the
communication overhead is at least O(n2) (if all nodes are within direct communi-
cation range). A distributed approach to provide all nodes in a MANET with secret
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shares is therefore only suitable for small MANETs. It is in general favourable to
distribute secret shares during the pre-configuration phase of a MANET, where a
trusted dealer can compute and distribute the secret shares to the nodes.
In MANETs where nodes are likely to join and leave groups, a dynamic admission
and revocation of nodes (secret shares) is required. Castelluccia et al. [32] proposed
a protocol for member admission by k + 1 secret share holders, i.e., an increase of
n without the intervention of a dealer. The scheme is based on sub-protocols from
Kong et al. [78] and Luo et al. [86], which come with the drawback that only one
malicious node of the contributing nodes can cause the protocol to produce a useless
secret share for the requesting node. The use of a symmetric bivariate polynomial for
a (k, n)-threshold scheme was proposed by Saxena et al. [125] and Daza et al. [43]. If
a malicious node contributes a wrong secret share in these protocols, further nodes
can be contacted and wrong secret shares can be detected.
While node admission can be performed dynamically and efficiently by the col-
laboration of k + 1 nodes, there is no known technique to efficiently revoke secret
shares. The only method to truly revoke a secret share is to refresh all secret shares,
leaving out the revoked one. This requires the same effort as to initially distribute
secret shares, and cannot be performed in an efficient way without a trusted dealer.
The same holds for merging and splitting of groups, which can only be established by
creating a new secret with new secret shares. More dynamic secret sharing schemes
are desirable to facilitate the use of more dynamic distributed TAs in MANETs. In
this thesis we restrict ourselves to the use of secret sharing schemes, as this is required
to implement a distributed trusted authority (see Chapter 4). The development of
more flexible secret sharing schemes is discussed as future work in Chapter 8.
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2.5.2 Group access control
Group access control is the direct application of a secret sharing scheme in MANETs.
Once a secret is distributed, the secret share holders form a group; holding a secret
share means to be a group member. However, group access control is more than
secret sharing, it can use additional techniques to organise the group, for example
to fix the weakness of inefficient revocation.
Recent papers on group access control have been published by Saxena et al.
[124, 53, 54], Kim et al. [76] and Narasimha et al. [94]. The most studied topic in
this area is node admission, which can be realised in an efficient way. However, the
“headache” of node revocation (as Saxena puts it) is only studied in more depth in
[125].
Saxena et al. propose in their work [125] to keep membership revocation lists and
to validate on each operation whether a node is still an “unrevoked” member or not.
Consequently, nodes are technically not revoked, but only written on a “black-list”.
While this approach avoids the cost for a complete key refreshing, it might increase
the risk that the number of malicious nodes reaches t+1. At the latest when t nodes
are on the membership revocation list, the keys need to be renewed anyway.
Once in place, secret shares of a group can not only be used for distributed
computations such as distributed signatures, they can also be used for pairwise key
establishment and encryption. Each secret share is issued with a public witness
value that allows nodes to validate their secret share’s correctness when receiving
it. Consequently, the secret share can be used as a private key, and the public
witness value as the corresponding public key; this allows nodes to send encrypted
messages (with the public key) to the owner of the corresponding secret share.
Furthermore, based on their secret shares, each pair of nodes in the MANET can
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non-interactively compute a symmetric shared key. This key can be used for secure
inter-node communication. For details we refer to [54].
2.5.3 Signatures
Digital signatures allow one party or a group of nodes to sign a message, which can
then be verified by other nodes as the signature of this one specific node or of the
group of nodes. The group of potential verifiers can either be all nodes, a designated
group of nodes or only one specific node.
For MANETs, the crucial properties of signature schemes are the signature length
and the required computational effort to sign and to verify a signature. Traditional
signature schemes required a signature length of 1024 or 2048 bit to be unbreakable
on today’s computers. In 2001, Boneh et al. [25] proposed the first encryption scheme
based on pairings. Pairing-based signature schemes allow secure signatures of 160
bit. Several signature schemes based on pairings have been proposed to meet all
varieties of requirements for a signature scheme. A good overview on pairing-based
cryptography can be found in “The pairing-based crypto lounge” [12].
Distributed signature schemes suitable for MANETs were introduced by Crescenzo
et al. [55, 41, 40]. These schemes build on secret sharing as introduced in Sec-
tion 2.5.1, and adopt the security properties and the (in)flexibility of secret sharing
schemes. Distributed signature schemes are consequently secure against k malicious
nodes, and the parameter k is chosen fixed for the whole group. As mentioned
before, more flexible distributed protocols are desirable for MANETs.
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2.5.4 Network layer protocols
So far we have discussed (cryptographic) distributed protocols which are located in
the transport layer of the network stack. While in cryptographic protocols security
is the major concern, the first design goal of protocols in the network layer (e.g.,
routing and clustering) is reliability and efficiency. In Section 2.4.1 we already
reviewed the literature on cluster algorithms for MANETs and showed that security
is neglected in existing cluster algorithms for MANETs. In this section we give an
overview on secure routing algorithms for MANETs.
Routing protocols Routing protocols have been extensively studied in the last
10 years, and numerous proactive [102, 35, 37] and reactive [103, 71, 72, 136, 99] pro-
tocols were proposed. Furthermore, methods to statistically determine stable paths
in routing protocols were proposed [60]. Many of these protocols are reasonably
reliable and efficient in specific environments, and even hybrid protocols [107, 133]
have been proposed to combine the strengths of different approaches.
While routing protocols have been traditionally optimised for reliability and ef-
ficiency, the security of routing protocols has attracted stronger interest in recent
years. A routing protocol is secure if an attacker cannot control the process of route
establishment. SAODV [150][151] is one of the few routing protocols that provides
an example of routing protocol security. It uses hash chains to avoid manipula-
tion of hop counts in route discovery messages, and digital signatures are used for
the immutable parts of these messages to provide end-to-end confirmation that the
request reached the owner of the address. SLSP [98] is an example of a security
mechanism for a proactive routing protocol. It uses signatures on link state update
messages to avoid manipulation of the topology information. The SAODV solution
is focused on verifying the validity of the path, whereas the SLSP approach is based
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on determining the correctness of the network topology. In both cases, the existence
of a PKI is assumed.
2.6 Attacks
MANETs provide many points of attack due to the communication over a wireless
channel and altering network topology. In this section we first give an overview of
attacks on cryptographic protocols. We continue with attacks on keys, including
attacks on key distribution and on identities in MANETs. Since distributed trust
authorities appear to be a powerful and widely used tool for key and certificate
management, we conclude our overview with attacks on distributed trust authorities.
2.6.1 Attacks on key distribution
Keys are the foundation of cryptographic protocols, and an adversary can invali-
date the security of the network by holding enough keys. This is especially true for
threshold secret sharing schemes as introduced in Section 2.5.1, where the adversary
requires k + 1 secret keys to take control over security-critical computations. Key
distribution protocols must therefore ensure, that keys are only distributed to, or ex-
changed with, authenticated parties. In Section 2.3 we introduced the Diffie-Hellman
protocol [121] for pairwise key exchange over an insecure channel. Two parties who
want to exchange a pairwise key do not authenticate each others’ identities in this
protocol, making the protocol vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. If authen-
tication is required to obtain a key, the adversary’s only chance of getting a key is
to compromise a node. Once the adversary holds one or several nodes due to node
compromise, it will try to gain the most benefit out of its keys. Known attacks that
aggregate the power of single compromised keys are the:
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• Sybil attack [47];
• node replication attack [100];
• key-swapping collusion attack [92].
In a Sybil attack, one attacking node holds multiple identities to gain a dispropor-
tionately large influence in the network. An adversary that controls one physical
device tries to act as different identities using this one device. In a node replication
attack, one compromised node is physically copied several times. One stolen identity
with respective key material can therefore be used in different physical locations in
the network. In a key-swapping collusion attack, compromised nodes collaborate to
cascade the adversary’s impact. Malicious nodes can use keys from other malicious
nodes to communicate with good nodes, allowing them to communicate with nodes
they share no key with. Furthermore, the malicious nodes can avoid detection by
using keys that do not belong to their physical location.
If an adversary has got one or several keys due to node compromise, the good
nodes might detect a suspicious behaviour by using an Intrustion Detection System
(IDS). If a malicious node is detected, there are two ways to deal with it: Firstly, the
good nodes could do nothing for the moment, because it might technically not be
possible to deactivate single keys; during a later global key refreshing, the malicious
nodes could then be excluded. Secondly, a revocation mechanism could be used to
dynamically revoke nodes, i.e., deactivate their keys. In this case, an elaborated
decision process needs to be implemented in the network that allows good nodes to
revoke bad nodes, but if possible not vice versa. A comprehensive survey on key
deactivation strategies in MANETs can be found in [10].
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2.6.2 Attacks on cryptographic protocols
Today’s cryptographic protocols are usually proven to be secure in an adversary
model that gives the attacking node(s) a set of capabilities to break the protocol.
These models include the Standard Model in which an attacker is only limited by
time and computational power (expressed by the complexity of a protocol), and
the Random Oracle Model [15] in which an oracle responds to every query of an
attacker with a random and uniformly distributed answer from the possible outputs.
Breaking the protocol is then proven to be at least as difficult as solving a well known
mathematical problem. Therefore, such protocols are secure within the adversary
model as long as the assumptions about used cryptographic primitives hold.
An important primitive in many cryptographic protocols is a hash function, that
take a string of arbitrary length as input and produces a pseudorandom output
string of defined length. If an attacker can predict the output of a hash function,
this might enable him to attack the whole protocol. An attacker will therefore try
to find weaknesses of the protocols beyond the security model.
An attack beyond the scope of the protocol is a Sybil attack (Section 2.6.1), that
allows one node to have several identities. A single node having k + 1 identities
in a secret sharing scheme can then control the protocol on its own. The attacks
described in the remainder of this section are such attacks that go beyond the scope
of cryptographic protocols: Attacks on keys affect the basis of protocols, and attacks
on distributed TAs help the attacker to maximise the influence of his nodes. The
prevention of these attacks is therefore as important as the security of cryptographic
protocols.
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2.6.3 Attacks on dynamicly distributed trust authorities
In Section 2.4 we discussed the benefits of a distributed TA in MANETs. If the
distributed TA is established dynamically, i.e., during deployment, the members of
the TA are determined by a cluster algorithm. Cluster algorithms however base
upon communication, and an attacker has manifold possibilities to manipulate this
communication. The attacker can:
• replay messages from other nodes to confuse them about their neighbour re-
lationships;
• send messages under wrong identities to influence the choice of TA members;
• cheat about malicious nodes’ properties to make them attractive TA aspirants.
Replaying messages has only minor influence on the cluster establishment. Some
nodes might connect to cluster heads that are more hops away than expected, but
the impact on the choice of the CHs is marginal. Furthermore, the malicious nodes
have a high risk of being detected if an intrusion detection system with triangulation
for position estimation is used.
Creating messages under wrong identities has direct impact on the choice of the
CHs. This attack needs to be prevented by an authentic message exchange, i.e.,
cluster messages need to be authenticated. As a consequence, we claim that cluster
algorithms for security services require authenticated message exchange.
Nodes can cheat about their own properties, for example the number of their
neighbours, to be promoted as TA nodes. Cheating about own properties cannot be
prevented and is hard to detect.
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2.6.4 Adversary models
In Section 2.6.2 we have mentioned adversary models that are commonly used to
prove security of cryptographic protocols. Adversary models reflect certain capa-
bilities of an attacker, and a protocol is secure in an adversary model if it can resist
any attack within the defined attacker’s capabilities. Adversary models therefore
provide a framework for clearly defining the security properties of protocols, which
is crucial in the complex environment of MANETs.
Attackers vary in their capabilities, and an adversary model might contain a
certain percentage of different classes of attacker. The concrete categorisation of
attackers depends on the respective protocol. General classes of attacker are passive
attackers, active attackers and Byzantine attackers. In an adversary model, the
adversary is an abstract entity that controls a certain number of attacking nodes.
We will stick to these terms, i.e., an adversary is the abstract entity and an attacker
or attacking node is the physical entity that runs the attack. We give a rough
categorisation of adversaries that needs to be refined depending on the respective
protocol.
• A passive adversary (also called honest-but-curious) will only eavesdrop on the
network communication.
• An active adversary may use the corrupted nodes to prevent the normal func-
tioning of the network via snooping, dropping, modifying, and/or fabricating
network messages. Nodes that are actively involved in such attacks and the
corresponding faults are called malicious or Byzantine.
• A combined adversary controls a number of nodes that only eavesdrop as well
as another set of nodes that runs active attacks.
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A further categorisation of the adversaries might be required due to different node
capabilities. An assumption that holds in many MANET environments is that at-
tacking nodes have the same computational and communicational capabilities as the
honest nodes. Unless otherwise defined, we assume in this thesis that attackers have
the same capabilities as honest nodes; in particular, we think of malicious nodes as
compromised nodes which consequently have the same capabilities as honest nodes.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter we have given an overview and discussed the challenges of design-
ing distributed protocols for MANETs. We started by defining the specific type of
MANETs we focus on in this thesis, so called Tactical MANETs, which have high se-
curity requirements but typically benefit from pre-configuration. We have identified
the characteristics of symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography which facilitate
the development of efficient protocols suitable for power-constrained devices. The
distribution of symmetric and asymmetric key material is a major issue in MANETs;
we have given an overview of existing key distribution techniques and have shown
the importance of distributed trust authorities. After an overview of distributed
trust authorities, we introduced the concept of secret sharing which provides the
basis for the development of secure distributed protocols. Finally, we have reviewed
the most important attacks in MANETs.
52
Chapter 3
Simulation environment for Tacti-
cal MANETs
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In this chapter we discuss the challenges in developing simulators for MANETs.
We introduce two extensions to the physical layer of the network simulator NS-2:
a lightweight ray optical radio propagation model and a group mobility model. We
furthermore define simulation scenarios that are used in Part I of the thesis to
investigate and validate network protocols.
Simulations are an important tool to evaluate the performance and reliability
of network protocols in MANETs, where topology changes and their impact on
protocols are unpredictable. Ongoing changes in communication protocols (e.g.,
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802.11) and new capabilities of network devices require the continuous adaptation
of network simulation tools.
The main challenge in developing network simulators is modelling the physical
layer. As soon as the physical layer is simulated, protocols from all higher levels
can be correctly implemented in exactly the same way as they are implemented
on real devices. Results from network simulators have to be handled with care.
The simulation of the physical layer can only provide an approximation of reality.
Mistakes that are made in simulating the physical layer may cause amplified mistakes
in the network layer, and so on throughout the network stack. Factors that need to be
simulated in the physical layer are the movement of the nodes and the transmission of
radio waves used for wireless communication. Taken together, these factors yield an
approximate model for the physical layer. In Section 3.1 we introduce our extensions
of the physical layer in NS-2, which allow us to implement the simulation scenarios
defined in Section 3.2. We use these simulation scenarios to validate the efficiency
and reliability of the network protocols investigated in Part I of this thesis.
3.1 Modelling the physical layer
As stated above, the main factors that need to be modelled in the physical layer are
the movement of the network nodes and the radio wave propagation.
The movement of the nodes in mobile networks is simulated by mobility models.
Mobility models are typically separated from network simulators, so that each mo-
bility model can be used for several network simulators. In Section 3.1.1 we discuss
why most of the mobility models used in today’s simulations are unsuitable to give
a good approximation of a military network, and we develop a new group mobility
model suitable for Tactical MANETs.
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In Section 3.1.2 we introduce our radio propagation model, which is particularly
suitable to model urban environments. The interested reader can find a comprehen-
sive overview of network simulators and their usage in [79].
3.1.1 Mobility model
Although network simulators have been an essential element of research in MANETs
for about ten years, mobility models are still surprisingly limited, with the most
commonly used model being a random waypoint model. As a result, many state-
ments about the behaviour of MANETs that are based on such simulations may be
questionable. We develop a suitable mobility model for tactical networks incorpo-
rating both environmental constraints and tactical doctrine. While sometimes the
argument is made that random mobility provides the worst case scenario for proto-
cols, we claim that one of the worst case scenarios is provided by groups in urban
environments. In these scenarios groups are likely to be separated, obstacles may
abruptly cut communication links, and high node densities may cause an overload
of the wireless communication channel. In this section we introduce our Coalition
Mobility Model (CMM), and define simulation scenarios showing the capabilities of
the CMM in Section 3.2.
3.1.1.1 Background
Research in mobility models has resulted in a number of models ranging from proba-
bilistic to completely deterministic. Random mobility models represent (almost)
probabilistic models since the movements of the nodes is only bound to a few para-
meters such as the variance of a Gaussian distribution or some constraints which keep
the nodes in a bounded area; see [28] for a survey and simulation-based comparison
of random mobility models, [16] for a concise categorisation of mobility models in
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general, and [6] for a good recent survey on mobility models in tactical networks.
One of the most utilised probabilistic models is the Random Waypoint Model [95,
17], in which nodes trace positions which are determined by a uniform distribution.
Since the nodes in this model use the shortest path to reach their destination, node
density in the centre of the simulation area tends to be higher than in marginal
regions. The Random Direction Model [122] attempts to avoid this behaviour by
sending the nodes on a “detour” via the border of the simulation area.
All of these random models are configurable by few parameters such as the
variance of the Gaussian distribution and provide basic mobility patterns for net-
work simulators. A more deterministic movement strategy is provided by the Graph
Model [135], which restricts the nodes to move randomly on predefined trails. Ex-
tensions of this model are commonly used in mobile Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks
(VANETs), where the nodes (cars) are stopping at cross-ways to simulate traffic
lights [106] or move smoothly through curves to simulate bends in the road [16]. Re-
cently, two easy-to-use VANET mobility generators have been implemented [104],
[13], which facilitate the automatic generation of VANET mobility files.
A topography-aware mobility model was proposed by Jardosh et al. [69, 70].
In Jardosh’s Obstacle Mobility Model, buildings are modelled as polygons, and the
transmission between two nodes is interrupted or highly attenuated if their line-of-
sight is intersected by a polygon. The nodes are either allowed to walk on predefined
trails or reach their randomly defined aim by the shortest pathway through the obsta-
cle area. An elaborated mobility model for desaster area scenarios was proposed by
Aschenbruck et al. [5]. Their model supports heterogeneous area-based movement on
optimal paths avoiding obstacles with joining and leaving nodes. Aschenbruck et al.
show how packet loss and data throughput is influenced by heterogeneous node
mobility.
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Certainly, the most realistic mobility model is one that directly reflects real
movements from mobility traces as proposed by Tuduce and Gross [137] and by
Lu et al. [84]. Their models use traces that are taken from real movements, trans-
ferring them in a mobility file which can be processed by the according network
simulator. However, generating these traces is very expensive and restricts the sim-
ulations to some available trace files.
All previously described mobility models treat nodes independently and thus
do not provide any group movement. A generalisation of these models are group
models, in which every node moves relative to the logical centre of a group, while
the movement of this logical centre can be provided by any of the models above.
Consequently, group mobility models need to handle both the movement of the
group centre and inter-group movements. They are therefore harder to implement
and less well-studied so far.
The first group mobility model for MANETs, the Reference Point Group Mobility
Model (RPGMM), was proposed by Hong et al. [65] in 1999. In the RPGMM, each
group has a logical centre and the nodes are randomly but uniquely distributed,
moving around the group centre. Wang and Li [140] extended the RPGMM to their
Reference Velocity Group Mobility Model, in which the movements of the nodes in
the group are dependent on each others’ velocities. Blakely and Lowekamp [20] fix
the relative positions of the nodes to the group centre in their Structured Group
Mobility Model.
A first model that allows nodes to change groups was proposed by Biao et al.
[18], but the relative position of the nodes to their group centre is not discussed.
Recently, Orchisuren et al. [96] proposed an actor-based group mobility model based
on RPGMM. In their model, movements of single nodes in the group are influenced
by the velocity of the group centre and a random factor that reflects unpredictable
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influences on the movement of single nodes. In 2006, Williams and Huang [142]
proposed the first group mobility model that combines group mobility and obstacles.
They refer to the RPGMM, but use repulsion forces to avoid collusions with other
nodes and obstacles.
In all existing group mobility models, the nodes are either in a fix relative position
to the group centre or perform random movements within their group. While these
approaches are suitable to model groups in which each node moves autonomously
within the boundaries of the group, they cannot reflect structured group movements
(as in military and emergency response networks and processions). We therefore
propose a mobility model that is based on Hong’s RPGMM but replace the random
mobility within the group with flexible formations.
Several basic implementations, especially of the random mobility models, can be
found in network simulators. In this thesis we use the simulator NS-2[51], which
offers the possibility to either create totally deterministic movements by writing
every single movement directly in the simulation script, or to generate a random
waypoint scenario with the script setdest. More modular and reusable software
for this purpose is provided by the tools BonnMotion [138] and CanuMobiSim [29].
Both tools are Java-based mobility generators, which provide several random models
as well as the possibility to generate mobility files for several common network
simulators including NS-2. Moreover, CanuMobiSim provides a graph model, where
the graph can either be read from a separate file or directly from an XML file. Due to
this functionality, CanuMobiSim was chosed as the basis for our implementantion.
3.1.1.2 Model and implementation
In Tactical MANETs, envisaged in military and emergency response networks, the
participants (nodes) are likely to move in groups, which split up, coalesce, and lose
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or add single members. As noted in Section 3.1.1.1, a number of random mobility
models for pairwise independent node movements have been developed, while the
investigation of group mobility models is limited to models that only provide random
or no mobility within the group.
In this section we extend the basic idea of the RPGMM and report on a new
Coalition Mobility Model (CMM), which is designed to be used in conjunction with
our topography aware propagation model [114] (both for use on the mobile nodes
and to provide more realistic simulations). We illustrate our mobility model using
a hierarchicly organised platoon. We note, however, that the mobility model can be
used to model any MANET that is organised in one or several groups.
The doctrine for the tactical movements of military formations as described in
[61] is to hierarchically organise nodes into one or more formations. Formations are
arrangements of soldiers and organised subgroups. Leaders choose formations based
on their analysis of the terrain, the likelihood of enemy contact and the need for
speed. The smallest group in an infantry operation is the fire team. Fire teams
typically consist of four soldiers that follow the orders of the team leader. Squads
form the next group in the hierarchy and consist of fire teams and a squad leader.
Squad formations describe the relationships between the fire teams in the squad.
Finally, platoons present the highest group in this hierarchy and consist of squads
in special formations, the platoon leader and other additional soldiers such as the
platoon sergeant or a machine gun crew.
squad leader
team leader team leader
| {z } | {z }
wedge-left wedge-right
Figure 3.1: Squad in formation “squad line”.
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Figure 3.1 shows one possible formation for a squad that is organised as a line. In
order to enable the modelling of arbitrary tactical units with changing formations,
our implementation of CMM contains a flexible and reusable definition of a group.
The entire mobility model, including the groups with their different formations, are
defined in an XML file. A group, as considered in CMM is defined in the Extended
Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) as follows:
distance = “real number”
angle = “real number”
name = “string”
node = distance angle
formation = name {{node} {group distance angle}}
group = name formation {formation}
According to this definition, every node has a fixed desired position in its formation,
which is described by the distance to the group centre and the angle relative to
the direction of the group motion. A formation itself can also contain complete
(sub)groups that are also positioned relatively to the group centre via distance
and angle. Finally, a group contains at least one formation. In the case of fire
teams, squads and platoons, the group “fire team” could contain several formations
with four nodes. The higher-levelled group “squad” could then consist of two “fire
team” groups and an additional node as “squad leader”, while the highest level
group “platoon” could consist of nodes, “fire team” groups and “squad” groups.
Finally, for completion of the CMM, the movement of the group centres needs
to be defined. We use an extension of the Graph Model, which has already been
implemented in the mobility framework CanuMobiSim by Stepanov et al. [29]. The
nodes in this model are restricted to walk on edges of a connected graph, i.e., there
exists a path between each two vertices on the graph. In Stepanov’s graph model
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[131], every node chooses the next destination vertex uniformly distributed under all
vertices, and traces its aiming point on the shortest path. Given that pathways in
tactical networks are typically not chosen randomly, and for simulating well-specified
scenarios, the routes in the CMM are predefined. Moreover, the CMM supports the
consideration of several groups with independent configurations, so that, e.g., several
taskforces could walk on different predefined routes. The CMM deliberately does not
consider the influence of the topography such as buildings or vegetation. Feasibly
complex realisations, such as nodes bouncing on walls or finding the shortest path
quoin by quoin are not realistic, while more suitable models tend to be very complex
and are subject of ongoing research. Instead we propose the consideration of the
topography separately during the simulation calculation. According to a predefined
topographical area, the edges of the graph and the group-configurations can be
determined manually.
Implementation We have implemented the CMM as an extension of the frame-
work CanuMobiSim [29], which already contains random mobility models and a
graph mobility model. An essential feature of CanuMobiSim is the configuration
of the respective mobility model in a XML file. We have extended the scope of
this XML file to include the description of groups and additional parameters for the
CMM. The configuration strategy of a group as defined in EBNF previously allows
the re-use of groups of arbitrary depth and thus enables an almost deterministic,
but still manageable setup of the CMM. Further extensions of the CMM, such as the
changing of nodes between groups or the collection of nodes, can be implemented as
required.
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3.1.1.3 Summary
We have defined our Coalition Mobility Model CMM that facilitates the generation
of formation-based group mobility files for NS-2and other network simulators by
the configuration of an XML file. Several hierarchically organised groups can be
defined in combination with other mobility patterns as provided by the framework
CanuMobiSim. Implementing our model in CanuMobiSim allows an easy extension
for further mobility patterns, which are discussed in Section 8.2.1.
3.1.2 Ray-optical propagation model
Even though highly accurate models of radio signal propagation exist, these mo-
delling and simulation environments are of considerable computational complexity
and are therefore unsuitable for the incorporation into real-time protocols, particu-
larly on resource-constrained platforms such as MANET nodes. We have therefore
proposed a simplified ray-optical signal propagation model in [113] which takes into
accound the position of nodes as well as topographical information, but does not in-
corporate a comprehensive model of physical effects. We have implement the model
as a module of NS-2, facilitating an easy integration of our model into NS-2. The
core part of our ray-optical propagation model was implemented in the master thesis
of Reidt [113]. Improvements regarding efficiency and accuracy were performed in
this thesis as well as the validation of the model against real test data. We use the
model for the simulations in this thesis; the implemented scenarios are defined in
Section 3.2.
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3.1.2.1 Background
Hoppe et al. [67] introduced a ray optical propagation model that takes into account
both reflection and deflection effects on buildings. This model requires the pre-
processing of the environment, which by far exceeds the computational capabilities
of mobile devices. Pre-processing the data on a powerful server and then storing it
on the mobile device is infeasible due to the size of the pre-processed data. The use
of this model is therefore restricted to the use of powerful computers or to devices
that allow the storage or sending of huge amounts of data is possible. The accuracy
of this model was verified in [130] and [111], showing the potential of the approach
to model radio propagation by a ray optical model. The model was further extended
by Hoppe et al. for the use in indoor environments in [66] and [110].
Dhoutaut et al. [44] propose the use of the Shadowing-Pattern Model to simu-
late radio wave propagation in VANETs where packet losses occur frequently. This
model takes into account most possible types of disturbances while keeping a low
computational cost and allowing the easy tuning of any particular disturbance inde-
pendently of all others. The model is probabilistic and therefore especially useful for
VANETs, where disturbance effects are highly correlated with the density of cars,
and where typical characteristics of streets allow similar configuration of the model
for most VANET scenarios. In Tactical MANETs however, it is difficult to estimate
the required configuration parameters of the model. Furthermore, the probabilistic
approach cannot take disturbances into account, such as the interruption of signals
by buildings in a city.
As noted above, current signal propagation models are typically optimised for
high accuracy and they are not intended for use in a resource-constrained environ-
ment in which computations must be performed within a near-real-time interval.
However, in the following we briefly review several models which are widely used
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and which partly form the basis for the ray-optical model as described in Section
3.1.2.2. The models discussed here are typically suitable for describing propagation
over arbitrary distances and at frequencies ranging from 1 MHz to 40 GHz unless
noted otherwise.
The Free Space model [51] assumes a line-of-sight connection between sender
and receiver node without consideration for other influences. Based on these as-
sumptions, the model calculates the power transmitted by the direct line-of-sight
connection between sender and receiver. The equation for calculating the power P
for a distance d is qualitatively given by P (r) ∼ 1/d2. The Two Ray Ground
model [51] is a direct extension of the Free Space model which also takes ground
reflection of radio waves into consideration [8]. It is based on the assumption of
horizontally polarised radio waves, and the power P at distance d is qualitatively
given by P (r) ∼ 1/d4.
The Shadowing model [51] used in the NS-2network simulator includes line-of-
sight components and time-dependent parasitics and scattering. The equation for
calculating the receiving power is qualitatively given by P (d) ∼ 1/dβ · X, where
0 < β ∈ R provides a configurable parameter for adjusting the parasitics, and where
X is a random variable modelling scattering.
The COST Walfish Ikegami [8] model considers obstacles such as buildings in
the vertical plane and effects such as multiple diffraction over rooftops between the
transmitter and the receiver node. The transmitter node is assumed to be 4 metre
to 50 metre above the ground and the distance between nodes needs to be at least
20 metre. This model is therefore mostly constrained to environments in which the
transmitter is located on a rooftop or similarly elevated terrain feature.
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3.1.2.2 Model
In the ray-optical propagation model introduced by Reidt [113], a 2D ray-tracing
approach is used to develop a simplified but efficient radio propagation model. Ac-
cording to [90] and [56], this approach is defensible under three main conditions:
1. The used frequency band is beyond 1 GHz.
2. Considered surfaces are large in comparison to the wavelength.
3. The surface structures of individual terrain features are approximately con-
stant.
The first condition is satisfied for the ISO 802.11 (a/b/g/h) series of standards
(which use bands from 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz and 5.15 GHz to 5.85 GHz, respec-
tively). The appropriate wavelength of approximately 10 cm at these frequencies
is substantially smaller than the topographic objects such as buildings. Further-
more, the model as specified by Reidt [113] provides only uniform surfaces and does
not include additional modifiers such as surface textures. Therefore, it also satisies
condition (iii). A further simplification for efficiency is the restriction to vertical
surfaces. This simplification allows to store a 2D instead of a 3D map and to use
a 2D instead of a 3D raycasting algorithm. In the following section we validate the
accuracy of the model of Reidt. A detailed description of the model can be found
in [113].
3.1.2.3 Evaluation and analysis
Based on the implementation of our propagation model in NS-2, we now discuss re-
sults on the quality of the approximation achieved by the model, as well as empirical
data on the performance of the model.
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3.1.2.4 Evaluation of calculations
The analysis in [113] has shown the consistency of reflection and deflection factors of
the ray-optical propagation with data found in the literature [56]. Beyond this theo-
retical evaluation, we now report validation results from actual field measurements
based on two experiments as reported in [4].
Scenario with obstacles Following the illustration of reflection and deflection
factors, which form the main part of the calculations, we next compare the re-
sults of our model to measurements from two scenarios. The first scenario in Fig-
ure 3.2(a) shows a building and two nodes, representing the sender (dotted circle)
and the receiver (crossed circle) [4, Section 3.2.9]. Both sender and transmitter are
portable computers equipped with standard 802.11 (a/b) network interfaces. While
the sender has a fixed position, the receiver moves away, following the line parellel
to the rectangle (building) in this scenario.
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Figure 3.2: Test scenarios.
The power values are measured in the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
[11], so that all power values originally had to be measured in RSSI and transformed
to dBm. Unfortunately, there is no standard for transforming RSSI into dBm or
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mW. Typically each card manufacturer defines its own relation between RSSI and
dBm. This circumstance could be the reason for the almost constant difference of
10 dBm between the measured, and the calculated power values in Figure 3.3 and
Figure 3.4. Another reason for this difference could be the ground in the simulation
scenarios. While the Two Ray Ground model assumes level ground, the ground
surface in the experiments was somewhat uneven and covered with vegetation. As
shown in [4], there is a gap of almost 10 dBm between measurements on concrete
surfaces as opposed to grass; the reason for this is the different permittivity of
concrete and grass. While grass is absorbing much of the transmitted power, concrete
and similar substances are reflecting most of it. Moreover, the transmitting power
of the sender with a maximum transmitting power of 100 mW was not explicitly
defined in [4]. However, we based our calculations on a transmitting power of 100
mW, and compensated for the 10 dBm gap; this gap does, however, indicate the
desirability of choosing basic propagation parameters carefully and may indicate a
need for incorporating ground permittivity in our constrained model.
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Figure 3.3: Test series 1.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the corresponding power values of the measurements and
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the calculation for the first scenario. Each black cross represents one of the mea-
surements, which were done in a distance of 1 m, and the red squares are the mean
power values for one distance measured in metres. Additionally, the stars show the
results of a measurement done under the same conditions but without any obstacles.
The calculations, which were performed using the ray-optical propagation model, are
illustrated by the dashed line. Apart from the gap of 10 dBm described above, the
curve of the calculated values provides a good fit for the measured values. Owing
to simplifications in our model, it is not possible to take interference effects into
account. Thus, the curve of the calculated values shows a very smooth behaviour,
whereas the measurements show interference patterns, most prominently caused by
ground reflection.
Deflection scenario While the propagation in the first scenario was dominated
by the direct line-of-sight and the reflection on the ground as well as on the building,
the second scenario illustrates the deflection on a house corner (Figure 3.2(b)). While
the sender has a fixed position, the receiver is moving behind the building, following
the line parallel to the building as before.
As already seen in the first scenario, the curve of the calculated values shows a
very smooth behaviour. However, calculated values of our model show a good fit to
measured values. After 5.7 m the receiver loses its line-of-sight connection to the
sender, resulting in a significant decrease of the receiving power.
The data of the investigated scenarios indicates a high degree of fidelity achieved
by our constrained model compared to field measurements. However, we observed
that parameters of the underlying Free Space model and Two Ray Ground model
need to be chosen carefully. Additional parameters for a future improvement of the
model are discussed in Section 8.2.2.
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3.1.2.5 Computation Periods
All computations were performed on a Pentium Centrino 1.7 GHz processor with
1 GB of main memory. It should be noted that the resources required for our model
including shape file handling do not exceed 5–10 MB depending on the complexity
and size of the terrain model.
Figure 3.5 shows the result of a single calculation, which was performed with the
help of our iNSpect extension [93]. The scenario shows a 600 m× 600 m square of the
centre of London and contains 180 faces and 25 nodes. Such calculations are to be
performed on PDAs or other mobile resource constrained devices to improve routing
strategies. Table 3.1 lists computation periods based on the scenario described
above. Although current PDAs perform at 20–40 % of the performance levels of our
test system, improvements in equipment and ongoing optimisation of our algorithms
and implementation will significantly reduce the computation times exhibited by
our proof of concept model. Results on single routes, however, can already be used
effectively for improving existing routing strategies.
69
3.1 Modelling the physical layer
Figure 3.5: Connectivity between nodes.
Table 3.1: Computation periods.
Description Time [sec]
Power transmitted between two single nodes 0.01
Multihop route with 3 hops 0.025
Multihop route with 5 hops 0.0375
Multihop route with 7 hops 0.05
Connections between all nodes in Figure 3.5 0.6
3.1.2.6 Summary
Based on earlier work [113], we have validated the accuracy and computational
efficiency of our ray-optical propagation model which is especially suitable for urban
environments. Our evaluation shows the efficiency of our radio propagation model
while still obtaining good approximative results. The propagation model is used to
simulate urban MANET scenarios, as defined in Section 3.2. Furthermore, it can be
implemented on power constrained mobile devices to add valuable information about
the connectivity to network protocols, e.g., facilitating elaborated routing protocols
and more accurate intrusion detection systems.
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3.2 Simulation scenarios
In Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 we have defined an efficient ray optical propagation model
and a group mobility model that facilitates the generation of complex group move-
ments including formation changes. In this section we define simulation scenarios
that combine these two models to create more realistic simulation scenarios for mil-
itary networks.
3.2.1 Overview and purpose of simulation scenarios
The purpose of our simulation scenarios is to validate the efficiency and reliability
of network protocols in Part I of this thesis. These protocols include the cluster
algorithm in Chapter 4 and the distribution of key material in Chapter 5. Based on
our mobility model and the ray-optical propagation model, we define three simula-
tion scenarios. Each of the three simulation scenarios contains a platoon of 35 to 37
nodes that accomplishes a certain mission. The communication range is set to 50 m
by default, the nodes are represented by soldiers on foot with a speed between 0 m/s
and 3.5 m/s. In some of the simulations in later chapters, the communication range
might be altered. The mobile devices in the simulation scenarios are supposed to
be handheld-sized devices that are equipped with omnidirectional antennas, trans-
mitting at a frequency of 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz according to the ISO 802.11 (a/b/g/h)
series of standards.
Simulation Scenario 1 contains a platoon that performs several formation changes,
has enemy contact and splits up into two groups to traverse a danger area. The pur-
pose of this simulation scenario is to model a) altering distances between nodes
(soldiers) during formation changes, b) splitting and merging of a platoon, and c)
failure of single devices during enemy contact. Simulation Scenarios 2 and 3 also
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contain a platoon that splits into subgroups in a city (in two different intensities).
While the platoon in Scenario 2 splits into several small subgroups that contain at
least three soldiers, the platoon in Scenario 3 splits only into three bigger groups
(squads) that contain at least 10 soldiers. Scenario 2 represents a worst case scenario
for the connectivity of the network, as subgroups are cut-off from the communication
to other subgroups at several points. Scenario 3 represents a more realistic mission,
in which the platoon only splits in squads but the squads themselves remain as one
group. Indeed, Scenario 3 is the result from several discussions about Scenario 2 at
military conferences. Since the subgroups (squads) in this scenario traverse parallel
streets, nodes from different squads occasionally have eye-contact and the connec-
tivity of the network is better than in Scenario 2. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the
benchmarking data of the three simulation scenarios.
Table 3.2: Simulation scenario configurations.
Simulation Area #Nodes Range Duration Speed
1 700 m × 900 m 37 45 m 1350 s 0 to 3.5 m/s
2 600 m × 900 m 35 45 m 850 s 0 to 3.5 m/s
3 1200 m × 800 m 37 45 m 1300 s 0 to 3.5 m/s
3.2.2 Application of simulation scenarios
Simulation Scenarios 1 and 2 are used in Chapter 4 to develop a cluster algorithm
that provides a reliable cluster according to the number of cluster heads, the fre-
quency of cluster head changes and the proximity of usual network nodes to the
next cluster head. Scenario 1 is used to explore the influence of altering distances
between nodes, splitting and merging of the platoon and failure of single devices
during enemy contact on our cluster algorithm. As our cluster algorithm appeared
to easily cope with the topology changes in Scenario 1, we used the “harder” city
simulation Scenario 2 to investigate the behaviour of our cluster algorithm under
abrupt link breakdowns.
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Simulation Scenario 3 is used in Chapter 5 to simulate the distribution of key
material. The distribution of the keys without obstacles in Scenario 1 can be per-
formed without problems as the network is connected at all times in this Scenario.
Contrary, in our worst case Scenario 2, the distribution of the key material is not
possible as the network is never connected. Dissemination of the key material in
Chapter 5 is therefore only simulated in Scenario 3.
Further simulations that are based on Matlab1 are used in Part II of this thesis.
However, these are no network simulations that are based on mobility and radio
propagation. These simulations will be discussed in the in the respective Chapters.
3.2.3 Detailed description of simulation scenarios
In Simulation 1 (Figure 3.6) a group of 37 nodes traces a route through a hostile area
and performs formation changes accordingly. Simulations 2 and 3 contain 35 and
respectively 37 nodes, traversing an urban area (Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8). In all
three simulations, the group is organised as a platoon in which the common distance
of neighbouring nodes is 10 m. Movement techniques for “travelling”, enemy contact
and crossing danger areas of platoons were motivated by [61]. As nodes in these
simulations are typically represented by infantry on foot, the average speed of the
group was set to 2 m/s, while nodes are able to increase their speed up to 3.5 m/s
to build up or keep desired formations. We chose transmission power of the nodes
to 5 mW, yielding a maximum communication range in free space of approximately
45 m, due to the underlying ray optical propagation model (Section 3.1.2).
Screenshots of the respective simulations are shown in Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7
and Figure 3.8. The nodes are represented by grey and black spots; black nodes
represent members of a trusted authority and grey nodes represent non-TA nodes.
1http://www.mathworks.com
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Figure 3.6: Simulation 1: Platoon of soldiers traversing a hostile area.
Simulation scenario 1 Simulation 1 shows a platoon of 37 nodes, first moving
in formation “travelling”, then having enemy contact and finally passing a danger
area. The platoon starts moving at a speed of 2 m/s and stretches while accelerating
up to 3.5 m/s (Figure 3.6(a)). Due to an expected enemy contact, the platoon splits
up a short time later: two squads follow the lower path while the remaining two
squads trace the upper two paths. At second 700, the lower two squads change their
formation to a line due to enemy contact (Figure 3.6(b)). During this 120 seconds
procedure, the nodes are moving with an average speed of 0.1 m/s and their wireless
devices are likely to incur loose contacts or drop out totally. Thereupon, after
collating to a platoon again, the group divides to cross a danger area (Figure 3.6(c))
and forms up as a “travelling” platoon again (Figure 3.6(d)).
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(a) 380 sec
(b) 590 sec
(c) 825 sec
Figure 3.7: Simulation 2: Platoon of soldiers tracing a city area.
Simulation scenario 2 Simulation 2 shows a platoon of 35 nodes tracing a city
area, splitting up in groups of at least three nodes and re-grouping. Figure 3.7(a))
shows the imminent devision of the platoon in three squads after reaching the city
area. The nodes have decreased the distances between each other from the typical
10 m to 5 m, yielding a more compact network. 210 seconds later (Figure 3.7(b)),
the squads trace independent routes in between the buildings, while several fireteams
temporarily leave the squad to occupy further streets. Finally, the squad leaves the
urban area and falls back into the original formation (Figure 3.7(b)).
Simulation scenario 3 Simulation 3 shows a platoon of 37 nodes tracing a city
area and splitting up in three groups (squads) of 10 to 16 nodes. Figure 3.8(a) shows
the platoon in its original formation with the front and the centre squad heading for
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(d) 1030 sec (c) 760 sec (b) 315 sec (a) 65 sec
Figure 3.8: Simulation 3: Platoon of soldiers traversing a city area.
the upper street, and the trail squad heading for the southern street. 250 seconds
later (Figure 3.8(b)) the three squads have split up. The tail squad remains in the
southern street, the centre squad remains in the main street and the front squad
with 10 nodes occupies further streets while re-connecting to the centre squad from
time to time. Second 760 (Figure 3.8(c)) shows such a situation where the front
squad leaves the centre squad to occupy a parallel street in the north. Finally, the
squad falls back into the original formation on reaching the end of the streets (Figure
3.8(c)).
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed two extension to the network simulator NS-2: a
ray optical propagation model for the simulation of wireless data transmission and
our group mobility model CMM. Our propagation model facilitates modelling inter-
node communication in cities where buildings obstruct and reflect radio signals.
Our group mobility model allows to simulate group movements including formation
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changes and following pre-defined paths such as streets in a city. Based on these
two extensions, we have defined three simulation scenarios. Two of the simulations
scenarios contain a small military MANET in a city area, one contains a MANET in
a hostile area. The simulation scenarios are used in Chapters 4 and 5 to investigate
the influence of group partitions and abrupt communication breakdowns on the
respective protocols.
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Bootstrapping a distributed TA in
MANETs
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In this chapter we investigate the dynamic bootstrapping of a distributed trust
authority (TA) using cluster algorithms. We develop a cluster algorithm that avoids
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frequent cluster head (CH) changes, and achieves its security by incorporating a trust
metric in the cluster head election process.
4.1 Introduction
The design of a flexible network security architecture presents many challenges in
MANETs (see Section 2.4). In traditional network architectures, keys and certifi-
cates are distributed and controlled by a trusted central authority. In a MANET,
cut off from a hierarchical point of control, such a TA no longer exists. The natural
approach to provide an alternative to a central trust authority is to establish a trust
authority within the network. On the one hand, assigning a single node as the TA
exposes the whole network to get compromised if an adversary takes control over
this node. On the other hand, leaving every security critical task to the whole net-
work (by voting or by using distributed protocols), imposes a high communication
overhead. A promising tradeoff between security and efficiency can be realised with
a distributed TA, in which a subset of nodes acts as the TA on behalf of the entire
network.
In this chapter we investigate techniques to determine a subset of nodes to serve
as a distributed TA. This set of TA “members” can either be static and pre-elected,
or deployed online by a cluster algorithm. We show that existing cluster algorithms
impose an infeasibly high communication overhead on the network and change the
CHs too frequently to maintain a stable TA. We develop a cluster algorithm that
fixes these weaknesses and makes TA membership configurable by several metrics for
trust, battery capacity, signal strength, bandwidth and reachability. Depending on
the IDS’s accuracy, the incorporation of a trust metric provides robustness against
an active adversary.
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4.2 Overview of cluster algorithms and trust metrics
In Section 2.4 we provided an overview on existing approaches to the use of cluster
algorithms for the purpose of saving energy, enhancing routing protocols, finding
efficient flooding and broadcasting mechanism. Clustering in support of TA services
has been studied by Bechler [14] and Jiun [82]. TA “members” are assigned in
their proposals based on the number of neighbours. However, this approach lacks
security against an active adversary who attempts to control a large ratio of the
cluster heads: if the cluster algorithm allows nodes to assign themselves as CHs
based on the number of neighbours, the nodes can simply cheat about their number
of neighbours to assign themselves as cluster heads.
In this chapter we are interested in developing a cluster metric which, if used in
cluster algorithms, incorporates the security requirements for a distributed TA. The
metric is intended as an open collection of parameters which can be expanded as
required; the major parameter however, incorporating the aspect of security, is trust.
We therefore concentrate on trust metrics and constraints imposed by the Tactical
MANET environment itself, namely limited battery capacity and radio frequency
interface constraints.
Evaluation of the efficacy of the cluster metric is achieved by using the algorithm
reported in [3] for max-min d-cluster formation in wireless ad hoc networks. This
algorithm results in each node either being a CH itself or being at most d hops
away from a CH. The following briefly reviews related work on trust metrics, as this
partial metric is the most important one in the context of our system, and has also
been the most intensely studied.
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Trust Metrics This paragraph reviews a selection of trust metrics which have
been proposed in recent years. Since some of these have not been explicitly proposed
in the form of metrics, we have adapted them to provide consistent terminology. All
models share the use of a digraph-based representation with different vertex and
edge valuation interpretations.
One of the first trust metrics was proposed by Zimmermann [154] in 1995. Here,
nodes are keys of a public key system and the edges represent certificates. A user
assigns a value from the set {unknown, not trusted, marginally trusted, fully trusted}
to every key he retrieves. The reduction to only four different types of trust allows
the model to be easily implemented. However, Kohlas and Maurer [77] showed that
due to this simplicity, the model may deliver counter-intuitive results, e.g., that
similar chains of trust can lead to different results.
A seminal approach to define a trust metric in the form of a model for public-
key certification, trust and recommendations was defined by Maurer [91] in 1996.
Maurer established the syntax of certificates, recommendation, trust and authenticity
of public keys, which form the axioms of his model. Based on these axioms, two
intuitive inference rules are defined which permit drawing of transitive conclusions
from a set of given axioms. Since the initial model is binary, Maurer inserts the
consideration of confidence on a continuous scale between 0 and 1 in a second step.
While Maurer’s model considers chains of trust of arbitrary length and complexity,
it has an exponential complexity in the length of trust chains.
In order to enable a real implementation of Maurer’s model and a computation
without exponential complexity, Caronni [30] suggested several possible simplifica-
tions.
Maurer’s model can be considered quite simplistic regarding the choice of ax-
ioms. The set of axioms in the original version does not contain a time parameter,
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which is necessary for key revocation. Marchesini [88] addressed this issue and ex-
tended Maurer’s model using axioms for properties, time and domain, and thus
provided numerous additional abilities of the system, including key revocation. Bi-
cakci et al. [19] investigated the incorporation of certificate revocation in Maurer’s
model.
Recent further work on trust metrics includes research by Sun et al. [132] who
propose two axioms for trust models, namely that (1) concatenating trust values in
one path does not increase trust and that (2) multipath propagation of trust does
not reduce trust. Sun et al. propose two trust models which model trust as a value
between −1 and 1. However, both models can return counter-intuitive results, since
the concatenation of two negative trust values can result in a positive value in both
models. The second axiom of Sun et al. is not satisfied in several other trust models.
Abdul-Rahman [1] and Xiong [144] calculate the trust value as the average of the
values calculated from different paths. According to this, an additional positive but
low evidence value will reduce the resulting trust value and thus break Sun’s second
axiom.
Reiter [120] proposed an efficient trust model that does not require the evaluation
of complex trust links. In this model the metric is based on the idea that every chain
is only as strong as its weakest link. Thus the trust value representing a node’s trust
in another node is simply computed by adding the weakest links of all chains of trust
between these two nodes. However, this construction can lead to counterintuitive
results, e.g., many low trust values can add up to a high trust value.
Recently, Theodorakopoulos [134] proposed an algebraic trust framework. While
this approach is mathematically elegant, it remains unclear how to implement the
system.
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4.3 Assumptions and definitions
In this section we outline the design requirements that our cluster algorithm for TA
member selection must satisfy, describe the assumptions that we make about our
scheme, outline our adversary model and give definitions used to define our cluster
algorithm.
4.3.1 Design requirements
• Security: We require that our cluster algorithm is secure against an active
adversary as defined in Section 4.3.3.
• Efficiency: We require that the cluster algorithm is efficient enough to be run
on a MANET node with limited computational and battery capabilities.
• Reliability: We require that the cluster algorithm is robust under topology
changes and node failures, i.e., provides a set of CHs of almost constant size
and rarely changing CHs.
• Scalability: We require that the cluster algorithm is scalable with regards
to security and efficiency. While a platoon moving in one group through a
friendly area should be configured to save energy, security becomes the major
concern if enemy contact occurs.
4.3.2 Assumptions
• Pre-loaded keys: We assume the presence of a public key infrastructure that
facilitates nodes to sign cluster messages.
• Intrusion detection system: We assume that an intrusion detection system
is active on each node. This intrusion detection system continuously monitors
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the behaviour of neighbouring nodes, yielding in trust values (opinions) about
other nodes.
4.3.3 Adversary model
We desire a cluster algorithm to be secure against an active (Byzantine) adversary
(see Section 2.6.4). Attack possibilities against a bootstrapping mechanism of a
distributed TA have been discussed in Section 2.6.3; an attacker can:
• replay messages from other nodes to confuse them about their neighbour re-
lationships;
• send messages using wrong identities to influence the choice of TA members;
• cheat about malicious nodes’ properties to make them attractive TA aspirants.
Another critical attack which applies to most network protocols is the Sybil attack
in which one node holds several identities (see Section 2.6). We assume a network in
which the Sybil attack can be contained, for example by having a cost of entry. An
overview of these attacks and prevention techniques in the context of routing algo-
rithms is presented in [2]. To avoid receiving messages from wrong identities, cluster
messages need to be authenticated. Each cluster message is therefore signed with
the pre-loaded private key of the respective node. The sending of wrong information
(cheating) cannot be prevented beforehand and needs to be detected by an intrusion
detection system. Replaying cluster messages can be detected (under the assump-
tion of synchronised clocks) by timestamps in the cluster message. If synchronised
clocks of the MANET nodes cannot be assumed, an intrusion detection system must
be used. The results from the intrusion detection system are the input to our trust
metric. Based on gathered evidence both from a node’s intrusion detection system
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and from neighbour’s opinions, our trust metric allows each node to estimate other
nodes’ reliability and thus their eligibility as a possible cluster head.
4.3.4 Definitions
Ad hoc networks are commonly modeled as a graph G = (V,E), where V is the set
of vertices and E the set of edges. In order to investigate the convergence behaviour
of our model we propose the following extensions:
Definition 1 (Quality factor) The quality factor rij ∈ [0, 1] describes the belief
of node i about node j′s qualification for being a TA1 member node.
Definition 2 (Belief Set) Let V be the set of all nodes, then the relation R(t) :
V × V → [0, 1] ⊂ R contains all quality factors of the network at a certain time. R
can be identified as a matrix R = (rij) ∈ M(n×n; [0, 1] ⊂ R) and is called the Belief
Set.
Definition 3 (TA configuration) Let sij denote the TA connection from node i
to node j, i.e., sij = 1 if node i chooses the TA member node j to cotact the TA,
and sij = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let R = (rij) ∈ M(n × n; [0, 1] ⊂ R) be the
Belief Set, then a matrix S = (sij) ∈ M(n× n; {0, 1}) is called TA configuration if:
∑
0≤i≤n
sij = 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ n (4.1)
sij = 1 ⇒ rij > 0 (4.2)
Thus a subset of nodes is called TA configuration if every node is connected exactly
to one TA node.
1For consistency, cluster heads are labelled as TA nodes.
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4.4 Metric-based cluster algorithm
4.4.1 TA selection mechanism
A cluster algorithm is used to determine the subset of TA nodes in the MANET. The
choice of TA connections as utilised by the cluster algorithm does not necessarily
establish real TA connection in the later security architecture. In the scope of the
cluster algorithm, a node can immediately connect to another node, which may
require an interval to establish its state as a TA member. According to this, our
cluster-based algorithm for TA member selection provides a sufficient subset of TA
nodes, which can then be used for bootstrapping the security architecture on top of
these nodes.
Without loss of generality, and as noted in Section 4.2, we use a modification
of Amis’ algorithm [3] for the initial implementation and evaluation of the metrics
used in distributing TA services. The underlying principle of deterministic cluster
algorithms is to let each node exchange information with immediate neighbours and
to decide whether it is a TA node itself or if it accepts a peer node as a TA node. If
a node A accepts another node B as a TA node, node B will be the connector to the
TA for node A. In the case of Amis’ algorithm, this information exchange procedure
is performed d times, yielding a network where every node has a maximum distance
of d hops to its TA connector. Amis describes the basic concept of his algorithm as
follows:
Initially, each node sets its winner2 to be equal to its own node id.
Then each node locally broadcasts its winner value to all of its 1-hop
neighbours. After all neighboring nodes have been heard from, for a
single round, the node chooses the largest value among its own winner
2winner is a TA node in this context.
87
4.4 Metric-based cluster algorithm
value and the values received in the round as its new winner. This process
continues for d rounds.
Extension 1: Choose TA nodes by quality In our extension of Amir’s al-
gorithm, the winner value is represented by a quality factor instead of the node
identity. Moreover, the base algorithm’s approach of choosing its d-hop cluster head
based on the decisions of neighboring nodes in round d−1 must be augmented since
different nodes might hold different views about a node’s TA qualification. The base
algorithm is therefore extended as follows:
TA Cluster Algorithm: In our cluster algorithm we use the two parameters
hopsToGo and forwardInfo. hopsToGo is the remaining number of hops that a
message shall be sent. forwardInfo is a list containing hopsToGo values.
• Each node collects the information broadcasted by neighboring nodes and re-
tains the information until it is refreshed or until it exceeds its predefined
lifetime. Cluster information with a hopsToGo value greater than 1 are pushed
on the stack forwardInfo, whereupon the respective hopsToGo value is de-
creased by 1.
• In certain (possibly node-specific) time periods, each node determines all qual-
ity factors about its known d-hop neighbours, choosing the node with the
highest quality factor as its cluster head. If the node itself holds this value,
or if another node has chosen it as cluster head, the node will itself be a TA
node. The node then broadcasts its newly determined TA status and its addi-
tional information such as the battery level and forwardInfo to its neighbours.
Every entry of the forwardInfo stack contains a parameter hopsToGo, which
is indicating the number of forwarding hops and initially set to the clustering
depth d.
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First simulations have shown the tendency of cluster algorithms to change the
cluster heads quite frequently. In cluster algorithms for MANETs, nodes broadcast
messages in certain frequencies, and after each broadcast clusters are reshaped and
cluster heads are likely to change. We observed that even with small topology
changes between these broadcast phases, caused by node movements, cluster heads
mostly changed. This behaviour could be prevented by configuring the quality factor
to assign a higher quality to TA member nodes and thus foster their reelection.
However, this would be a misuse of the quality factor that would decrease its potency
for more sensitive configuration issues such as energy level and trust values. We
therefore augmented the cluster algorithm itself by a mechanism for avoiding abrupt
changes of the cluster heads.
Extension 2: Avoid frequent changes of TA members. To avoid fre-
quent changes of TA members, we firstly augmented the possible set of TA states
TA MEMBER and NOT TA MEMBER by TA ASPIRANT and LEAVING TA. The TA ASPIRANT
parameter is used to insert a second step into the process of becoming a TA mem-
ber. Accordingly, a node first changes its state to TA ASPIRANT if it holds the
highest quality value within its neighbourhood. After a certain configurable pe-
riod CONST TA INTEREST as TA ASPIRANT, the node will become a TA member if it
still holds the highest quality value. In our simulations in the following section,
the parameter CONST TA INTEREST was set to three times the cluster message fre-
quency. The respective mechanism was evaluated with the help of the parameter
CONST NO TA INTEREST for the state LEAVING TA to avoid a abrupt release of the
TA MEMBER state. This parameter was set to one time the cluster message frequency,
when using greater values it appeared to drastically bar the nodes from leaving the
TA.
Summarising our extensions to Amis’ [3] algorithm, Algorithm 4.1 shows the
protocol specification of our TA cluster algorithm.
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Algorithm 4.1: TA cluster algorithm pseudocode.
Input: cluster frequency cf , d, cluster metric
/* In cluster frequency cf node i does: */
Determine quality value rij for all nodes in d-hop neighbourhood;1
if the node with the highest value rij is a TA member then2
node i chooses this node with the highest rij value as its TA connection;3
else4
i sends ’you are my best quality’ message to the node with the highest rij5
value (possibly itself);
i chooses the TA member with highest rij in its d-hop neighbourhood as6
its TA connection (possibly none);
end7
if node i got a ’you are my best quality’ message in the last period cf8
(possibly from itself) then
if hasStatus(TA ASPIRANT) then9
TA ASPIRANT TIMER += cf ;10
if TA ASPIRANT TIMER ≥ CONST TA INTEREST then11
setStatus(TA MEMBER);12
end13
else if hasStatus(LEAVING TA) then14
setStatus(TA MEMBER);15
else if hasStatus(NOT TA MEMBER) then16
setStatus(TA ASPIRANT);17
TA ASPIRANT TIMER = 0;18
end19
else20
if hasStatus(TA ASPIRANT) then21
setStatus(NOT TA MEMBER);22
else if hasStatus(LEAVING TA) then23
LEAVING TA TIMER += cf ;24
if LEAVING TA TIMER ≥ CONST NO TA INTEREST then25
setStatus(NOT TA MEMBER);26
end27
else if hasStatus(TA MEMBER) then28
setStatus(LEAVING TA));29
LEAVING TA TIMER = 0;30
end31
end32
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4.4.2 Metrics
The choice of the cluster heads in our algorithm is based on the quality factors. In
Definition 1 the quality factor was fixed as a value in the continuous interval from
0 to 1. A quality factor rij = 0 means that a node i has no evidence about a
node j, while a value of 1 perfectly qualifies node j as a TA node according to our
metrics. In this section we develop several partial metrics, which will be combined
to the cluster metric.
Each partial metric is mapped onto the continuum [0, 1], assuming no constraints
are violated. In the case of a constraint violation of one or more partial metrics,
the cluster metric will itself yield 0 and thus disqualify a node as a TA node. The
partial metrics are merged into a cluster metric using a linear combination. This
itself requires a linear and continuous mapping of the partial metrics and weighting
for relative importance. The metrics discussed in this section are not exhaustive;
partial metrics can be replaced and additional partial metrics be used as discussed in
Section 4.6. The core of our cluster metric is the trust metric, which is derived from
Maurer’s [91] model for a public key infrastructure. For the remaining metrics for
signal strength, energy level, bandwidth and incorporation in the routing process,
there exist no elaborated metrics in the literature.
4.4.2.1 Trust metric
The trust metric is the core of the cluster metric, since it induces the cluster algo-
rithm to determine a set of essentially trustworthy TA nodes. In our approach, a
modification of Maurer’s [91] model can be used, containing both a different trust
model and valuations, provided that the constraints described in Section 4.4.2 are
satisfied. Maurer’s model consists of two parts, a deterministic and a probabilis-
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tic part. However, the basic model is not suitable for implementation owing to its
computational complexity, and must be adapted in its deterministic part as des-
cribed in the following. We first describe Maurer’s model, before we introduce our
modifications of Maurer’s model.
• Deterministic part The deterministic part defines the parameters which are
considered by the model, and defines inference rules for these parameters.
Maurer labels the parameters as statements which include the Authenticity of
public keys, Trust, Certificates and Recommendations. Based on those state-
ments, Maurer defines two inference rules which consider recommendations of
arbitrary depth. For example, if a node A believes in the authenticity of a node
X and it also trusts X to administer certificates and X holds a certificate of
Y , then A will also believe in the authenticity of node Y (see [91] for details).
The statements in Maurer’s model can be described in more detail as follows:
– Authenticity of public keys. AutA,X denotes A’s belief that a particular
public key PX is authentic.
– Trust. TrustA,X,1 denotes A’s belief that a particular entity X is trust-
worthy for issuing certificates. Similarly, her belief that X is trustworthy
for issuing recommendations of level i− 1 is denoted by TrustA,X,i.
– Certificates. CertX,Y denotes the fact that A holds a certificate for Y ’s
public key issued and signed by entity X.
– Recommendations. RecX,Y,i denotes the fact, that A holds a recommen-
dation of level i for entity Y issued and signed by entity X.
The inference rules that allow the derivations of statements from already
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known statements are defined by Maurer as follows:
AutA,X , T rustA,X,1, CertX,Y ⊢ AutA,Y , (4.3)
AutA,X , T rustA,X,i+1, RecX,Y,i ⊢ TrustA,Y,i . (4.4)
The statements can thereby be divided into two different categories. The
first category gives information about the characteristic of nodes and contains
AutA,X and CertX,Y . The second category holds information about the trust-
worthiness of nodes’ characteristics and contains the statements TrustA,X,i
and CertX,Y,i. Note that all these statements are deterministic, so trust in
a node’s characteristic means total trust. Due to the different levels i of
trustworthiness statements, it is possible to infer statement chains of arbitrary
length. In Maurer’s model the general aim of building those chains is to infer
new Aut statements. Thus a chain of statements could be built as follows: [91,
Example 3.4.]
AutA,X , T rustA,X,2, RecX,Y,1, CertX,Y , CertY,B ⊢ AutA,B ,
since:
AutA,X , T rustA,X,2, RecX,Y,1 ⊢ TrustA,Y,1 ,
AutA,X , T rustA,X,1, CertX,Y ⊢ AutA,Y ,
AutA,Y , T rustA,Y,1, CertY,B ⊢ AutA,B .
The first simplification of [91] yielding a reduction of complexity, especially in
the computations of the probabilistic part, is to restrict the trustworthiness
statements to level 1, while disallowing the use of second-hand evidence. For
the purpose of building a pure trust model, we also redefine Maurer’s state-
ments as follows:
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– Trust. TrustX,Y denotes X’s belief that a particular entity Y is a trust-
worthy TA member.
– Distrust. DistrustX,Y denotes X’s belief that a particular entity X is
generally not a trustworthy TA member.
– Authenticity of public keys. AutA,X denotes A’s belief that a particular
public key PX is authentic.
To incorporate negative evidence in a deterministic model, it is necessary to
define an additional parameter for distrust. Further statements such as Aut
that might deliver information about a node’s trustworthiness can also be de-
fined. Limiting the length of trust chains to 1, inference rules are defined as
follows:
TrustA,X, T rustX,Y ⊢ TrustA,Y , (4.5)
TrustA,X, DistrustX,Y ⊢ DistrustA,Y , (4.6)
TrustA,X, AutX,Y ⊢ AutA,Y . (4.7)
Rules (4.5) and (4.6) represent the forwarding of trust information over one
hop, while (4.7) shows the mechanism to include additional statements in the
model.
• Probabilistic part The deterministic model part defined all parameters of the
trust model such as fixed statements and inference. This allowed the deduction
of all implicitly available statements. Our probabilistic augmentation adds the
notion of uncertainty to statements in a continuous certainty range [0, 1]. Every
event is true only with a certain probability, and the core of the probabilistic
part is to determine the certainty of the inferred events (statements). The
following provides a brief summary of the model; for details on the base model
of Maurer we refer to [91].
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The set of statements which are contained in a node A’s view is denoted by
ViewA. The closure of ViewA under the inference rules (4.5)–(4.7) is then
labelled with ViewA, and contains the whole statement knowledge of node A,
including inferred statements. Since every statement shall be certain in a range
from 0 to 1, the certainty of a statement is represented by the probability that
this statement is true, and the probability P (S ∈ ViewA) is labelled as the
confidence value.
The probability of an inferred statement S from node A is the probability
of this statement being inferable from statements included in ViewA, i.e.,
S ∈ ViewA. With SA denoting the power set of ViewA, the confidence value
conf(S) for a statement S can be defined as conf(S) = P (S ∈ ViewA) =∑
V⊆SA:S∈V
P (V).
The model defined so far allows to specify arbitrary dependencies between the
statements in SA. Having limited the level of inferences to 1, P (V) can be
computed as:
P (V) =
∏
S∈V
p(S) ·
∏
S /∈V
(1− p(S)) .
Finally, the probability p(S) for a derived statement S can be obtained as
p(S) = conf(S) =
∑
V⊆SA:S∈V
∏
S∈V
p(S) ·
∏
S/∈V
(1− p(S)) ,
where the most costly, but due to the limitation to inference level 1 still prac-
tical, computable part is the determination of the set {V ⊆ SA : S ∈ V}.
A crucial point in every trust system is the initial determination of trust. We
assume that trust is anchored either by physical contact (e.g., intervisibility with a
compromised node) or by evidence gathered by an IDS during the scenario.
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Determining one trust value as input for the cluster metric requires that both the
confidence values for Trust and Distrust are combined to one trust factor 1 ≥ tf ∈ R.
Every strategy that overstates one of the values would provide a potential point of
attack. In the case of a strong effect of the Distrust value for example, an attacker
could spread negative evidence about a node’s neighbours and thus isolate the node
from all its friendly neighbours. In order to minimise the ability of such attacks,
we calculate the final trust factor ft as ft =
1
2 +
(conf(Trust)−conf(Distrust))
2 ∈ [0, 1],
where 0 means maximum distrust, 0.5 means no or a neutral opinion, and 1 means
maximum trust.
4.4.2.2 Signal strength metric
To avoid a permanent transmission breakdown between a node and it is TA connec-
tion, it is desirable to choose a nearby node as TA connection. Since the distance
between two nodes does not necessarily represent their connection quality, we choose
the signal strength as a measure for the proximity of nodes. The signal strength
is commonly specified in dBm, and the benchmark data are provided by the max-
imal transmission power (100 mW = 20 dBm using the IEEE 802.11 standard as
an example) and the threshold for the minimal required receiving power of -80 dBm
[4]. Since dBm already provides a logarithmised and thus feasible measure for the
original mW values, we use the dBm values to define the signal strength factor fs
for a signal strength of s dBm as fs =
s+80
100 .
4.4.2.3 Energy metric
Limited battery power is one of the major constraints in mobile ad hoc networks.
Since TA nodes generally perform a higher interaction with their neighbours than
ordinary nodes, it is desirable to choose TA members with a sufficient battery level.
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Most modern battery systems provide a direct or indirect metric based on the voltage
of the batteries decreasing with the percentage of discharge disc ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R, pro-
portional to 1− 3√disc [42]. We therefore define the energy metric as fe = 1− 3
√
disc.
4.4.2.4 Routing metric
Although the set of TA nodes which is determined by our cluster algorithm would
provide a suitable routing backbone, our approach is also intended to fit into a
network with a preselected routing protocol. As stated in Section 4.4.1, a TA overlay
network might be bootstrapped without performing additional data transfer. Under
the premise of an existing routing protocol, we define the routing metric in a way that
takes advantage of already established routes. For this purpose we use the number
of destination nodes rdn (routing destination nodes) that a node has reached within
a certain time period rtp (routing time period), as a measure for its activity in the
routing process. The value for rtp needs to be defined depending on the routing
protocol. The parameter rpn (routing perfect node) defines a benchmark for the
number of reachable destination nodes. A node is of significant importance for
the routing process, i.e., part of many routes, if rdn ≥ rpn . According to this
convention, we define the routing value, which is the output of the routing metric as
follows:
fr =


1− rpn−rdnrpn , rdn ≤ rpn
1 , rdn > rpn .
However, if there is no predefined routing protocol and the routing is performed
using the TA nodes as backbone, this metric is not required and hence not included
in the cluster metric.
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4.4.2.5 Bandwidth metric
While the routing metric encourages the concentration of data transfer to a small
number of nodes, this can exceed the nodes’ bandwidth. To avoid delays or dropped
packets, the bandwidth metric measures the load of a node with respect to its avail-
able bandwidth. As before, we use the IEEE 802.11g standard for our example. In
802.11g the data rate at a certain point in time is dependent on the signal strength,
and varies between 8 values from 6 Mbps3 to 54 Mbps. We label these values dr1
(data rate 1) to dr8, where dr1 represents the lowest rate of 6 Mbps and dr8 the
highest rate of 54 Mbps, respectively. Moreover, we define drc = ⌊dr⌋ as the highest
dri that is lower than dr, and di, 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 denotes the respective data rate. We
assume that a data rate at least two levels above the minimum required level is
sufficient to achieve the desired throughput dr. Based on this assumption, we define
the bandwidth factor fb as follows:
fb =


0 , drc ≥ dri
dr−drc
2·(drc+1−drc)
, dri−1 ≤ drc < dri
0.5 + dr−drc2·(drc+1−drc) , dri−2 ≤ drc < dri−1
1 , drc < dri−2 .
4.4.2.6 Cluster metric
All component metrics were designed to firstly return a value in [0, 1] to provide a
linear correlation between their return value and its relative importance. We chose
a linear correlation as it allows us to define several partial metrics in an intuitive
way, and additionally allows a straight forward definition of the cluster metric. For
example, a battery level of 50 % is considered as “half as good” as a totally charged
31 Mbps = 106 bits per second
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battery, and a signal of 100 % (20 dBm) is twice as good as a signal of 50 % -30 dBm).
According to this simplified approach, the cluster metric finally combines all partial
metrics in a linear combination and returns the quality factor in Definition 1. Let
M = {t, s, e, r, b} be the set of indices of all partial metrics, and ft, fs, fe, fr, fb be
the respective return values based on the information of a node i about a node j at
a certain time. Then the quality factor rij is calculated as:
rij =


∑
i∈M λi · fi (fi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ M)
0 otherwise ,
with: ∑
i∈M
λi = 1, λi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ M .
The configuration of the λ values is discussed in the following Section 4.5.
4.5 Evaluation and analysis
4.5.1 Simulations
For evaluating our cluster algorithm and for investigating configurations with differ-
ent values of the loading factors λi of the cluster metric, we have implemented the
proposed model in the network simulator NS-2. We set up three different simulation
scenarios: Simulation 1 is a random waypoint scenario investigating the influence
of the cluster metric, Simulation 2 and 3 examine the stability and efficiency of the
cluster algorithm based on scenarios defined in Section 3.2.
Simulation 1: Influence of the cluster metric The purpose of Simulation
1 is to investigate the influence of the metrics from Section 4.4 in the choice of
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the TA nodes. We chose random node mobility for this simulation to examine the
development of trust values in a highly dynamic network with frequent network
topology changes. We ran a simulation containing 48 benign and 2 hostile nodes. In
our simulations, benign nodes were able to find out about a node’s affiliation if the
distance between the nodes was 10 m or less. After 100 seconds in a 700 m × 700 m
area, all friendly nodes had a trust value about the two enemy nodes of 0.1 or smaller,
and thus did not choose them as TA nodes at all.
In a second simulation, nodes were only configured to attack for a time period of
30 seconds, such that only two other nodes had physical contact with these hostile
nodes during these 30 seconds. The purpose of this scenario was to examine the
effect of Byzantine behaviour on our algorithm. Even after 15 minutes, the other
nodes were changing their opinions about the two temporarily hostile nodes. This
shows the difficulty of providing security against temporarily misbehaving nodes (as
might be the case for Byzantine nodes), and the need for intrusion detection systems
that quickly detect nodes’ misbehaviour.
Further simulations for the same setup were performed to illustrate the quanti-
tative effect of different configurations for our cluster metric. Figure 4.1 shows four
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Figure 4.1: Number of nodes with sufficient battery level.
different configurations of the node id and the battery level, while the other metrics
were not considered, i.e., loaded as 0. The left graph (thin solid line) presents the life-
time of the nodes for the loading (node id, battery level) = (1, 0), which corresponds
in the case of a 1-hop cluster to Amis’ original cluster algorithm [3]. For this con-
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figuration, the nodes start running out of energy after 200 seconds. The other three
graphs display the lifetime of the nodes for the configurations (2/3, 1/3) (dashed
line), (1/3, 2/3) (dotted line) and (0, 1) (thick solid line), and thus the influence of
our energy metric. In the configuration (0, 1), all nodes live as long as possible and
run out of energy at almost the same time after 360 seconds. These results show
the impact of our quality factor and its scalability with respect to incorporating our
energy metric.
Due to constant changes in the energy level as well as other parameters which
have an impact on our cluster metric, the quality value of the nodes are changing
permanently. To avoid the frequent swapping of the TA nodes, we introduced Exten-
sion 2 to our cluster algorithm (see Section 4.4). We use the simulation Scenarios 1
and 2 as defined in Section 3.2 to examine the stability of the cluster algorithm and
the robustness against node failures.
4.5.2 Stability and reliability of the distributed TA
In Section 4.4 we discussed the changes to our cluster-based algorithm for TA mem-
ber selection. In this section we illustrate, based on two simulation scenarios, the
behaviour of our cluster-based selection algorithm with respect to three aspects:
• total number of TA nodes (cluster heads);
• number of nodes successfully connected to the TA;
• number of received packets/second.
The first aspect describes the number of TA nodes at every time interval in our
simulation scenarios, and shows the influence of formation changes, interaction of
radio waves with the topography and the transmission power on the total amount
101
4.5 Evaluation and analysis
of TA nodes. Since our TA member selection algorithm is intended to perform the
basis for a security architecture in which several secret shares are distributed among
the TA members, the number of TA nodes is a decisive factor.
The second aspect (number of nodes that are successfully connected to the TA)
reveals how many nodes in the network have chosen a node as TA member (cluster
head) that is indeed capable of acting as a TA node. We define a node to be
successfully connected to the TA if its TA node is indeed a member of the TA, and
a physical connection is still existent. The continuous exchange of cluster packets
would yield a perfectly informed network and thus enable every node to imme-
diately react to connection breakdowns and changes in the behaviour of neighboring
nodes. However, since transmission is a crucial factor for the energy consumption in
MANETs, we aim to maximise the interval between cluster messages, while keeping
the connectivity to the TA nodes at a sufficient level.
The third aspect (number of received packets) illustrates the additional data
overhead caused by the cluster algorithm. Since the amount of transmitted packets
per second in our model can simply be calculated as “the number of nodes in the
network divided by the frequency of cluster messages”, we examine the number of
received packets as a metric for the data overhead.
Simulation 2: Cluster algorithm behaviour in a city area Simulation 2
models a platoon of soldiers traversing a city area as defined in Scenario 2 in Sec-
tion 3.2 and illustrated in Figure 3.7. The group of 37 nodes is moving between
buildings, splitting up in three subgroups and merging again. This simulation is
intended to expose the effect of abrupt communication breakdowns as well as the
division of the network in several subgroups. Figure 4.2 through Figure 4.4 show
the behaviour of the network with respect to aspects 1–3 for different frequencies of
the cluster message exchange. We ran our simulations for frequencies of multiples
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of 2 seconds up to 16 seconds, and chose 2, 4 and 8 seconds to give a clear overview
of the results.
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Figure 4.2: Simulation 2: Number of nodes connected to the TA.
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Figure 4.3: Simulation 2: Number of TA nodes.
We set the initialisation time (see Section 4.4) to 100 seconds. In this time the
nodes are configured to choose their best TA connection independently from already
established TA nodes. After the initialisation time, the reelection of TA members
is encouraged to avoid frequent changes of TA nodes (see Section 4.4). Figure 4.2
shows that directly after the start, only 5 to 10 nodes are successfully connected
to a TA node, while this number increases to more than 30 nodes in the course
of time. The duration of this configuration process is dependent on the frequency
of cluster messages. In the case of a cluster message frequency of 2 seconds (solid
line) this process lasts only 20 seconds, while it takes 80 seconds in the case of
103
4.5 Evaluation and analysis
0
40
80
120
160
200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time[s]
Received packets
Cluster frequency:
2 s
4 s
8 s
Figure 4.4: Simulation 2: Total number of received cluster packets per second.
a cluster frequency of 8 seconds (dotted line). Accordingly, our cluster algorithm
needs approximately 10 rounds of cluster message exchanges to shape a sufficient
set of TA nodes.
After approximately 380 seconds (see Figure 3.7(a) in Section 3.2), the nodes
start to split up between the buildings. The effect on the connectivity of the network
and the TA can be seen in Figure 4.2 and 4.4. The number of received packets
increases until second 380, since the platoon needs to choose a closer formation to
move in between the buildings. Thereupon this number decreases abruptly due to
communication breakdowns. As an impact on the connectivity to the TA in case of
a cluster frequency of 8 seconds (dotted line), up to 9 of the 35 nodes temporarily
lose their connection to the TA. In case of a cluster frequency of 2 (solid line) or 4
(dashed line) seconds, the algorithm reacts more quickly, and only 5 nodes lose their
connection to the TA.
A further crucial observation are the fluctuations in Figure 4.2 between sec-
ond 400 and 700, especially for a cluster frequency of 2 seconds (solid line). This
behaviour occurs when the nodes from different small groups get a temporary con-
nection between buildings, as can be identified in Figure 3.7(b). This problem does
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not occur for a cluster frequency of 8 seconds (dotted line), since the nodes of dif-
ferent small groups will not receive enough cluster messages to choose the new node
from another group as TA member.
Despite the fact that the number of received packets increases after the collation
of the group (Figure 3.7(c)), this event has no notable effect on the TA or the
connectivity of the network. As a further important result of Figure 4.2 through
Figure 4.4, the cluster algorithm shows a very similar behaviour for the different
cluster message frequencies of 2, 4 and 8 seconds. In view of bootstrapping a security
architecture on top of the TA, the consequence of this observation is that even in a
network with numerous abrupt communication breakdowns, a cluster frequency of
8, or possibly more seconds, is still sufficient.
Simulation 3: Influence of unreliable nodes and links Simulation 3 models
different movement techniques of a platoon of soldiers in a hostile area, as defined in
Scenario 1 in Section 3.2 (Figure 3.6). Figure 4.5 through Figure 4.7 show the be-
haviour of the network with respect to aspects 1–3 during the simulation for different
cluster message frequencies of 4, 8 and 16 seconds. We changed the frequencies to
4, 8 and 16 seconds for this simulation, since longer durations between the exchange
of cluster messages are desireable and Simulation 2 already showed that cluster fre-
quencies of 4 and 8 seconds are feasible. Additional simulations, based on a message
frequency of 8 seconds and illustrating the influence of node failure, loose contacts
of the wireless devices and different amounts of transmission power, are shown in
Figure 4.8 through Figure 4.10.
The behaviour during the initialisation time of 100 seconds is similar to Simula-
tion 2, where approximately 10 rounds of cluster message exchange are required to
first shape a sufficient set of TA nodes (Figure 4.5). Subsequently, the number of
received packets decreases due to the formation stretching of the travelling platoon
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Figure 4.5: Simulation 3: Number of nodes connected to the TA.
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Figure 4.6: Simulation 3: Number of TA nodes.
during second 150 and 320 (Figure 3.6(a)). The partition into three squads which
move in a compact formation until second 600, increases the number of received
packets, while the following formation change to a “stretched line” (Figure 3.6(b))
abruptly decreases this number. Nevertheless, these changes in the connectivity of
the network have almost no effect on the connectivity of the TA (Figure 4.5) and
the number of TA nodes (Figure 4.6).
The only two noticeable events in the rest of the simulation that come with
a short decrease of the connectivity to the TA, are the resumption of speed after
the file formation in Figure 3.6(b) and the division of the network in second 1070
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Figure 4.7: Simulation 3: Total number of received cluster packets per second.
(Figure 3.6(c)) while crossing the danger area. In summary, our algorithm for the
distribution of the TA works smoothly and does not have any weak points in this
simulation scenario. For further refinement of the algorithm we have examined
the influence of node failures, loose contacts and different amounts of transmission
power, as illustrated in Figure 4.8 through Figure 4.10. The wireless devices of the
nodes in the first of these scenarios begin to drop out during the enemy contact
from second 700 to 800 (Figure 3.6(b)). There are only slight differences between
the network containing 20 failing nodes (dashed line) and the network without node
failures (dashed line in Figure 4.8). The first apparent influence can be observed in
the case of 25 failing nodes, as illustrated by the dotted line.
We performed the same simulation as illustrated in Figure 4.8 a second time
with loose contacts of the wireless devices instead of node failures. Loose contacts
were simulated by a random failure in sending and receiving packets of 50 %. Even
25 failing nodes only has minor impact on the connectivity to the TA, while a loose
contact of 20 devices has no visibly negative effect.
Finally we also ran Simulation 3 under different transmission strengths of 1 mW,
5 mW and 15 mW, yielding a communication range in free space of approximately
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Figure 4.8: Simulation 3: Influence of the breakdown of several nodes.
Cluster frequency: 8s.
30 m, 45 m and 60 m, respectively. Our algorithm appeared to be sensitive to the
stretching of the formation in case of a communication range of 60 m (Figure 4.10
solid line). In the period of 150 to 320 seconds, as well as after the division of the
network after 600 seconds, the increasing distances between the nodes disconnected
up to 15 nodes from the TA. This can be traced back to the higher communication
range, which enables the nodes to connect to distant TA members that move out
of the connected node range at the aforementioned events. In networks with high
communication ranges, the quality value of our cluster algorithm should therefore
be configured in a way that encourages the choice of nearby nodes, i.e., by using the
signal strength metric.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have investigated cluster algorithms for establishing a distributed
trust authority in MANETs. We modified an existing cluster algorithm to:
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Cluster frequency: 8s.
• incorporate a trust metric to provide robustness against malicious nodes, re-
lying on the accuracy of the underlying intrusion detection system;
• be configurable by several metrics to provide a tradeoff between efficiency,
reliability and security;
• require less communication overhead;
• change cluster heads withs a low frequency, making the cluster heads a feasible
set of nodes for a distributed trust authority.
Simulations have shown the robustness of our developed cluster algorithm under
node failures and mobility, as well as significant gains in efficiency while adding
the ability to incorporate higher-layer properties such as trust. Our analysis has
shown that cluster algorithms allow a distributed trust authority to be determined in
MANETs. This TA can dynamically react to network changes and can help to allow
scalability of the energy level of the network and other parameters such as trust. The
incorporation of a trust metric in the cluster head selection mechanism constrains
the election of suspicious nodes as TA members. An open research problem is
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Figure 4.10: Simulation 3: Influence of different amounts of transmission power.
Cluster frequency: 8s.
the development of adversarial models for cluster algorithms and other network
layer protocols, which allow to quantify the robustness against malicious nodes. In
Chapter 8 we discuss possible directions for the development of such adversarial
models.
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In this chapter we propose two protocols for non-interactive key agreement. We
prove the resilience of both schemes against a large number of malicious nodes and
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investigate their feasibility for MANETs regarding computational and communica-
tional costs.
5.1 Introduction
Key agreement is a fundamental tool for secure communication; it lets two nodes in
a network agree on a shared key that is known only to them, thus allowing them to
use that key for secure communication (see Section 2.3.3).
In environments where bandwidth is at a premium, there is a significant ad-
vantage to non-interactive schemes, where two nodes can compute their shared key
without any interaction. The classical Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [45]
is an example of a non-interactive scheme: in that protocol, node A can compute
a shared key with node B knowing only the public key of B (and its own secret
key). However, the nodes in this protocol must still learn each other’s public keys
somehow, which implies either direct communication between them or some other
form of coordination.
To minimise the required coordination, one may use identity-based key agree-
ment, where the public key of a node could be the node’s identifier. Such schemes
rely on a central authority with a master secret key that provides each node with
a secret key that corresponds to that node’s identifier. In this setting, the non-
interactive identity-based scheme of Sakai et al. [123] allows node A to compute a
shared key with node B knowing only B’s identity (and A’s own secret key).
However, in MANETs it is often unrealistic to expect all nodes to register with
just one central authority as required by Sakai et al. [123]. One would therefore
prefer a hierarchical system, where a root authority only needs to distribute keys to
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a small number of large organisations, and each of these can further distribute keys
to smaller and smaller units, until finally the end-nodes get their secret keys from
their immediate organisational unit.
In this chapter we propose two schemes that have all the above functional prop-
erties and are secure in a strong sense. That is, they are non-interactive to save on
bandwidth, identity-based to save on coordination and support ad hoc communica-
tion, and hierarchical to allow for flexible provisioning of nodes. At the same time,
we design these schemes to be resilient to the compromise of any number of end-
users (leaf nodes) and resilient to the compromise of a threshold number of nodes
in the upper levels of the hierarchy.
One of our proposed schemes is computationally very efficient but requires larger
keys, making it especially suitable for MANETs where keys are distributed during
pre-configuration which will be used during the life-time of the MANET. The second
scheme is computationally slightly less efficient but has very small key sizes, making
it attractive for MANETs where online key refreshing is required. We run simu-
lations to investigate the online distribution of the key material using the second
scheme. This work was accomplished in close collaboration with IBM Research.
5.2 Background
In the context of symmetric key agreement protocols in Section 2.3.3, we already
discussed the works of Sakai et al. [123], Blundo et al. [22], and Eschenauer and
Gligor [50] (and its extension by Ramkumar et al. [109]), which play a central role
in our construction.
There are also a few prior attempts to improve the resilience of the scheme of
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Blundo et al.. Hanaoka et al. [63] show that in a sparse system (where most pairs of
nodes never need to communicate) the threshold can be increased by a significant
factor (possibly up to 16 fold) without adversely effecting the performance. That
solution is applicable in relatively static networks where one can partition the nodes
into disjoint sets and have no inter-set communication, but it is not applicable in
settings where every pair of nodes may potentially need to communicate.
Another technique for improving the resilience of the Blundo et al. scheme was
proposed by Zhang et al. [152], using random perturbations in order to randomise the
polynomials used in the protocol of Blundo et al.. However, a practical instantiation
of the parameters for the protocol enables the parties to agree on a small number
of bits (say 12) in each execution of the protocol. Thus in order to generate enough
secret keying material, about ten independent executions of the protocol need to be
carried out. Furthermore, this scheme does not provide the hierarchical capabilities.
Matt [89] described some trade-offs between resilience and performance, and
even proposed a combination of the schemes of Blundo et al. and Sakai et al. that is
similar to ours. However, his scheme requires that each node communicates directly
with the central authority, and hence it is not a hierarchical scheme.
Following the identity-based encryption scheme of Boneh and Franklin [24], Hor-
witz and Lynn [68] initiated a study of hierarchical identity-based encryption. In-
terestingly, their scheme combines a pairing-based scheme and a polynomial-based
one, as we do. However, they only use two levels, where the pairing-based scheme
is placed at the top level and the polynomial-based scheme at the second level. In
this work we reverse the order, using the polynomial-scheme for all the top levels
and the pairing-based scheme only for the leaves, to obtain a solution that supports
non-interactive key agreement.
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Our key agreement schemes (KAS) are built by combining the identity-based key
agreement protocol of Sakai et al. [123] with hierarchical schemes that use linear
operations, such as the polynomial-based key distribution system of Blundo et al. [22]
or the random-subset-based scheme. Below we present some background material
and recall these schemes.
5.3.1 Bilinear maps and the BDDH assumption
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of order q for some large prime q. Let e be a
mapping e : G1 ×G1 → G2. The mapping e is:
1. Bilinear if e(P a, Qb) = e(P,Q)ab for any P,Q ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Zq.
2. Non-degenerate if e does not send all pairs to the identity in G2.
3. Computable if there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
Bilinear mappings that can be computed efficiently are known based on Weil and
Tate pairings in Abelian varieties.
Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDDH).
The central hardness assumption on which we base our schemes is the following
BDDH assumption introduced by Boneh and Franklin [24]. Let G1, G2 and e be as
above. Given a random P ∈ G1, P a, P b, P c ∈ G1 for random a, b, c ∈ Zq, and given
h ∈ G2, it is hard to distinguish the case where h = e(P,P )abc from the case where
h = e(P,P )r for a random and independent r ∈ Zq. Formally, an algorithm A has
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advantage ǫ in solving the BDDH in 〈G1, G2, e〉 if
Pr[A(P,P a, P b, P c, e(P,P )abc) = 1]− Pr[A(P,P a, P b, P c, e(P,P )r) = 1] ≥ ǫ,
where the probability is over the random choice of P ∈ G1, a, b, c, r ∈ Zq, and
the internal randomness of A. The BDDH assumption (with respect to 〈G1, G2, e〉)
states that feasible adversaries can have only an insignificant advantage. In this
chapter we forgo the asymptotic notation that is needed to make this formal. Instead
we take the “concrete security” approach, directly relating the advantage of an
adversary against our scheme to the advantage in solving BDDH over the relevant
group.
5.3.2 Non-interactive identity-based key agreement
Sakai et al. [123] propose the following non-interactive (but not hierarchical) key
agreement scheme. The central authority sets up the parameters for an identity-
based public key system, by fixing two cyclic groups G1, G2 and the bilinear map
e : G1 × G1 → G2. Furthermore, it chooses a cryptographic hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → G1. It then chooses a secret key s ∈ Zq and provides a node with identity
ID with the secret key SID = H(ID)
s ∈ G1.
The shared key between two nodes ID1 and ID2 is K = e(H(ID1),H(ID2))
s ∈
G2, which party ID1 computes as K = e(SID1 ,H(ID2)) and ID2 computes as
K = e(H(ID1), SID2).
The security of this scheme can be reduced to the BDDH assumption in the
random-oracle model, as was shown in [49].
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5.3.3 Polynomial-based KAS
Our generic KAS presented in Section 5.4 can be instantiated using different hier-
archical systems. Here and in the next subsection we describe two instantiations of
such hierarchical systems. The first is based on multivariate polynomials and follows
Blundo et al. [22] (we refer to it as Blundo’s scheme). Let L be the depth of the
hierarchy, i.e., the nodes are arranged in a tree with L levels. Each node’s identity
corresponds to the path from the root to the node (thus a node at level i will have
as identity a vector with i components 〈I1, . . . , Ii〉 where each Ij is an integer).
For desired threshold parameters {ti : i ≤ L}, the root authority chooses a
random polynomial (over Zq for a large enough prime q) F (x1, y1, · · · , xL, yL),
where the degree of xi, yi is ti. F is chosen such that F (x1, y1, · · · , xL, yL) ≡
F (y1, x1, · · · , yL, xL), i.e., F is symmetric between the xi and yi. One way to choose
such polynomial is to choose a random polynomial f on the same variables, and
then set F (x1, y1, · · · , xL, yL) = f(x1, y1, · · · , xL, yL) + f(y1, x1, · · · , yL, xL). We
note that the size of the description of F (number of coefficients) is ΠLi=1
(ti+1)(ti+2)
2 ,
so this scheme can only be used with moderate thresholds ti and small values of L.
The master secret of the system is the polynomial F . The secret key of the
node with identity I in the first level of the hierarchy is the polynomial FI =
F (I, y1, x2, y2, · · · ) that has 2L− 1 variables. Similarly, the secret key of a node at
level iwith identity ~I = 〈I1, . . . , Ii〉 is the polynomial F~I = F (I1, y1, · · · , Ii, yi, xi+1, yi+1, . . .)
that has 2L− i variables, and the secret key of the leaf with identity 〈I1, . . . , IL〉 is
the polynomial in L variables F (I1, y1, · · · , IL, yL).
The shared key between the two leaf nodes 〈I1, . . . , IL〉 and 〈J1, . . . , JL〉 is the
value of the polynomial F (I1, J1, . . . , IL, JL) = F (J1, I1, . . . , JL, IL), that each node
can compute by evaluating its secret polynomial on the points that correspond to
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its peer’s identity.
Blundo’s secret sharing scheme provides information theoretic security for un-
compromised nodes in the following important way. We call a node compromised
if the attacker has learned all of the node’s secrets (i.e., all the coefficients of the
polynomial the node holds, and hence all of its descendants’ shared keys), otherwise
we call it uncompromised. Blundo’s scheme guarantees that the key shared between
any two uncompromised nodes is information theoretically secure, namely, all values
of the key are equally possibly given the attacker’s view.
Note that a node N in the hierarchy can be compromised (i.e., all its secrets
learned) by directly breaking into N and finding its secrets or by breaking into other
nodes from which the information in N can be reconstructed. For example, one can
learn all of N secrets by breaking into an ancestor of N or by breaking into t + 1
of its children (where t is the node’s threshold). Here, the word “secrets” can refer
to the coefficients of the polynomial held by a node N or, equivalently, to the set of
pairwise shared-keys known to N and its descendants (i.e., the set of keys shared by
these nodes with every other node in the hierarchy). In general, since pairwise keys
are derived by evaluating a polynomial, the knowledge of a set of secrets (coefficients
and/or pairwise keys) can allow an attacker to derive the value of additional secrets.
Given a set of secrets S, we say that a key K (e.g., between parties I and J) is
independent from S if no attacker (even if computationally unbounded) can learn
anything about K from the set S; we say that a set of keys S is independent if
each key in it is independent of the other keys in the set. It can be shown that in a
Blundo’s hierarchy with L + 1 levels (with the root being at level 0 and the leaves
at level L) and threshold ti at level i, an attacker that wants to learn all the secrets
of a node N in level ℓ must learn (at least) a set of T independent keys where T
equals
ΠLi=ℓ+1
(ti + 1)(ti + 2)
2
Πℓi=1(ti + 1).
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In particular, the attacker must learn at least this many number of keys (or coeffi-
cients) in the system before it can learn all of N secrets.1
5.3.4 Subset-based KAS
A different instantiation of our KAS uses subset-based key pre-distribution schemes,
which were first studied by Eschenauer and Gligor [50]. In such schemes the root
authority chooses a large number of secret keys for its key-ring, the key-ring of every
node contains a random subset of these keys, and the shared key for two nodes is
computed from the intersection of the keys in their respective key rings.
Extending it to a hierarchical ID-based scheme is fairly straightforward: a parent
node in the tree gives to each child a random subset of its key ring, and that subset
is computed deterministically from the child’s name (using a cryptographic hash
function). Such a hierarchical scheme was described by Ramkumar et al. [109].
The scheme works as follows:
1 When all ti are equal to the same number t we have T = (
(t+1)(t+2)
2
)L−ℓ(t+ 1)ℓ.
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• The parameters of the system are the number of keys at the root (denoted N),
and for each level i in the tree a probability pi ∈ (0, 1), which says what
fraction of the key ring of the parent is forwarded to the children.
• The root node chooses N secret keys at random for its key ring. For our pur-
poses, we think of these keys as integers modulo a fixed large prime number q.
• Let n = 〈I1, . . . , Ii〉 be a node at level i with key ring Rn = {K1,K2, . . .},
and let c = 〈I1, . . . , Ii, Ii+1〉 be a child of n in the tree. The node n uses a
cryptographic hash function to derive a sequence of numbers from the child’s
name, say by computing: rj ← H(c, j) . The child c gets all the keys Kj ∈ Rn
for which rj < pi. Namely, its key ring is Rc = {Kj ∈ Rc : rj < pi}.
• For two leaf nodes 〈I1, . . . , IL〉 and 〈J1, . . . , JL〉, the nodes repeat the hash
calculations from above to determine the intersection of their key rings, and the
shared key is computed as the sum modulo q of all the keys in the intersection.
It is not hard to show that in order to withstand up to ti compromised nodes
at level i, the optimal setting for the parameter pi is pi = 1/(ti + 1). And given all
the ti and pi, the parameter N should be set large enough to ensure the required
level of security. Specifically, to ensure that an attacker that compromises up to ti
nodes in each level i will not have more than e−m probability of learning the shared
key between two specific uncompromised nodes, the parameter N should be set to
N =
⌈
m/
∏
i p
2
i (1− pi)ti
⌉ ≈ meL ·∏i ti(ti + 1). To ensure that the attacker will
have probability at most e−m to learn the key of any pair of uncompromised nodes,
we need to add to the number N above 2 logM where M is the number of nodes in
the system.
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5.4 Our fully leaf-resilient KAS
Our goal is to provide a hierarchical identity-based key agreement scheme that is
secure against compromise of any number of nodes at the lowest level of the hierarchy.
Namely, we consider a KAS in the form of a tree-like hierarchy of authorities that
issue keys to nodes lower in the hierarchy, where any two leaf nodes can compute
without interaction a shared key unique to these two leaves. That is, each leaf
computes the shared key from its own secret key, its peer’s identity, and potentially
some other public information.
We want this hierarchy to be secure in the sense that an attacker that compro-
mises some of the nodes in the hierarchy cannot learn the keys shared by leaves
that are not in the subtree of a compromised nodes. Typically, the above guarantee
of security will only hold as long as the attacker does not compromise too many
nodes, and we extend this guarantee even in the face of an unlimited number of
compromised leaves.
Technically, our scheme is a combination of linear hierarchical schemes (of which
the schemes from Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 are special cases) and the identity-based
scheme of Sakai et al. that was described in Section 5.3.2. In the rest of this section
we formalise the linear requirement from the underlying hierarchical KAS and then
present our hybrid scheme.
Definition 4 (Linear Hierarchical KAS) A hierarchical key agreement scheme
is called linear if it satisfies the following properties with respect to some linear
space V and an integer parameter N : (i) The root authority selects N random ele-
ments from V to be used as the master secret keys. (ii) The secret key of each node
in the hierarchy consists of a set of values v1, v2, . . . ∈ V , each of which is a linear
combination (over V ) of the master secret keys. (iii) The shared key between every
two nodes is an element of V which is also a linear combination over V of the master
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secret keys. (iv) The number of values vi in each node and the coefficients in the
linear combinations that determine these values are derived deterministically from
public information such as the position of a node in the hierarchy and its identity.
We note that in typical hierarchical schemes, an internal node will provide its chil-
dren with values that are linear combination of its own values (which thus must be
linear combinations of the master secret keys). This is indeed the case for the two
schemes from Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4.
5.4.1 A leaf-resilient hybrid hierarchical KAS
We now show how to combine a linear hierarchical KAS H with the bilinear identity-
based scheme of [123] (see Section 5.3.2), resulting in a hybrid scheme, H′, that is as
resilient to attack on the internal nodes as H is, but which is fully resilient against
leaf compromise. Roughly, a leaf node with identity ID can compute the shared key
“in the exponent”, thereby obtaining the secret H(ID)s as needed for the scheme
of Sakai et al..
Our scheme can be described as follows. Let H be an L-level linear hierarchical
KAS, and we construct an L+ 1-level hybrid KAS H′ as follows:
• The root authority of H′ sets up and publishes the parameters for an identity-
based public key system, by fixing two cyclic groups G1, G2 of order q and the
bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2, as well as a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
In addition, the root authority carries the same actions as the root authority
of H, where the linear space over which H is defined is set to Zq.
• For any internal node other than the root, a leaf or a parent of a leaf, all
actions are identical to the scheme H.
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• A node F that is a parent of a leaf has secret values v1, . . . , vn ∈ Zq as in H.
For each child leaf ℓ with identity2 IDℓ, the values that F provides to ℓ are
the elements H(IDℓ)
vi ∈ G1, i = 1, . . . , n.
• The shared key between leaf nodes ℓ, ℓ′ with identities ID, ID′ whose parents
are F,F ′, respectively, is computed as follows:
Let v1, . . . , vn be the secret key of F , and let α1, . . . , αn be the coefficients of
the linear combination that F would have used in H to compute a shared key
with F ′. In other words, F would compute the shared key with F ′ in H as
s =
∑
i αivi (mod q). Recall that the secret key of ℓ are the group elements
V1 = H(ID)
v1 , . . . , Vn = H(ID)
vn ∈ G1, and that the coefficients αi can be
computed from publicly available information. The leaf ℓ computes
U1 ←
∏
i
V αii
(
= H(ID)
P
i αivi = H(ID)s
)
and U2 ← H(ID′), and sets the key to K ← e(U1, U2) = e(H(ID),H(ID′))s.
Similarly the leaf ℓ′ with secret key V ′1 , . . . , V
′
n′ determines the coefficients
β1, . . . , βn′ that F
′ would have used in H, then computes U ′1 ← H(ID) and
U ′2 ←
∏
i(V
′
i )
βi and sets K ← e(U ′1, U ′2) = e(H(ID),H(ID′))s.
For example, when applying this hybrid to the subset scheme from Section 5.3.4,
the two leaves will determine the set of indexes I for which they both received
keys, and then the leaf ℓ will compute U1 ←
∏
i∈I Vi and the leaf ℓ
′ will compute
U ′2 ←
∏
i∈I V
′
i .
Security A rigorous analysis and proof of the above generic hybrid scheme is
presented in our paper [57].
2We assume that the identity includes the entire path from the root of the hierarchy to the leaf,
so no two leaves have the same identity.
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5.5 Implementation and simulations
There are many trade-offs that one can make when choosing a key agreement scheme
for a particular application. Below we describe some of these trade-offs:
5.5.1 Setting the thresholds
The complexity of the schemes that we present here is proportional to the product∏
i ti, so to get a realistic scheme one must choose the ti’s as small as the security
considerations allow. As was explained in the introduction, if the hierarchy is ex-
pected to only have a very small branching factor (except for the leaves), then one
can set the ti’s to this expected branching factor. Otherwise, it might be the case
that higher-level nodes are better protected than lower-level nodes, and thus the
thresholds ti should increase as we go down the tree.
Below we demonstrate the complexity that we get for two settings, both of which
correspond to a hierarchy that has two levels of intermediate nodes (i.e., the leaves
are three levels below the root). The first setting is applicable to a very small tree,
where we set t1 = t2 = 3. The second setting is applicable to a large tree, where
we use t1 = 7 and t2 = 31. The resulting key sizes and number of operations to
compute the shared key are summarised in Table 5.1.
5.5.2 Polynomials versus subsets
The two underlying hierarchical schemes from Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 offer quite
different characteristics. The main advantage of the polynomial scheme is that the
secret keys are small: for the same setting of the thresholds, the polynomial scheme
has the leafs holding keys of size
∏
i(ti + 1) group elements, and the root holding a
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key that is a square of that, namely
∏
i ((ti + 1)/2)
2. The factor of 12 is because the
polynomial is symmetric. In the subset scheme, on the other hand, the size of the
keys is larger by roughly a factor of meL (for security level of e−m). In our examples
with L = 2, and assuming m = 20 (which seems to be a reasonable value), the keys
in the subset scheme are larger by about two orders of magnitude.
However, computing the shared key between two leaves may be faster using the
subset construction. This is because in the polynomial scheme the leaves have to do
one elliptic-curve multiplication for every group element in their key, whereas in the
subset scheme they only need to do an elliptic-curve addition for every element in
the intersection of the two sets (which is a small fraction of the entire key of each
of them).
Another difference is the security behaviour: the polynomial scheme ensures se-
curity as long as the adversary does not exceed the threshold of nodes compromised,
but can break completely once the threshold is exceeded. The subset construction,
on the other hand, provides a gradual degradation of security, with the probability
of a break monotonically increasing as the adversary compromises more nodes.
Finally, we comment that one can also use hybrids between the two schemes,
such as using the subset construction on one level and the polynomial construction
Table 5.1: Performance characteristics of hierarchical schemes.
Subset numbers are listed with respect to security level e−20 ≈ 2× 10−9. (add. and
mult. stand for “additions” and “multiplications”, respectively)
Scheme: Polynomial scheme Subset scheme
Thresholds: t1 = t2 = 3 t1 = 7, t2 = 31 t1 = t2 = 3 t1 = 7, t2 = 31
Key size
(# of elements)
Root: 100
Leaves: 16
Root: 19008
Leaves: 256
Root: 28768
Leaves: 1800
Root: 8930800
Leaves: 35000
Shared key
Computation
1 pairing
16 EC mult.
1 pairing
256 EC mult.
1 pairing
450 EC add.
1800 hashing
1 pairing
1100 EC add.
35000 hashing
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on the other. Such hybrids are discussed in the works of Du et al. [48] and Liu and
Ning [83].
5.5.3 Concrete implementations
Combining the numbers from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (and assuming that the SHA256
hashing operation takes about one microsecond on a 2.4 GHz Pentium-4 platform),
the running times and storage requirements for the various schemes are summarised
in Table 5.3. As is evident by these tables, the polynomial scheme offers much
smaller keys, while the subset construction is faster for the leaves (but slower for
the parents of the leaves).
In addition to the operations listed in Table 5.3, one also needs to implement
the key generation by the root and key delegation between internal nodes. At key
generation time the root needs to choose random numbers between 1 and q, one for
every group element, where the prime number q is the order of the elliptic curve over
which this scheme is implemented. For the curves that we deal with, the prime q is in
the range from q ≈ 2160 to q ≈ 2300. For the polynomial scheme the time and space
requirements are insignificant, and even for the subset scheme this is manageable.
At worse, with the parameters t1 = 7, t2 = 31 and working over a large curve, the
Table 5.2: Elliptic-curve parameters from [97].
Security level is the approximate equivalence in RSA security. SS(n,−) is the curve
Y 2 = X3 − X − 1 over GF (3n). Running times are in milliseconds on a 2.4 GHz
Pentium 4. Addition time is an estimate based on the timing of multiplication.
Element-size is the number of bits representing a point on the curve.
Security EC Addition Multipl. Pairing El.-size
RSA-912 SS(163,-) 0.1 ms 15 ms 57 ms 260
RSA-1080 SS(193,-) 0.12 ms 22 ms 86 ms 307
RSA-1976 SS(353,-) 0.3 ms 94 ms 355 ms 561
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Table 5.3: Timing/storage of hierarchical schemes.
The numbers were computed from Tables 5.1 and 5.2, assuming 1µs for computing
SHA256.
Scheme: Polynomial scheme Subset scheme
Security level:
t1 = t2 = 3
RSA-912
t1 = 7, t2 = 31
RSA-1976
t1 = t2 = 3
RSA-912
t1 = 7, t2 = 31
RSA-1976
Key size
Root: 2000 Byte
Leaf: 520 Byte
Root: 713K Byte
Leaf: 17952 Byte
Root: 575K Byte
Leaf: 58500 Byte
Root: 327 MByte
Leaf: 2.34 MByte
Key delegation
to leaves
0.24 sec 24.1 sec 27 sec 3290 sec
Shared key
computation
0.3 sec 24.4 sec 0.1 sec 0.7 sec
root needs to generate 327 MByte of random data.
Delegating between intermediate nodes in the subset scheme consists only of
hashing (in order to determine which keys to delegate). With the parameter t1 = 7,
the root needs to do one hash calculation for approximately every 85 numbers in
its key ring (since we only need three bits per number in order to select it with
probability 1/8, and one application of SHA256 yields 256 bits). Hence the root
needs to perform only about 100000 hashing operations, which can be completed in
approximately 0.1 seconds. The intermediate nodes need to do even less work to
compute the key delegation. However, the keys in the subset scheme are large, so
key delegation may take considerable bandwidth.
Delegating between intermediate nodes in the polynomial scheme requires the
evaluation of polynomials modulo q. Specifically, every element that a node at
level i delegates to a child is obtained as the result of evaluating a polynomial of
degree ti modulo q, which means performing ti modular multiplications. Since we
work with small ti’s and moderate values of q, and since the secret keys in the
polynomial schemes consists of at most a few thousand elements, then this is a
rather short calculation. In our more computationally-demanding example, with
parameters t1 = 7, t2 = 31, the root needs to evaluate 8192 polynomials of degree
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seven (for a total of about 60000 multiplications modulo a 160-bit to 300-bit prime).
Extrapolating from reported speeds of modular exponentiations, this can be done
in well under one second. For example, the implementation of DSA in openssl
was reported to perform one 160-bit exponentiation modulo a 512-bit prime in 0.8
millisecond on a 2.4 GHz Pentium-4. Hence a multiplication modulo a 300-bit prime
should take no more than 2–3 microseconds, and 60000 of them can be done in under
0.2 seconds. We complement our discussion of implementation issues with a report
on a specific simulation scenario in the following section.
5.5.4 Simulation of key distribution
Although the main advantage of a non-interactive key agreement scheme lies in
applications where the distribution of keys to the leaves can be done in an oﬄine
manner, there are still many applications where one needs to refresh the keys “in
the field”. In this section we examine the feasibility of our key distribution scheme
in such an environment. We build our simulation on the polynomial-based scheme,
which is due to smaller key sizes particularly suitable for an online post-deployment
key distribution. Specifically, we consider a small tactical network, where complete
key refreshing may be mandatory, e.g., to merge networks with different security
parameters.
To get a feel for the time and feasibility for an ad hoc key refreshment in a
tactical network, we set up a simulation scenario illustrating a platoon of 37 nodes
in a city area. For this simulation we chose to work with the setting of t1 = 3, and to
use small parameters also for the elliptic curve. We use the Scenario 3 from Section
3.2. Figure 5.1 shows a snapshot of the simulation. Figure 5.1 shows a snapshot of
the scenario.
In the simulation scenario, the platoon is splitting between buildings in two,
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root
Figure 5.1: Snapshot of our simulation scenario illustrating a platoon.
The platoon consists of 37 nodes traversing a city area.
and temporarily three, subgroups, which are represented by squads. Two of the
squads remain connected nearly all time, while the connection to the third squad
is disrupted several times due to buildings and distances between the squads. The
platoon is intended to be part of a bigger network, e.g., a network of several platoons.
The node labelled as “root” represents the root (level 0) node, the black nodes are
level 1 nodes and the gray nodes are leaf nodes in the hierarchy of depth 2. The
simulation examines a key distribution process, which is executed with a frequency of
50 seconds. For this purpose, the root node disseminates the key material to all level
1 and leaf nodes. As part of a bigger network, the root node can either calculate
the respective keys on its own, or receive it from a key distribution centre. The
simulation starts at the point where the root node already holds the key material
and simulates its distribution in time steps of 50 seconds. This is not supposed
to be a realistic frequency for key refreshing, rather we want to investigate several
times whether the keys can be successfully distributed. The simulation does not
incorporate response messages from internal and leaf nodes or retries in case of
transmission failures.
The keys for level-one nodes in this scheme consist of 42 = 16 numbers modulo
q ≈ 2160, and the size of leaf nodes consist of 16 points on the elliptic curve. Hence
the size of the key material packets for level-one nodes is 16 × 160 = 2560 bit (320
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Figure 5.2: Simulation results of the key distribution in an interval of 50 sec.
The tables beneath show the results for every 50 seconds of the distribution process.
solid line: buildings interrupt communication as shown in Figure 5.1; dashed line:
buildings are ignored.
bytes), and the size of the key material packets for leaf nodes is 16 × 260 = 4160
bits (520 bytes)3.
The graph in Figure 5.2 shows the number of nodes that received their new
key at various points in time. New keys are distributed at a frequency of every
50 seconds. The dotted line illustrates the results using the standard Two Ray
Ground propagation model as incorporated in NS-2 [51], which does not consider
buildings. The figure shows that the distance between the nodes in the periods of
150 to 450, 650 to 800 and 1000 to 1200 seconds is small enough to reach all nodes in
the network. The solid line displays the results under the consideration of buildings
3To transmit the key material securely, it can be encrypted by the old private key as proposed
by Balfe et al. [9].
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as obstacles and reflections on house walls up to a depth of 2 by our ray-optical
propagation model (see Section 3.1.2). In the period of 250 to 1000 seconds, the
root node mostly only reaches 25 nodes, which is the size of the upper two squads
in the simulation. Despite several moments of intervisibility between the squads,
the complete key material cannot be reliably distributed. In the time periods from
second 350–370 and 750–770, for instance, several connections between the squads
exist, but the routing protocol seems to react too slowly to take full advantage of
these temporarily existing routes. These results indicate that we cannot expect a
successful key distribution in a weakly connected network similar to the illustrated
one in second 250 to 1050.
Beneath the graph in Figure 5.2, the first row lists the maximum number of nodes
that could be reached after the respective time. Values are listed for multiples of
100 seconds for the simulation that incorporates influences by buildings (solid line).
The duration values show that the routing process keeps sending packets up to a
period of 30 seconds. If the links in the network are stable, the distribution process
is completed after 1.5 to 5 seconds. This situation occurs in second 150 and 1000
to 1200, when all nodes have a line-of-sight contact, as well as in seconds 400, 500
to 550 and 800 to 900, where the upper two squads are properly connected but the
third one is disconnected from these two due to buildings or distance. The values
for the data and routing packets give an overview of the amount of data that is sent
during a key distribution. The high amount of dropped routing packets highlights
the potential for sophisticated communication strategies, which will be investigated
in future work. However, distribution times of 1.5 to 5 seconds at times when the
network is well connected, and the computation period of less than one second, show
that an ad hoc key refreshment in our hierarchical key generation scheme is feasible
for hierarchy of depth 2 (not counting the root node).
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5.5.5 Summary
The bottleneck of our scheme appeared to be the generation of the leaves’ secret
keys. While the calculation of the master key and the internal nodes’ key material
takes only 0.76 seconds, the leaves’ key generation takes approximately 10 seconds
and turns into the major part of the calculation. To keep the overall execution
period at a feasible level, the calculation of the keys needs to be distributed among
the internal nodes. As stated in the examination above, the key of every node can
be determined by all nodes superior in the node’s hierarchy-branch up to the KDC.
According to our NS-2simulation, the calculation of the leaves’ key polynomials could
be distributed among the 5 superior nodes, where each of these nodes would calculate
at most 6 leave keys. Thus the computation period would be 0.76 seconds in the
first instance for creating the master secret and the key for the internal nodes, and
6 ·0.32 = 1.92 seconds in the second instance, yielding a total period of 2.68 seconds.
Since the dissemination of the key material is split into two parts, where in each
part the respective nodes are at a 1-hop distance, we expect the distribution period
to remain at approximately 3 seconds. The combination of the key generation and
the key distribution therefore yields a total time period of approximately 5 seconds.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed, and analysed, hierarchical non-interactive key
agreement protocols which are particularly suitable for use in MANETs. The em-
phasis of our schemes is on being resilient to compromises of arbitrary numbers of
leaf nodes (which are considered the most vulnerable). While our schemes are lim-
ited in their efficiency as the thresholds grow, this is not an impediment for networks
with the number of nodes and limited hierarchies typically found, for example, in
tactical networks. The proposed schemes are intended to minimise the communica-
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tion complexity both by small key sizes and a decentralised key distribution due to
the hierarchical structure. Simulation of the key distribution process demonstrates
that an online key refreshing requires 1.5 to 5 seconds if the nodes in the MANET
are connected.
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In this chapter we present a novel algorithm for enhancing the efficiency and ro-
bustness of distributed trust authority protocols for MANETs. Our algorithm selects
a set of TA nodes that are best suited to perform a distributed computation such
as a threshold signature using a suite of metrics for measuring the efficiency and
reliability of candidate nodes.
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6.1 Introduction
To avoid a single point of vulnerability or failure, many TA security services in
MANETs are distributed using (k, n)-threshold secret sharing schemes (see Sec-
tion 2.4). A node wishing to obtain certification of a public key, refresh a private
key in an identity-based public key infrastructure or revoke a key using quorum-
based decision making, must typically interact with at least k + 1 TA nodes to
successfully complete a protocol.
In contacting these k + 1 TA nodes, the current MANET literature largely as-
sumes that all TA nodes are equally viable as service providers. However, in all
distributed security architectures (see Section 2.4), nodes can either assign them-
selves as TA members or are selected as TA members based on the network topology.
In Chapter 4 we developed a cluster algorithm to select the TA member nodes based
on parameters such as trust and battery level, to provide a more elaborated choice
of the distributed TA. To contact TA nodes, a requesting node typically floods the
network with service request messages in the hope that they contact the necessary
number of TA nodes. Unfortunately, the level of interactivity required to support
such schemes may become problematic in ad hoc networks due to the limited energy
capacity of nodes, as well as bandwidth constraints on the communication links be-
tween nodes. Excessive amounts of inter-node communication can quickly deplete a
node’s energy reserves, as well as potentially clogging the channel over which multi-
ple nodes must communicate, ultimately disrupting the provision of security services
within the network.
In this chapter we take the view that TA nodes are not equal, and that it
should be possible to specify which individual TA nodes participate in a protocol
request. For instance, a group of TA nodes may be deemed to be more reliable,
better connected, have greater energy reserves, be within a certain geographically
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bounded area or be considered more trustworthy than another group of TA nodes.
To this end, we present a novel route optimisation algorithm that determines a
suitable set of TA nodes (as judged against a specified set of criteria metrics), and
that provides a routing path to contact these nodes with minimum communication
overhead. Our algorithm further balances the need for resource efficiency with the
ability to reliably complete a distributed TA service within a bounded time-frame
(with a specified success probability). If our algorithm finds a satisfactory solution,
it returns a set of TA nodes and an appropriate (Pareto-optimal) routing strategy
for contacting them. If no initial solution can be found matching our constraints, our
algorithm returns a set of suitable TA nodes and a calculated success probability to
reach k+1 of these nodes (based on average number of prior successful interactions).
In the latter case, the returned nodes can either be contacted directly using unicast
protocol, or, alternatively, the success probability, time frame and/or criteria metric
parameters of our algorithm can be relaxed for a revised run of our algorithm in an
attempt to find a more efficient routing solution.
6.2 Background
There has been significant research on distributed security protocols for ad hoc
networks in recent years [153, 78, 87, 147]. Beginning with the work of Zhou and Haas
[153], much research has been carried out on distributing traditionally centralised
Certification Authority (CA) functionality over multiple nodes within a network
[78, 87]. In [153], nodes are pre-designated as either CA or non-CA nodes. A non-
CA node wishing to obtain certification must contact at least k-out-of-n CA nodes
via a reliable broadcast channel. The use of network broadcast techniques as a
means of reliably contacting TA nodes has also been studied in [147]. To reduce the
high communication overhead generated by flooding, later proposals have suggested
the use of β-unicast as a mechanism for contacting TA nodes [148]. This mechanism
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relies on multiple individual unicasts targeted on individual TA nodes. Carter et al.
[31] achieve a further reduction of the communication overhead by investigating
manycast routing protocols for contacting TA nodes. However, missing from the
majority of these proposals is the criteria leading to the selection and use of TA
nodes. With the exception of [148], many authors leave the selection of TA nodes
to some unexplained and unexamined policy layer. In [148], the authors suggest
that TA nodes should be elected based upon battery level, transmission range and
physical protection, but their proposed algorithms for contacting TA nodes ignores
this information in composing a suitable routing strategy.
6.3 Communication algorithm
In this section we outline our route optimisation algorithm for contacting selected
TA nodes. Our algorithm assumes an overlay network of TA nodes that operates on
top of a physical MANET. A requesting non-TA node initially contacts his nearest
TA node, who in return contacts k additional TA nodes (using an efficient routing
strategy). To select these additional TA nodes, we assume the initiating TA node
has the following information: the location of TA nodes in its neighbourhood, e.g.,
all TA nodes that are at most c physical hops away; the length of routes (number of
hops) between these TA nodes; and any pertinent properties of these TA nodes, e.g.,
energy-reserves, degree of physical protection etc. We assume that this information
is publicly available (or at least derivable) from network observations.
Our algorithm’s goal is to find an overlay route containing a desired set of TA
nodes. We leave the routing between the non-TA nodes to the underlying MANET
routing protocol. We denote a non-splitting route, which is starting and ending
at the same TA node, as a single loop path. The length of a single loop path
is the number of TA nodes it contains, excluding the point of contact TA node.
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Figure 6.1(a) shows an example of a single loop of length 4. We refer to a loop
consisting of one or more single loops as a splitting loop, and the individual single
loops within this splitting loop as partial loops, see Figure 6.1(b). The length of a
splitting loop is the length of the longest partial loop it contains.
(a) Single loop. (b) Splitting loop with
two partial loops.
(c) Splitting loop with
six partial loops.
Figure 6.1: Single and splitting loops.
TA Node = Black, Non-TA Node = White, TA Overlay Route = Solid Line,
Physical Route = Dashed Line.
We model the communication cost (or cost) of either a single or partial loop by
the number of transmissions required to complete the loop, approximated by the
number of physical hops. For example, the route in Figure 6.1(a) contains the ini-
tially contacted TA node, 4 other TA nodes, and 5 non-TA nodes. The number of
hops, and thus the communication cost of the route shown in Figure 6.1(a) is there-
fore 10. Our routing optimisation strategy, as shown in Figure 6.1(a) and 6.1(b),
applies only to distributed protocols in which the payload does not dramatically
increase as the route is traversed. For protocols unsuitable for this sort of execution,
every node must be contacted independently. However, we note that this strategy
can be expressed using multiple splitting loops. Figure 6.1(c) shows a splitting loop
in which every TA node is independently contacted.
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6.3.1 Probability for success and expectation values
Once the initiator TA node has begun a distributed protocol, several factors can
impact the protocol run. In particular, nodes along the path may fail or refuse to
participate in the protocol (either as result of temporary overloading or because
of Byzantine behaviour). Consequently, one or more partial loops may fail, either
through non-participation of one or more TA nodes or through the (partial) collapse
of the path due to networking issues. In either case, less than the desired k TA nodes
will have been contacted and the protocol may have to be (partially) restarted.
In order to estimate the probability for the occurrence of partial failure, every
TA node stores the results from previous protocol runs and sets the probability of
each event (non-participation and path collapse) to the average outcome of prior
interactions. We denote pj as the probability that a contacted TA node nj will
successfully contribute to the protocol, and p(i) as the probability that a single loop
(or partial loop) of length i will not collapse. The values of pj and p
(i) are based on
potentially incomplete information, and cannot incorporate all (statistical) depen-
dencies between the effects of non-participation and loop collapse. Consequently, pj
and p(i) can only provide approximative probability values. We initially set both
probabilities to 0.5.
Based on pj and p
(i), we calculate probabilities and expectation values for the
communication cost, and for the number of TA nodes that will successfully con-
tribute to the protocol run. The probability of successfully reaching k nodes in a
splitting loop L is given by:
P (L)(k) =
∑
(J,I)∈K∗L

∏
j∈J
pj ·
∏
j∈L\J
(1− pj) · PI

 ,
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where
PI =
∑
I∈I

∏
i∈I
p(i) ·
∏
i∈IL\I
(1− p(i))

 .
K∗L contains all possible combinations of TA nodes and non-collapsing loops in which
exactly k TA nodes are successfully contacted. Thus, K∗L consists of tuples (J,I)
which define a set of TA nodes in J , and the corresponding sets of non-collapsing
single loops of length i in I. Furthermore, IL is the set of all single loops of length i
contained in L. Consequently, the expectation value EN (L) for the number of nodes
that can be reached in a splitting loop L can be calculated as:
EN (L) =
∑
k
P (L)(k) · k . (6.1)
If an insufficient number of TA nodes have been reached for the distributed compu-
tation, the initiator TA node may need to contact the remaining TA nodes in one or
more additional rounds. Let L1km denote the splitting loop that is executed in round
1, and Lmkm, m ≥ 2, denote m alternative loops to be used in the following rounds.
Furthermore, let Lmkm denote the splitting loop in a possible configuration
conf :=
{
L1k1, (L
2
k2)1≤k2≤k1, (L
3
k3)1≤k3≤k2, . . .
}
,
that is executed in round m, if a number km of TA nodes remains to be contacted
after m − 1 rounds. The probability P (S, k), that the initial k TA nodes can be
contacted after mˆ rounds is given by:
P (S, k) =
mˆ∑
m˜=1
∑
~k∈Km˜
(
m˜∏
m=1
P (L
m
km
)(km+1)
)
, (6.2)
where Km˜ is given by:
Km˜ = {(k1, . . . , km˜+1)|k1 = k, km˜+1 = 0, ki ≥ ki+1} .
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Accordingly, the expectation value EC(S) for the communication cost of a configu-
ration conf , under the assumption that k nodes could be reached, can be calculated
as:
EC(S) =
mˆ∑
m˜=1
∑
~k∈K
(
m˜∏
m=1
P (L
m
km
)(km+1) · Cost(Lmkm)
)
. (6.3)
6.3.2 Greedy communication algorithm
Our Greedy algorithm consists of three stages. In the first stage, our algorithm
chooses an initial set of TA nodes and a routing strategy that contacts each of these
nodes independently (Figure 6.1(c)). In the second stage, our algorithm successively
searches for a more efficient routing strategy using splitting loops, which always con-
tain a subset from the TA nodes determined in the first stage. The third stage of our
algorithm simply compares all routing strategies from the first and the second stage,
and returns the most optimal (as judged against our fitness criteria of timeliness,
probability of success and the quality metrics of the TAs) as the algorithm’s output.
It is possible that the algorithm executes several iterations during one distributed
protocol computation. If less than the desired k nodes were reached in the first (or
a subsequent rounds), the remaining TA nodes can be used to complete the dis-
tributed protocol in future rounds. We denote the TA nodes that have not been
contacted in a previous round as G.
First stage: The first stage chooses the sets g1, g2 ⊂ G, g1 ∩ g2 = ∅ of TA nodes for
the current protocol run. TA nodes are added to sets g1 and g2 as follows:
I: Our algorithm first determines the expected number of nodes that can be con-
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Algorithm 6.1: Communication algorithm pseudocode.
Input: minProb, k, quality metrics, maxT, set of all nodes
/* First stage: Initialize the set of possible configurations C */
P = 0; /* P : Probability to reach k nodes by current configuration conf */1
while P < (1 +minProb)/2 do2
if EN (L
g1) ≤ EN(L
g2) then3
add new node to g1 (based on quality metrics);4
else5
add new node to g2 (based on quality metrics) ;6
end7
determine direct way to reach nodes in g1 and g2 (current configuration conf);8
calculate new P value for conf ;9
if P ≥ minProb then10
add conf to C;11
end12
end13
if C = ∅ then14
return conf ;15
end16
/* Second stage: Find loops to contact subsets of g1 and g2 */
while P ≥ minProb do17
find loop to current choice of g1 and g2;18
calculate new P value for conf ;19
if P ≥ minProb then20
add conf to C;21
(Step A)22
end23
remove last added node from g1 or g2;24
(Step B)25
end26
/* Third stage: Return best configuration */
minCost = infinity;27
bestConf = NULL;28
for conf in C do29
calculate new P value for conf ;30
while P ≥ minProb do31
remove node from g2;32
calculate new P value for new conf ;33
end34
if cost for conf < minCost then35
minCost = cost for conf ;36
bestConf = conf ;37
end38
end39
return bestConf ;40
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tacted directly from either g1 or g2. To balance the chance of contacting the
same number of nodes from g1 and g2, a new node will be selected for inclusion
in g1 if EN (L
g1) ≤ EN (Lg2) (see Equation 6.1) and for g2 otherwise, see step II.
II: In this step, our algorithm searches for a suitable node to add to either g1 or
g2, based upon the nodes perceived quality metrics. We use a quality value, as
used before for our cluster algorithm in Chapter 4, to consider all the desired
quality metrics for a given node. This quality value rj of a node nj is a result
from several metrics fi, and outputs a value between 0 and 1.
Let M be the set of desirable properties (e.g., battery level, trust, etc.), then
the quality value is calculated as: rj =
∑
i∈M λifi, where λi is the weighting
factor for property i (adding up to 1):
∑
i∈M λi = 1, λi ≥ 0. In order to factor
in a node’s connectivity to the network, we define a new connectivity metric fc
with the function d(nj , nk) calculating the number of hops (distance) between
node nj and nk.
fc(nj) = min
( P
nk∈g1
nk
k · d(nj , nk)
−
P
nk∈g2
nk
k · d(nj , nk)
+
P
nk∈G\(g1∪g2)
nk
2k · d(nj , nk)
, 1
)
The purpose of the connectivity metric is to positively consider the topologi-
cal proximity of the TA node nj to all g1-nodes, and negatively consider the
proximity to g2-nodes. TA nodes that do not belong to either g1 or g2 are also
considered positively, but only with half weighting1. This allows us to obtain
two sets, g1 and g1, where the nodes in each set can reach each other either
directly or over a few hops.
For example, let us assume that connectivity and battery level are the dominant
factors in determining node placement in g1. The connectivity is measured by
fc and the battery level is measured by the energy metric fe, as defined in
1If a node is to be added to the set g2, then g1 and g2 need to be reversed in the equation.
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[117]. Then the quality value rj =
1
2fc(nj) +
1
2fe(nj) is calculated for every
node nj ∈ G. The node with the highest quality value will be added to g1.
III: This process ends when the probability P (S, k) has reached 1+minProb2 , or when
no more TA nodes are available, i.e., G = g1 ∪ g2.
The set g1, |g1| ≥ k will now contain the nodes that the initiating TA will try to
contact, in order to perform a distributed computation. If the distributed computa-
tion can be completed successfully by contacting TA nodes from g1, the set g2 will
not be used. However, if some of the nodes in g1 fail to participate in the distributed
protocol, then the distributed computation will fail. If k1 < k TA nodes could be
reached in the first attempt, then k2 = k− k1 TA nodes remain to be contacted. To
contact these remaining nodes, nodes from g2 can be used.
The algorithm terminates here if P (S, k) < minProb, i.e., no configuration could
be found for the given constraints. Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds with the sec-
ond stage to find more efficient routing strategies.
Second stage: The second stage consists of two iteratively executed steps, A and
B (see Algorithm 6.1). Step A determines an alternative loop to contact the current
nodes in g1. Step B removes a single node from g1. The second stage begins with a
single execution of step A in order to find an alternative route for the nodes in g1.
Then steps A and B are applied consecutively until the probability to reach k TA
nodes is less than minProb. Step B next simply removes one node from either g1
or g2; nodes are removed in the opposite order in which they were added in the first
stage. The heuristic strategy to determine the alternative (improved) route in step
B merges successively those single loops to the current configuration which yield the
highest EN value. Thus, this stage begins with a single loop L with the highest
EN (L) value. As long as nodes remain in g1 (which are not included in L), a further
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loop is added to L, i.e., combined with L to form a splitting loop.
Third stage: The third stage compares all of the configurations that have resulted
from the first and second stages, and chooses the configuration with the smallest
cost expectation value EC(S) as the final result. The TA then uses the selected
nodes to attempt its computation with the appropriate routing strategy.
Table 6.1: Average simulation results from 50–150 nodes.
simulation area [m] 400 × 500
number of nodes 50 75
k 2 3 4 2 3 4
Costs (direct) 16.06 25.57 35.99 15.19 23.73 33.25
Costs (proposed) 9.55 16.59 24.63 9.51 16.27 23.93
SuccessProb (direct) 0.91 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.86
SuccessProb (proposed) 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.85
R 95100
88
100
43
100
100
100
98
100
80
100
CostRed 40.5 % 35.1 % 31.6 % 37.4 % 31.4 % 28.0 %
CompTime 2.4 ms 4.2 ms 12 ms 3.9 ms 9.4 ms 37 ms
simulation area [m] 500 × 800
number of nodes 100 150
k 2 3 4 2 3 4
Costs (direct) 18.56 29.27 40.32 17.99 27.84 38.42
Costs (proposed) 11.82 20.29 28.57 11.90 19.98 28.40
SuccessProb (direct) 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.86
SuccessProb (proposed) 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.85
R 100100
95
100
85
100
100
100
99
100
96
100
CostRed 36.3 % 30.7 % 29.1 % 33.9 % 28.2 % 26.1 %
CompTime 4.4 ms 12.6 ms 39 ms 4.7 ms 16.3 ms 65 ms
6.4 Analysis and simulation results
In this section we analyse the behaviour of our communication algorithm with re-
spect to its complexity and its efficiency.
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6.4.1 Complexity
To determine the algorithm’s complexity, we refer to the pseudo-code definition
found in Section 6.3.2. The key aspect of the first stage is the selection of new nodes,
which are split into groups g1 and g2. For this purpose, our connectivity value fc(nj)
is calculated for each TA node nj, which can be contacted within the time maxT .
Furthermore, the knowledge of each node is assumed to be restricted to its c-hop
neighbourhood. Assuming a network with a maximum node degree d, in which every
node is a TA node and the number of fc(nj) values that must be calculated to add a
node to g1 or g2 (line 4 or 6) is min
{
d · (maxT/2)·((maxT/2)+1)2 , d · (c/2)·((c/2)+1)2
}
. The
operations in line 3, 8 and 9 have a constant complexity. Since these calculations
must be executed up to 2k times during the “while loop” starting at line 2, the
complexity of the first stage can be expressed as min
{
O(maxT 2 k), O(k c2)
}
.
The second stage consists of step A (lines 18 to 22) for determining a new route
for the remaining TA nodes, and step B (line 23) for reducing the number of TA
nodes. In step A, all possible single loops with a maximum length of k are deter-
mined. This calculation is performed once for all loops of length i, i < k. Each
removed node can be deleted from this set to achieve the single loops for k˜ < k.
The complexity to determine the initial i-loops for i ≤ k is O(dk), as each of the k
TA nodes is assumed to have at most d neighbours. Step B requires a single calcu-
lation for each of the k˜ remaining nodes, yielding a complexity of O(k˜). The overall
complexity of the second stage is therefore
∑k
k˜=1
O(k˜) = O(k·(k+1)2 ) = O(k
2).
To combine multiple single loops to one splitting loop, the expectation value for
the number of reachable nodes EN is calculated for all single loops. The number
of single loops cannot exceed dk, and the calculation for the cost expectation value
is linear to the number of nodes contained in the loop. In preparation for the
final combination to a splitting loop, the single loops are sorted by their EN values
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with an insertion sort with quadratic complexity. Consequently, the complexity for
calculating and sorting the EN values is O(d
kk2). Finally, a subset of the single
loops is combined to the resulting splitting loop. In the worst case, all dk single
loops are chosen successively in the sorted order, yielding constant complexity. The
combination of single loops to the resulting splitting loop has a complexity of O(dk).
Thus, the complexity for stage 2 is O(k2) +O(dk) +O(dkk2) +O(dk) = O(dkk2).
Stage three consists of selecting the best configuration that has occurred during
the first and second stages. Since the first stage creates at most |g1| configurations,
and any reduction of the nodes in stage two results in a single new configuration,
the number of configurations which are created in the first two stages is linear in
k (line 30). Every examination of a configuration requires the reduction of nodes
in g2 (line 31 to 34). As the number of nodes in g2 is at most k, the complexity
for the third stage is O(k2). Consequently, the overall complexity of the algorithm
is min
{
O(k ·maxT 2), O(k · c2)}+O(dkk2). In infrastructure-less tactical networks
consisting of usually no more than 150 nodes, d = 6 is a reasonable choice. Addition-
ally, in many MANETs the choice of k is typically small [85] and so our algorithm
remains feasible within such networks.
6.4.2 Efficiency
To examine the efficiency of our algorithm, we performed 4 test series, each consisting
of 100 different network topologies. Our simulations consisted of two groups of 50
and 75 nodes (respectively) in a 400 m × 500 m area, and of two groups of 100 and
150 nodes (respectively) in an 800 m × 500 m area. The transmission range of the
nodes was set to 100 m, and the topologies were created by randomly generating
the nodes’ positions within the defined areas. We determine initial TA nodes by a
1-hop cluster algorithm, in which nodes with a high number of neighbours initially
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qualify for TA selection [117]. Additionally, we set the reliability of the connections
between TA nodes, and the probability that a given TA node participates, to 0.95,
i.e pj = 0.95 and p
(i) = (0.95)i. We also configured our simulations so that the
initiator TA node knows all other TA nodes in its 6-hop neighbourhood (c = 6).
Furthermore, we set the minProb to 0.8, and the desired maximum execution time
for the protocol run to maxT = 10 units of time. Furthermore, the algorithm is
configured to optimise for minimum communication overhead, i.e., rj = fc.
Table 6.1 shows the results of our test series. R is the ratio of topologies,
which afforded the possibility to reach k nodes. CostRed = (Costs(direct) −
Costs(algo))/Costs(direct) shows the expected cost reduction of the proposed rout-
ing strategy, compared to the basis case of contacting each TA node indepen-
dently. Furthermore, CompTime shows the time necessary to complete a proto-
col. The expected costs (i.e., the number of transmissions) and the probability
(SuccessProb = P (L)(k)) for successfully reaching k nodes in the time window
maxT , are compared for the different routing strategies.
For all three values of k, our algorithm achieves a greater cost reduction for a
smaller number of nodes. This can be explained by the density of TA nodes in
the network; the longer the inter-TA node distances become, the greater the cost
reduction achieved by the algorithm’s routing strategy.
6.5 Summary
Distributed protocols for MANETs have to cope with Byzantine behaviour and
unreliable communication links. Whilst many existing security protocols for TA
services build on broadcast techniques and network flooding, we have shown the
potential for more reliable and significantly more efficient routing strategies. We
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have investigated the use of overlay networks (optimising for certain configurable
properties) and partial re-starting, and developed an algorithm for enhancing the
efficiency and robustness of these computations. Our simulation results demonstrate
significant energy efficiency improvements for small to medium-sized networks (50
to 150 nodes). These efficiency gains may go a long way to ensuring the longevity
of TA security services within a network.
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In this chapter we present a lightweight probabilistic path authentication scheme
to detect and diagnose routing misbehavior in MANETs.
7.1 Introduction
The security of routing protocols against a variety of attacks, including worm hole,
impersonation and falsification attacks, has sparked the interest of the research
community in recent years. In Section 2.5.4 we gave an overview on secure routing
protocols for MANETs, which typically rely on digital signatures, i.e., costly public
key cryptography. In this chapter we make a contribution to the security of routing
protocols that is based on symmetric key cryptography and is resilient against active
Byzantine attackers.
We present a lightweight probabilistic path authentication scheme allowing us
to detect and diagnose routing misbehaviour in MANETs. The goal of path au-
thentication is to verify the conformance of the path traversed by a packet with the
path prescribed by the underlying routing protocol and detect (and identify) misbe-
having nodes in the event of non-conformance. In particular, we focus on incorrect
packet forwarding behaviour for the following reasons. First, a malicious node may
violate the path prescribed by the routing protocol (e.g., shortest path or trusted
path) to interrupt critical data flows or divert traffic to perform timing and traffic
analysis attacks. Second, many route falsification attacks (e.g., grey hole or worm
hole) result in incorrect packet forwarding behaviour. Third, misconfigured nodes
often lead to incorrect packet forwarding behaviour.
We introduce a new cryptographic primitive, composite Message Authentication
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Code (composite MAC), which forms the basis of our lightweight probabilistic path
authentication scheme. In our scheme, composite MACs can have any length start-
ing from one bit. Rather than attempting to authenticate the path traversed by
each packet, the proposed scheme amortises the cost of path authentication over
a sequence of packets that traverse the same path, while allowing the recipient to
collectively authenticate (with high probability) the path traversed by these packets.
Besides the authentication of an expected path (Figure 7.1(a)), our scheme facilitates
the identification of the path, even when it deviates from the intended one (Figure
7.1(b)). Furthermore, our proposed approach supports the detection of malicious
nodes (Figure 7.1(c)) that do not follow the prescribed path authentication scheme
correctly, i.e., change the authentication tag in an unintended way. We present a
detailed security analysis that shows the detection and diagnostic capabilities of our
scheme.
We also present a detailed quantitative analysis that captures various tradeoffs
between a resource constrained MANET (e.g., mobility and mean lifetime of a path
or size of authentication tags) and the desired security properties (e.g., probability
of correct path authentication, probability of diagnosing and pin-pointing misbehav-
ing node(s) in the event of an authentication failure). We show how the number of
bits in an authentication tag needs to be chosen to achieve detectability of malicious
nodes with a desired probability for a given network size and a given range of route
lengths. We argue that the computation costs of identifying the path and the prob-
ability of detecting misbehaving nodes compete in an optimisation problem. The
results from our quantitative analysis show that a stream of ten packets carrying
an eight bit MAC each is sufficient to authenticate a path of length five, and to de-
tect misbehaving nodes (if present) with high probability. These results show that
the probabilistic path authentication scheme can operate even on short-lived paths,
which are common in MANETs.
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(a) Path identification by verification: If
a packet was forwarded through the ex-
pected path, the destination node can di-
rectly verify it.
(b) Path identification by back tracing:
If the packet is forwarded over an un-
expected path, the destination node can
identify the nodes by back tracing the au-
thentication tag.
(c) Detection of a Byzantine node: A ma-
licious node might overwrite the authenti-
cation tag of the packets with random bits
to avoid back tracing. This node can be
identified with an accuracy of up to two
nodes (dotted circle).
Figure 7.1: Identification and detection capabilities.
7.2 Background
Recently, several research proposals have used cooperative network monitoring based
on root cause analysis techniques to detect malicious and faulty nodes in networks.
Cooperative monitoring techniques range from physical layer power estimation for
detecting jamming attacks [149][64], and MAC layer misbehaviour detection [108][81]
to routing layer faults and anomaly detection [128]. However, to date, all cooperative
root cause analysis techniques assume that the monitors are honest, what is not a
reasonable assumption in Tactical MANETs.
Boldyreva et al. [23] introduced the primitive of an ordered multi-signature
scheme, which allows signers to attest to a common message as well as to the order
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in which they signed it. The benefit of Boldyreva’s scheme compared to previous
similar work on multi-signatures is that it does not require synchronised clocks or a
trusted first signer. Boldyreva focuses on path authentication in the Internet as the
main application of the scheme. Pairing-based signature schemes (as Boldyreva’s)
have a signature size of typically 60 bytes, which is still small compared to other
public key-based signature schemes. Since the typical packet size is 1500 bytes, in
wired as well as in wireless communication, the additional communication overhead
caused by the 60 byte signature is approximately 5 % (for a 1200 byte payload).
We note that most nodes in a MANET are battery powered and thus severely con-
strained. Hence, while this additional communication overhead might be feasible for
the Internet, decreasing the lifetime of a MANET by 5 % appears to be unreason-
able. Furthermore, performing elliptic curve operations on each forwarding node for
each packet imposes a computational overhead, which is infeasible for devices with
limited computational capabilities and battery power.
7.3 Problem definition
In this section we outline the design requirements that our path authentication
scheme must satisfy, describe the assumptions that we make about our scheme and
outline our adversary model.
7.3.1 Design requirements
• Unforgeability: We require the path authentication scheme to be unforgeable
by any number of misbehaving nodes on the path.
• Path identification: We require a scheme that facilitates to provably identify
the nodes on the path even if the path deviates from the expected one, namely,
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the path prescribed by the routing protocol. Path identification therefore
includes path authentication, since we consider path authentication as the
proof of the nodes’ identities of an expected path.
• Detection of misbehaving nodes: We require a scheme that facilitates
detection of misbehaving nodes, including those nodes that attempt to strate-
gically deviate from the path authentication scheme (see Section 7.3.3).
• Computational efficiency: We require the scheme to be lightweight and
flexible to support a wide range of devices ranging from handheld devices
(e.g., PDAs) to laptops.
• Communication overhead: We require that the scheme adds at most a
few additional bits to each packet. We call this field of additional bits the
authentication tag, or tag for short.
• Part of routing: We require a scheme that blends in the routing protocol:
no nodes outside the route shall be involved and no additional packets shall
be sent.
7.3.2 Assumptions
• Symmetric key infrastructure: We assume that the destination node
shares a symmetric key with the source and with each intermediate node on
the route to the destination node. Key distribution schemes that require mini-
mal storage and no communication overhead to calculate a shared key, include
non-interactive key distribution schemes, as we proposed in Chapter 5. We
also assume that the nodes can efficiently perform symmetric key operations
as well as compute a collision resistant hash function and a pseudorandom
function.
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• Routing protocol: We assume that the coalition MANET uses a source
routing protocol, i.e., the entire path is determined by the source (or the
destination) node. Source routing is commonly used in the Internet (e.g.,
BGP) and MANETs (e.g., DSR, AODV) to support policy-based routing.
7.3.3 Adversary model
We distinguish between two types of attacks that target the path authentication
protocol itself:
• Selfish nodes: A node is selfish if it forwards packets correctly but ignores
the path authentication protocol (e.g., to save energy), i.e., the node does not
change the authentication tag as required by the protocol.
• Byzantine nodes: A node is Byzantine if it modifies the tag in a way that
deviates from the path authentication protocol (e.g., attempts to forge the
path, overwrite with random content, etc.).
We want our path authentication scheme to be robust against any number of selfish
and Byzantine nodes (Section 7.3.1) in the path. We assume the source and the
destination node to be honest.
7.4 Metric-based path authentication algorithm
In this section we introduce our probabilistic path authentication scheme, which uses
composite MACs, an extension of aggregate MACs introduced by Katz and Lindell
[74] for message authentication. Our scheme allows to verify the conformance of the
path traversed by a packet with the path prescribed by the routing protocol; and
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to detect (and to identify) misbehaving nodes in the event of non-conformance. We
exploit the ability of Katz’s scheme to sequentially aggregate several MACs into a
constant size authentication tag, while significantly shortening the tag size (say to 1
to 8 bits). We note that short tags result in probabilistic verification; for example,
a verified tag of length 4 can only ensure authenticity with a probability of 1516 .
However, the proposed scheme extracts its strength by aggregating the information
contained in multiple authentication tags that are embedded in a stream of packets.
The proposed scheme is agnostic to packet losses and out-of-order packet arrivals;
only the total number of packets used for the authentication is of interest. Hence,
composite MACs are especially useful in a MANET setting where communication is
unreliable and highly expensive.
7.4.1 Composite MACs
We first recall the aggregate MAC scheme [74]. We use ki,d to denote the shared
key between node i (in the path) and node d (the destination node).
Definition 5 (Aggregate Message Authentication Code) Let Mac be a pseu-
dorandom MAC that takes a key ki,d and the actual message m (the rest of the packet
that excludes the authentication tag) as input; tag is the authentication tag of the
same length as Mac.
• Initialisation: The sender sets
tag = Macks,d(m) ,
where ks,d is the shared key between the sender s and the destination node d.
The sender forwards tag and the message m.
• Aggregation: On input m and tag, a node i sharing the key ki,d with the
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destination node, computes
tag = tag⊕Macki,d(m) .
Node i forwards tag and the message m.
• Verification: On inputm, tag and an expected set I of nodes that aggregated
their MAC to tag (including the sender), the destination node d verifies:
tag =
⊕
i∈I
Macki,d(m) .
Definition 6 (Composite Message Authentication Code) Let Mac be a pseu-
dorandom MAC that takes a key ki,d and the actual message m as input. tag is
the authentication tag of the same length as Mac. Composite MAC extends aggre-
gate MAC by defining the three composition operators Aggregate, Overwrite and
KeepIdentical. Nodes in the path pseudo-randomly choose a composition opera-
tor that is applied for the authentication tag. We now describe the composite MAC
scheme; the role of these composition operators will become evident in the subsequent
sections.
• Initialisation: The sender sets
tag = Macks,d(m) ,
where ks,d is the shared key between the sender s and the destination node d.
The sender forwards tag and the message m.
• Composition: On input m and tag, a node i sharing the key ki,d with the
destination node, computes
tag = tag ◦Macki,d(m) .
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Node i forwards tag and the message m. The composition operator ◦ can be
defined as Aggregate, Overwrite, or KeepIdentical:
– Aggregate: tag ◦Macki,d(m) = tag⊕Macki,d(m) ,
– Overwrite: tag ◦Macki,d(m) = Macki,d(m) ,
– KeepIdentical: tag ◦Macki,d(m) = tag ,
• Verification: On input m, tag and an expected ordered set I of nodes that
modified tag (including the sender), the destination node d verifies:
tag =©i∈IMacki,d(m) .
7.4.2 Detection of misbehaving nodes
In this section we informally discuss the detection capabilities of the composite MAC
scheme. A detailed security analysis is presented in Section 7.5.
Byzantine nodes. While an aggregate MAC, as defined in Definition 5, can be
used for path authentication, it does not support detection of Byzantine nodes.
For instance, a Byzantine node can easily subvert the aggregate MAC scheme by
overwriting the tag with random bits (see Byzantine nodes in Section 7.3.3). Since
the remaining nodes on the path would aggregate their MACs with a random tag, the
resulting tag would still remain random, and therefore be of no use for the destination
node. The composite MAC scheme defeats Byzantine nodes using the composition
operator Overwrite as follows. Honest nodes positioned between the misbehaving
node and the destination node may overwrite the tag with their MACs as part of the
composite MAC scheme, thereby allowing us to detect the last Byzantine node in the
path with non-trivial probability. The key intuition is that even if a misbehaving
node ij in a path {s, i1, i2, . . . , ir, d} (j < r) replaces the tag with random bits,
160
7.4 Metric-based path authentication algorithm
benign overwritings by subsequent nodes {ij+1, . . . , ir} allow the recipient to detect
the misbehaving node ij .
Selfish nodes. A composite MAC, as defined in Definition 6, is agnostic to selfish
nodes on the path. Recall that a node is selfish (see Section 7.3.3) if it simply ignores
the path authentication scheme, i.e., leaves the tag unchanged. Since selfish nodes
put no information at all in the authentication tag, evidence about their existence
in the path has to be provided by other nodes. In order to detect selfish nodes, we
incorporate the information about the respective prior node i − 1 as an additional
parameter in the MAC. We use F to denote a pseudorandom function that takes
the message m, the key ki,d and the identifier IDi−1 (of the previous node) as input,
and outputs a unique string of the same length as tag:
Macki,d(m, IDi−1) = F (m,ki,d, IDi−1) . (7.1)
Thus, if a node that was expected to be part of a path did not aggregate/overwrite
its MAC to an authentication tag when it was expected to, the destination node can
identify the selfish node by the MAC of the subsequent node.
7.4.3 Back tracing
In this section we describe our back tracing mechanism, which identifies the nodes
on the path traversed by a stream of packets. We recall that back tracing is used
when the packet takes an unexpected path, i.e., tag verification failed, indicating
that the path traversed by the packets did not conform to the expected path. We
first describe a naive and inefficient approach to back tracing. We then show that
one can suitably tune the composite MAC scheme to achieve more efficient solutions
that can scale with the size of the network.
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Let S denote the set of nodes that are potentially contained in the path. In
the absence of any additional information, S includes the set of all nodes (all par-
ticipating organisations) in a coalition MANET. Back tracing essentially works by
postulating a hypothesis (a plausible path taken by the packet(s)) and corroborat-
ing the hypothesis against evidence (a collection of authentication tags on these
packet(s)). It is easy to see that the number of such hypothesis (number of plausi-
ble paths) is combinatorial in S in the worst case. To keep the complexity of back
tracing low, we use two enhancements.
First, we pseudo-randomly choose only a small subset of nodes on the path to
aggregate or overwrite an authentication tag. We ensure that the choice of a node
to aggregate, overwrite or keep an authentication tag identical, is known by the
respective forwarding node and the destination node, and must not be known by
any other node in the network. This approach significantly decreases the number
of possible honest nodes that modify the authentication tag, thereby decreasing the
cost of identifying an unexpected path by back tracing. At the same time, it is not
possible for a bad node to selectively misbehave (and to avoid detection), since it
cannot a priori guess the choice of composition (aggregate/overwrite/keep identical)
exercised by the good nodes on the path.
We use the parameters p and q to denote the fraction of sub-tags that are modified
by aggregation and overwriting, respectively. Consequently, 1 − p − q denotes the
fraction of sub-tags that are kept identical by a node. To achieve these properties,
we let a node i aggregate its MAC to the tag of a packet if:
2−λ · PRF (packetID, ki,d) ≤ p ,
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overwrite the tag with its MAC if:
p < 2−λ · PRF (packetID, ki,d) ≤ p+ q ,
and keep it identical otherwise. PRF is a publicly known pseudorandom function
whose output is a non-negative integer of length λ bits, and ki,d is the shared key
between node i and the destination node. The packet identifier packetID can be
any part of the packet that uniquely defines the packet. Depending on the routing
protocol, this could be a sequence number or the timestamp on the packet. Using
packetID allows a node i to pseudo-randomly change the choice of composition on
a per-packet basis.
As our complexity analysis in Section 7.6.3 shows, a careful choice of the param-
eters p and q reduces the complexity of back tracing to poly(|S|)1. Further, in large
MANETs the set of nodes that might participate in a path can be restricted to the
nodes that are within a certain distance from the source and destination node.
Second, to enhance the efficacy of back tracing, we argue that using cn tags of
length n/cn is superior to using one tag of length n. The key intuition here is as
follows. In a composite MAC scheme, each verifiable tag serves as evidence for a
subsequence of the path traversed by the packet. The table in Figure 7.1 shows the
evidence encoded in sample tags attached to packets that traversed the same path.
It is easy to see that increasing the Overwrite probability q decreases the chances of
authenticating long paths. However, in the absence of a non-zero q, the scheme can-
not tolerate Byzantine nodes. Given q > 0, using multiple sub-tags (cn > 1) allows
each sub-tag to serve as an evidence for different subsequences of the path (e.g., {i4,
i5} from tag2, {i6} from tag3 and {i3, i5} from tag4), thereby enhancing the efficacy
of back tracing without compromising detection (of Byzantine nodes). To this end,
1O(|S|3) under typical parameter settings.
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the respective MAC Maci,d of length n is divided in cn MACs Maci,d,j, j = 1, . . . , cn
of length n/cn such that Maci,d = Maci,d,1|Maci,d,2| . . . |Maci,d,cn (| is the concatena-
tion operator). A detailed quantitative analysis in Section 7.6 shows the tradeoffs
between the number of sub-tags and the efficacy of back tracing and detection.
Table 7.1: Evidence collection.
{s, i1, i2, · · · , i6, d} = path traversed by the packet; i2 is a Byzantine node; Actions
taken by nodes on the path: A = aggregate, O = overwrite, Or = overwrite with
random bits (Byzantine node), K = keep identical; Verifiable = No⇒ tag is useless;
Verifiable = Yes ⇒ evidence column shows the subset of the path that may be
(probabilistically) evidenced by the tag. Combining these evidences, the destination
may (probabilistically) conclude that either i1 or i2 is a Byzantine node.
Sub-tag i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 Verifiable Evidence
tag1 O Or A K K A No -
tag2 K Or A O A K Yes {i4, i5}
tag3 A Or A O A O Yes {i6}
tag4 O Or O K A K Yes {i3, i5}
7.5 Security
In this section we examine the security properties of the composite MAC, which
include the first two design requirements from Section 7.3.1: unforgeability and
detection of misbehaving nodes. While unforgeability is inherited from Katz’s ag-
gregate MAC scheme, our security analysis emphasises on the detection capabilities
of the composite MAC.
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7.5.1 Unforgeability and randomness
Katz and Lindell have proven that aggregate MACs are unforgeable2 under an adap-
tive chosen-message attack [62]. The attacker in their security model is allowed to
have all but one of the shared keys between the nodes aggregating a message and
the destination node. The only requirement is that the individual MACs are unpre-
dictable. This holds for any secure (standard) MAC, by definition [74].
Let us examine the key differences between a composite MAC and an aggre-
gate MAC, namely, the composition operators OverWrite and KeepIdentical. A
composite MAC that is overwritten one or more times is equivalent to an aggregate
MAC whose initial value equals the last overwriting. Nodes that keep the composite
MAC identical can be ignored for the security analysis. Since the start value of an
aggregate MAC can be any MAC, unforgeability under an adaptive chosen-message
attack follows directly from Katz’s proof for aggregate MACs. While forging an
authentication tag with any non-trivial probability that is larger than 2−n is infea-
sible (where, n is the size of the tag), using short tags (e.g., n = 4 bits) does not
preclude the possibility of accidental forgery. However, we show in Section 7.5.2
that the composite MAC scheme can combine evidences from R ≥ 1 tags to detect
misbehaving nodes with a probability one as R → ∞.
Besides the unforgeability, a composite MAC used for path authentication needs
to be pseudorandom. If an attacker knew whether the former or the latter nodes on
the path were to modify (i.e., aggregate or overwrite) the tag, it could selectively
overwrite the tag with the goal of avoiding detection and falsely accusing honest
nodes in the path. In our composite MAC scheme, the choice of the composition
operator is pseudo-random, making such attacks infeasible.
2Infeasible for a poly-time adversary to forge an n-bit authentication tag with probability 2−n+ǫ,
for some ǫ > 0.
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7.5.2 Detection of selfish and Byzantine nodes
Unforgeability and randomness of composite MACs ensure that no node except the
destination node can learn any information from a received tag or create a valid
tag on behalf of other nodes. Given that the authentication tags are unforgeable
(in any meaningful manner), a node may follow one of the following three strate-
gies: (a) Honest: follow the protocol correctly, (b) Selfish: leave the tag unchanged
when it was required to modify (aggregate or overwrite) the tag, and (c) Byzantine:
overwrite the tag with random bits.
Due to the randomness of the composite MAC, the strategies (a), (b) and (c)
cannot be selectively applied on packets. Thus, even if a node were to switch between
these strategies, it can at best do so randomly. The analysis of the tags, i.e., path
identification and detection of misbehaving nodes, is performed over a collection of
tags. Thus, analysing several tags will result in plausible evidences about a node’s
misbehaviour. If a node switches between strategies (a), (b) and (c), this will be
reflected in the evidences about this node. The security analysis therefore tolerates
nodes which are switching their strategies; the results will simply apply in the ratio
the respective strategies were used.
We define the following sets of nodes:
• I: Ordered set of nodes expected in the path.
• I ′: Ordered set of nodes contained in the path traversed by the packet(s).
• A: Good nodes in the network, following the protocol correctly and putting
the correct identity of the former node into the composite MAC.
• B: Byzantine nodes in the network, modifying the tag in a way that makes it
unreadable for the destination node.
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• C: Selfish nodes in the network that leave the tag unchanged.
• R: Number of packets used for an analysis.
The detection capabilities of the composite MAC path authentication scheme for
Byzantine and selfish nodes are expressed in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.5.1 Given a sufficiently large number of composite MACs, one can with
high probability identify: (i) the good nodes in the path and the selfish nodes, prior
to a good node in the path, and (ii) the last Byzantine node, or one of the selfish
nodes that succeeds the Byzantine node, is detected up to two nodes accuracy.
Formally, a series of R ≥ 1 composite MACs as defined in Section 7.4 contains the
following information with non-negligible probability P . Furthermore, P converges
to 1 for R→∞. We distinguish the two cases B ∩ I ′ = ∅ and B ∩ I ′ 6= ∅.
1. B ∩ I ′ = ∅ :
Let L∩(X,Y ) → Z be the function that takes an ordered set X and a set Y
as input, and returns a set Z, which contains for each element x ∈ X ∩ Y the
element prior to x in X. Then the information contained in a R ≥ 1 composite
MACs is:
A ∩ I ′ and L∩(I ′, A) ∩C ,
namely, the set of good nodes in the path and the set of selfish nodes prior to
a good node in the path.
2. B ∩ I ′ 6= ∅ :
Let PB(X) (pop-back) be the function that returns the last element of an
ordered set X, and R∩(X,Y ) → Z be the function that takes an ordered set
X and a set Y as input, and returns a set Z which contains for each element
x ∈ X ∩ Y the element after x in X. Then the information contained in the
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series of composite MACs is:
PB(B) ∈ B ∪ C or PB(R∩(I ′, B)) ∈ B or (n ∈ C) ∈ B ∪ C ,
i.e., the last Byzantine, or one of the selfish nodes after him, is detected up to
two nodes accuracy.
Lemma 7.5.1 shows that, in the absence of a Byzantine adversary, the good nodes
can be exactly identified, and selfish nodes can be detected if they are followed by a
good node. In the presence of Byzantine nodes, we can localise the misbehaving node
to a set of at most two nodes. Since the destination node cannot decide whether
a Byzantine or a selfish node is detected in the detection analysis, it has to fear
the worst and accuse this node of being Byzantine. This, however, is an incentive
for nodes to follow the protocol, since selfish behaviour might be interpreted as
Byzantine behaviour.
Proof
1. B ∩ I ′ = ∅ :
In the absence of a Byzantine adversary, each good node aggregates or over-
writes the tag with non-negligible probability (p + q), and will be authenti-
cated if no later node overwrites (≥ (1 − q)|I′|) the tag. Thus, each good
node on the route (A ∩ I ′), is authenticated with non-negligible probability ≥
(p+q)·(1−q)|I′| > 0. Consequently, the set A∩I ′ is encoded in a single compos-
ite MAC with non-negligible probability, say P > 0. Since this statement holds
for each composite MAC, in a collection of R composite MACs, the probability
that A∩I ′ is encoded in one of the composite MACs is (1−(1−P )R) R→∞−−−−→ 1.
Each good node i includes the identity of the prior node IDi−1 (the node
that forwarded the packet to node i) in the MAC as defined in Equation 7.1.
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Thus, if a good node aggregates its MAC (which it does with non-negligible
probability p > 0), this proves the existence of node i − 1 in the route. If
node i− 1 is also supposed to aggregate or overwrite its MAC (probability =
p · (p + q) > 0), but it leaves the tag unchanged, then the selfish behaviour
of the node is detected. This argument holds for each selfish node that is
followed by a good node on the path; hence, L∩(I
′, A) ∩ C is encoded in a
each composite MAC with non-negligible probability, say P . Consequently,
the probability that L∩(I
′, A) ∩ C is encoded in one of the composite MACs
is (1− (1− P )R) R→∞−−−−→ 1.
2. B ∩ I ′ 6= ∅ :
If one or several Byzantine nodes on the path overwrite the composite MAC
with random content, then the destination node cannot verify the tag un-
less the tag has been overwritten by a benign node that succeeded the last
Byzantine node on the path. Firstly, with non-negligible probability, none
of the nodes after the last Byzantine node may benignly overwrite the com-
posite MAC, such that the tag remains unverifiable; such an unverifiable tag
indicates the existence of a Byzantine node in the path. Secondly, with non-
negligible probability, a node g after the Byzantine node (if there exists one),
overwrites the tag benignly. This shows that there is no Byzantine node that
succeed node g on the path. However, the node g may be the Byzantine node
itself; a Byzantine node could correctly overwrite the tag that it is supposed
to overwrite as part of the scheme, but overwrite the remaining tags (that was
supposed to be aggregated or kept identical) with random content (see Ta-
ble 7.2). Thus, by receiving a correctly overwritten tag, the destination node
cannot pin-point the Byzantine node; however, it knows that the overwriting
node itself or one of the former nodes is Byzantine.
With an increasing number of packets R, the probability that the first good
node say a1 after the Byzantine node overwrites the tag converges to one. At
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this stage, the destination node has obtained the maximum information that
it can get about the last Byzantine node b on the path. If there is no selfish
node between b and a1, then the destination node knows, that either a1 or the
prior node b is the Byzantine node. If there are selfish nodes between b and
a1, then the destination node knows, that either a1 is a Byzantine node or a1
is correctly following the protocol, and the prior node is selfish. Therefore,
the final conclusion is that either a1 is Byzantine (PB(R∩(I
′, B)) ∈ B), or the
prior node of a1 is either selfish or Byzantine (PB(B) ∈ B∪C or (n ∈ C) ∈
B ∪ C).

Table 7.2: Two strategies of a Byzantine node.
The strategies yield different conclusions for the destination node: Strategy I results
in evidence revealing the Byzantine node, while Strategy II lets the subsequent node
appear to be Byzantine. Action denotes the composition operator that a node is
supposed to apply; Strategy I and II show the action taken by a Byzantine node
instead of the stipulated action; Actions taken by nodes on the path: A = aggregate,
O = overwrite, Or = overwrite with random (Byzantine node), K = keep identical.
Stipulated Action A O K
Strategy I Or Or Or
Strategy II Or O Or
7.6 Configuration and results
In this section we first identify the parameters that need to be configured for our path
authentication scheme. We continue to determine the probabilities to (a) identify
(verify) a path if the packet is sent over the expected path, (b) identify (back trace)
the nodes on an unexpected path, and to (c) detect a Byzantine adversary up to
two nodes accuracy. The detection of selfish nodes is incorporated in the path
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identification, since the required information to detect selfish nodes is contained in
the MACs. Based on these probabilities, we then propose a strategy to configure
our probabilistic path authentication scheme. Finally, we present results for the
probability to identify a path and to detect Byzantine nodes, depending on both the
length n of the tag and the number of packets R used for the analysis. Simulation
driven experiments were used to validate our quantitative results and the optimality
of our configuration settings.
7.6.1 Parameters
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show various parameters in our probabilistic path authentication
scheme, including those that capture tradeoffs between verification, back tracing
and detection of misbehaving nodes. We briefly discuss these parameters to clarify
their meaning and influence on the scheme.
Table 7.3: Configuration parameters.
n The length of the authentication tag in bits.
cn The authentication tag is divided in cn subtags.
p The ratio of tags (sub-tags) to which each node
is supposed to aggregate its MAC.
q The ratio of tags (sub-tags) that each node
is supposed to overwrite with its MAC.
R The number of packets used for an analysis.
d Maximum back tracing depth.
Table 7.4: System parameters.
S Set of nodes in the network that
potentially change the tag.
r The length of the route(s).
sv Importance of verification.
st Importance of back tracing and the
detection of selfish nodes.
sB Importance of the detection of
Byzantine nodes.
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• n: The length of the authentication tag.
A longer authentication tag yields more accurate results. However, the tag
length should be kept short to minimise the communication overhead.
• cn: The authentication tag is divided in cn sub-tags.
As our analysis shows, dividing the tag in sub-tags enhances the scheme’s
ability to detect misbehaving nodes.
• p: The ratio of tags (sub-tags) to which every node is supposed to aggregate
its MAC.
This parameter mainly influences the ability to back trace the authentication
tags.
• q: The ratio of tags (sub-tags) that every node is supposed to overwrite with
its MAC.
This parameter directly controls the probability to detect Byzantine nodes and
influences the ability to verify correct paths.
• R: The number of packets used for an analysis.
An analysis can be performed over any number of received packets (or tags).
Evidently, the accuracy increases with the number of packets used for the
analysis. Nevertheless, the optimal choice of p and q depends on the number
of packets R.
• d: Maximum tracing depth.
Back tracing composite MACs from a given authentication tag is performed
by hypothesizing a plausible path taken by the packet(s) and verifying the hy-
pothesis against tags (evidences). The number of MACs that are aggregated on
such plausible paths is limited to d; this in turn keeps the computational com-
plexity small O(|S|d+1) (see Section 7.6.3). However, computational efficiency
comes at the cost of disregarding tags that are aggregated at d + 1 or more
nodes. For the remainder of this section we fix the tracing depth to d = 2.
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Parameters that influence the configuration of the authentication process:
• S: Set of nodes that potentially change the tag.
Back tracing needs to be based on a set of nodes S that potentially aggregate or
overwrite the tag. This set might be given by all nodes in the neighbourhood of
a path, or even by the entire network. The greater S, the higher is the chance
that nodes in S have the same MAC over a short n-bit tag. Depending on the
back tracing strategy, ambiguous MACs might not be considered at all for the
back tracing, or only with a smaller weight. In our analysis we only consider
unique MACs for back tracing, i.e., if two or more nodes have the same MAC
that fits to a back traced tag, we ignore the packet instead of counting it as
1/2 or 1/n, n > 2 evidence.
• r: The length of the path(s).
The longer the path, the more difficult it is to authenticate all nodes on the
path; and the harder it is to detect Byzantine nodes. We configure the path
authentication scheme to optimally support the longest expected route. Veri-
fication and detection of misbehaving nodes become exponentially harder with
the path length.
• sv, st, sB : Importance of verification, authentication and the detection of mis-
behaving nodes.
The ability to verify, authenticate (back trace) a path and to detect Byzantine
nodes compete in the proposed path authentication scheme. The parameters
sv, st, sB ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R : sv + st + sB = 1 are weights for the importance of
these competing parameters. One reasonable choice for these parameters is
to choose the importance of the respective event by the ratio of its expected
occurrence. For instance, sv could be defined as the ratio of packets which
are sent over the expected path and not modified by a Byzantine node, st as
the ratio of packets which are sent over an unexpected path and not modified
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by a Byzantine node, and sB as the ratio of packets modified by a Byzantine
node. The detection of selfish nodes is included in the verification step and
therefore not handled separately. Successful verification automatically proves
that no selfish node exists on the path, and back tracing reveals the identities
of all detectable selfish nodes.
7.6.2 Probabilities for authentication and detection
As mentioned in the description of the parameter R, the optimal configuration of cn,
p and q depends on the number of packets R used for the analysis. In this section
we therefore determine, depending on the number of packets R, the probability to
successfully verify or back trace, and to detect Byzantine nodes.
7.6.2.1 Path identification by verification
Analysis of an authentication tag starts with the destination node attempting to
verify the tag against the expected path. To this end, the destination node calculates
the composite MAC from the verification step in Definition 6 and compares it with
the authentication tag in the packet.
As described earlier, let n be the length of the tag divided in cn sub-tags, p
the probability that a node aggregates its MAC to the authentication tag, q the
probability that a node overwrites the tag with its MAC, and r the length of the
path. The probability that a node at position s ∈ {1, . . . , r} can be verified by one
sub-tag, and that the verification does not happen accidently because of the short
tag, is:
pv(s) = (q + p) · (1− q)r−s · 2
n/cn − 1
2n/cn
. (7.2)
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Equation 7.2 is derived as follows. The node in position s overwrites it (q) or
aggregates its MAC (p) and none of the remaining nodes overwrite it (1−q)r−s. The
probability of not authenticating a node by a successful verification after examining
1 and R tags is then 1 − pv(s) and (1 − pv(s))R, respectively. Consequently, the
probability to authenticate a node by a successful verification after R packets (= R·cn
sub-tags) is pv,R(s) = 1 − (1 − pv(s))R·cn . Finally, the probability to authenticate
all nodes in the path by successful verification is:
pv,R,r =
∏
s∈{1,...,r}
pv,R(s) =
∏
s∈{1,...,r}
1− (1− pv(s))R·cn . (7.3)
7.6.2.2 Path identification by back tracing
If the verification fails, i.e., the composite MAC calculated in the verification step
in Definition 6 differs from the tag embedded in the packet, the destination node
attempts to back trace with the goal of revealing identities of nodes on the unex-
pected path. To this end, the destination node hypothesizes a plausible path, and
verifies whether the composite MAC that corresponds to the plausible path matches
the received tag. Thus it will perform the verification step in Definition 6 for each
plausible path I ′ other than the expected path I, and compares it with the received
tag. The theoretical complexity of back tracing is exponential in |I ′|. To reduce
computational complexity, back tracing is limited to a depth d, i.e., back tracing is
limited to one overwriting followed by at most d aggregations. However, tags that
contain d + 1 or more aggregations may be ignored by the destination node; thus,
some good evidence may be lost. We note that as long as the probability of d+1 or
more aggregations is small (p−d), then the probability of disregarding good evidence
is small. Further, the destination node may heuristically enumerate plausible paths,
starting with a hypothesized path I ′ that slightly varies from the expected path I,
to increase the chances of an early hit.
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Let n, cn, r, p, q, and R be defined as before, and |S| the total number of nodes
that potentially aggregate their MAC to the authentication tag (for example, all
nodes in the network). Furthermore, let S˜ ⊂ S, |S˜ | > 0 be a set of nodes that
aggregated their MAC to a specific tag. Given S the probability that S˜ can be
uniquely derived is:
pd(|S|, |S˜ |, n, d) =


0, n < |S| or d < |S˜|∏|S˜|
i=1
2n−2i−1
2n−1 , else
(7.4)
Setting n = 3, the set of valid MACs is {001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111}. We do
not allow {0}n as a MAC, since it would not be traceable. The first MAC in S˜ can
now be any element from these valid MACs, yielding a probability of 1 if |S˜ | = 1.
For a tag that consists of aggregated MACs in S˜ to be traceable, the second MAC
needs to be different from the first one, yielding a probability of 2
3−2
23−1
that the tag
is traceable. The next MAC must not be identical to the first, or the second or the
combination (XOR) of both. Thus the probability that 3 randomly chosen MACs
from S are traceable after aggregating them is 23−2
23−1
· 23−22
23−1
.
The probability that the MAC of a node at position s ∈ {1, . . . , r} can be
revealed, i.e., back traced from the authentication tag, and that the verification
does not happen accidently, is:
pt(s) = (1− q)r−s · 2
n/cn − 1
2n/cn
·
(
q · B (d, r − s, p) · B (n/cn − i, |S| − r, p)
· pd (j + i, i, n/cn, d) + p ·B (d− 1, r − s− 1, p)
· B (n/cn − 1, |S| − r − 1, p) · pd (j + i+ 1, i + 1, n/cn, d)
)
, (7.5)
where B(k,m, p) =
∑k
l=0 p
m(1 − p)m−l(ml ) is the cumulative binomial distribution
function. The equation is essentially an extension of Equation 7.2. Firstly, q is the
probability that the node at position s overwrites the tag. If this happens, then the
nodes on the path between s and the destination node must not overwrite the packet.
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Furthermore, only a restricted number of nodes have to aggregate their MAC to the
tag to keep the tag traceable. The rest of line one therefore calculates the probability
that the tag remains traceable after aggregating MACs from the remaining r − s
nodes. pi(1 − p)r−s−i(r−si ) is the probability that exactly i of the remaining r − s
nodes in the path aggregate their MAC to the tag. pj(1 − p)|S|−r−j(|S|−rj ) is the
probability that exactly j of the |S|−r (all but the r from the path) nodes aggregate
their MAC to the tag. The sums stop at d and ncn − i, since pd would be 0 for greater
values. Recall that pd represents the probability that the tag is traceable. The
second term in the equation can be explained similarly under the supposition that
the node at position s aggregates its MAC to the authentication tag. The fraction
2n/cn−1
2n/cn
finally is the probability that the tag is not just a random tag, i.e., the
analysis of the tag is not a false positive.
Similar to the verification, the probability to authenticate all nodes in the path
of length r by back tracing is:
pt,R,r =
∏
s∈{1,...,r}
1− (1− pt(s))R·cn . (7.6)
7.6.2.3 Detection of Byzantine nodes
Let r be the path length, R the number of the tags used for the analysis and p, q the
probabilities for aggregating and overwriting the MAC respectively. The probability
of identifying a node at position s ∈ {1, . . . , r− 1} that is randomly overwriting the
tag (up to a precision of two nodes) by analysing one authentication tag is3:
pB(s) = q(1− q)r−s−1 · 2
n/cn − 1
2n/cn
. (7.7)
3Recall from Lemma 7.5.1 that a Byzantine node can at best be identified up to an precision of
two nodes.
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Equation 7.7 expresses the probability that the node is at position s + 1, and that
none of the remaining nodes overwrites the tag. If the node at position s is corrupting
the authentication tag, then the packets that are overwritten by a node between node
s and the destination node are correctly embedded in the authentication tag. Once
node s has overwritten a tag with its MAC, the destination node knows that the
Byzantine node is either node s or one of the prior nodes. Evidently, the boundary
between the Byzantine node and the subsequent good nodes in the path gets more
precise with the number of analysed packets. The probability to reveal a Byzantine
nodes’ identity (up to a precision of two nodes) using R authentication tags, is:
pB,R,r = 1− (1− pB(s))R·cn . (7.8)
7.6.3 Complexity of back tracing
The number of plausible paths I that need to be distinguished for complete back
tracing can be determined as follows: on an average p|S| nodes in the network
aggregate their MAC to the composite MAC, and q|S| nodes overwrite the composite
MAC. Let P ⊂ S be the set of nodes that has to aggregate, and Q ⊂ S the nodes
that overwrite the tag. Now, each combination of subsets of P with at most d nodes
can be combined with zero or one node from Q, yielding (
∑d
i=0
(
|P |
i
)
(|Q|+1) possible
combinations. The average number of combinations for a complete back tracing is
therefore (
∑d
i=0
(p|S|
i
)
(q|S| + 1). Thus, the complexity for backtracing is O(|S|d+1)
if p > 0.
7.6.4 Configuration
In this section we have so far determined the probability distributions for path au-
thentication by verification, back tracing and detection of Byzantine nodes. The
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parameters as listed in Section 7.6.1 that need to be configured for the path au-
thentication scheme are n, cn, p, q,R, and d. Recall that d is the maximum tracing
depth and needs to be configured depending on the computational capabilities of
the destination node4. As discussed in Section 7.6.1, we set d = 2 to allow computa-
tionally cheap back tracing. Furthermore, the parameters n and R need to be fixed
before we can formulate an optimisation problem that results in an optimal setting
for the parameters cn, p and q. The choice of n and R needs to be balanced with the
available network resources (e.g., communication overhead determines n, mobility
determines mean path life and thus the number of packets R used for analysis) and
the need for accuracy in path identification and detection of Byzantine nodes.
We now assume that the number of nodes potentially modifying the tag (which
might in the worst case be the whole network size) and the parameter rmax is
known. Furthermore, the weights sv, st and sB and the parameters R and n need to
be fixed. In order to maximise both the probability to authenticate the path and to
detect Byzantine nodes, we propose to determine p, q and cn by solving the following
optimisation problem:
max {sv · pv,R,rmax + st · pt,R,rmax + sB · pB,R,rmax |p, q ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R, n/cn ∈ Z} .
(7.9)
To approximately solve this optimisation problem in three variables over non-linear
polynomial functions, numeric techniques need to be applied. We give an outline of
the technique that we used to approximately determine the optimal values for p, q
and cn. The main observation for our approximation strategy is that p has little
or no bearing on the probability to detect Byzantine adversaries pB,R,r, and only
minor influence on the probability to authenticate a node by verification pv,R,r. We
therefore determine p to maximise the probability to authenticate by back tracing
pt,R,r with a seed value of q = 0.5. The calculated p value is then used to determine
4If back tracing is oﬄine then one can perform deeper tracing.
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the q that maximises the equation sv · pv,R,rmax + st · pt,R,rmax + sB · pB,R,rmax . We
now repeat these two steps iteratively using newer values of q and p respectively
at each step. This calculation is performed for each cn | n mod cn = 0, and the
combination of cn, p, q that maximises Equation 7.9 is chosen as the final result.
Establishing a configuration In order to configure our path authentication
scheme for a certain network, firstly either the tag length n or the minimum number
of packets R that are expected to be available for the analysis of a path need to
be specified. In a MANET with a certain mobility pattern, one could specify R by
estimating the lower bound for the number of packets that are typically sent before
a path changes due to mobility. Based on different values for n, the probabilities to
authenticate the path and to detect Byzantine nodes can then be calculated. n can
finally be chosen as the smallest n that satisfies desired authentication and detection
probabilities. The resulting values for the sub-tag length cn and the probabilities
p and q for aggregation and overwriting are then used to configure the composite
MAC as defined in Section 7.4.1.
7.6.5 Simulation results
Using Equation 7.9 to calculate near optimal values for p, q and cn, Figures 7.2
and 7.3 show results for a sample setting. Besides theoretically obtained results,
simulation results show the real ratio of nodes that can be identified and detected
as Byzantine nodes. For each combination p, q,R and n, i.e., for each marker in the
graphs, we ran 100 simulation runs and counted the ratio of tags that allowed us
to verify, back trace and detect a Byzantine node, respectively. Figures 7.2 and 7.3
show that the simulation results are close to our theoretical results.
Figure 7.2 shows the calculated values for p, q and cn and the resulting probabil-
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(c) Detecting a Byzantine node.
Figure 7.2: Example results for a number of R = 10 packets.
S = 30, rmax = 5 and the tag length is varied.
ities for different tag lengths and the route length of r = rmax = 5. We only show
the results for path length r = 5, the probabilities for shorter routes would be even
higher. The number of nodes potentially modifying the tag is set to |S| = 30, and
R = 10 packets are used for analysing the tags. The tag length n was set to 1, 2, 4,
and multiples of 4 up to 32 and the weights sv, st and sB are set to sv = st = sB =
1
3 . Figure 7.3 retains the same setting but varies the number of packets R used for
analysis while fixing n = 8 bits.
As the Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show, both the length of the authentication tag and
the number of packets can be increased to achieve path identification and detection
of Byzantine nodes with a desired probability. We also observe that even a very
small number of R = 2 packets can be sufficient to achieve high probabilities if a
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(c) Detecting a Byzantine node.
Figure 7.3: Example results for a tag length of n = 8 bits.
S = 30, rmax = 5 and the number of packets R is varied.
sufficiently long tag is used, and vice-versa.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show that for sufficiently large R (≥ 4), the optimal value for
cn is n, i.e., the tag is divided into sub-tags each of length one bit; also, the calculated
optimal value for p is 0. Note that p = 0 means that the composition operator
Aggregate is seldom used; only OverWrite and KeepIdentical operators are used
by the (honest) nodes in the path. Simulations for different settings have affirmed
that splitting the authentication into smaller sub-tags increases the probabilities for
identification of the path and especially the detection of Byzantine nodes. Informally
this result can be explained by the fact that it is better to have many small but
probabilistic pieces of evidence than one perfect piece of evidence that rarely occurs.
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Finally, we observe that the probability of path identification by verification
or back tracing, and the detection of Byzantine nodes are satisfactory (> 0.9) for
R = 10 or more packets and n = 8 bits. This amply demonstrates the efficacy
of our path authentication scheme while operating under minimal communication
overhead.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter we developed a path authentication scheme feasible for MANETs.
The tag length in our probabilistic scheme is scalable, starting with a tag length of 1
bit, and the required computations are cheap (comparable to a hash function). Our
scheme uses composite MACs, a new cryptographic primitive which facilitates not
only the authentication of paths but also the detection of adversarial nodes. Results
show that the combination of evidence from several packets allows to authenticate
a path with high probability, even for small tag sizes of only 2–8 bits. The design of
our path authentication scheme shows how a probabilistic approach combined with
symmetric key cryptography can help to design a scheme that meets the efficiency
requirements of MANETs.
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8.1 Summary
In this thesis we have investigated the development of protocols that satisfy some
of the requirements for security, reliability and efficiency presented by MANETs.
In particular, we have explored the management of a security architecture within
MANETs, which provides the basis for distributed security protocols. Furthermore,
we have shown on the example of path authentication how to design protocols that
avoid costly computations and how to meet the high security requirements in mili-
tary MANETs. Whilst the primary driver for this research been military networks,
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many of the results obtained are generalisable to other environments that share the
constraints presented by these networks.
As preliminary work we created a simulation environment to validate the effi-
ciency and reliability of our security architectures and protocols in military scenarios.
This simulation environment (see Chapter 3) includes a radio propagation model and
a mobility model, which together facilitate the creation of simulation scenarios in
urban environments. Scenarios that incorporate splitting groups and communica-
tion interruptions caused by buildings are more challenging than commonly used
scenarios, which are characterised by random node mobility in free space. While in
random mobility scenarios a partitioning of the network happens only for short time
periods, groups in military applications might split for minutes.
In Part I of this thesis we examined the bootstrapping of security architectures
within MANETs. Most security protocols require a trusted authority, which does
not exist in a MANET per se. Therefore, a set of nodes in the MANET can be as-
signed as a distributed TA that requires TA nodes to collaborate in order to perform
security critical TA computations. The TA nodes either need to be pre-established
during the MANET pre-configuration phase or elected/changed dynamically during
deployment. To establish a dynamic trust authority, we developed a cluster algo-
rithm in Chapter 4. Efficiency and reliability of this algorithm has been validated
in the simulation scenarios defined in Chapter 3. To make our algorithm secure
against an active adversary, we incorporated a trust metric into the cluster creation
mechanism. To provide stronger security properties for our approach, an adversary
model for network protocols would be required. The development of such an adver-
sary model is a challenging but crucial task to provide better security of network
protocols, and is discussed in the future work, Section 8.2.4.
A major task of our security architecture for MANETs is the organisation of
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cryptographic keys. We have investigated the distribution and efficient storage of
symmetric keys in Chapter 5. We proposed two schemes for non-interactive key
agreement, which are resilient against a large number of malicious nodes, and due
to their computational efficiency suitable for MANETs. For small hierarchies of
depth 2 or 3, as can be found in small military MANETs, the size of the keys is
only a few KB. This allows online key distribution, as might be required in military
networks, when a certain number of nodes got compromised.
In Part II of this thesis we investigated how to efficiently perform distributed
computations in MANETs. In Chapter 6 we developed an algorithm for enhancing
the efficiency and robustness of distributed trust authority protocols for MANETs.
Our algorithm selects a set of TA nodes that are best suited to perform a distributed
computation using a suite of metrics for measuring the efficiency and reliability of
candidate nodes. Furthermore, our algorithm proposes a routing strategy to contact
the selected set of TA nodes. Simulation results showed that the proposed routing
strategy considerably reduces the communication cost compared to traditional ap-
proaches.
Concluding, in Chapter 7 we developed a path authentication scheme suitable
for MANETs. Our scheme is unforgeable and facilitates up to a certain accuracy
the detection of malicious nodes on the route. While traditional schemes for path
authentication require public key operations, our scheme builds on message authen-
tication codes and therefore only requires symmetric key operations. The use of
message authentication codes makes our scheme not only computationally efficient,
but also allows the selecion of the length of the authentication tag to any length
starting from one bit. Our scheme for path authentication shows how symmetric
keys can be effectively used to develop more efficient and flexible algorithms for
MANETs.
186
8.2 Directions for future work
8.2 Directions for future work
At the end of each chapter we have provided several avenues for future research.
However, in addition to these individual pieces of work, a number of key challenges
need to be addressed in order to accelerate the widespread adoption of MANETs.
We continue with a discussion on improvements for network simulations, including
extensions of the mobility model and the ray optical propagation model. MANET
simulations will remain an important tool for the evaluation of network protocols,
as most of the simulated MANETs are not ubiquitous today, making tests in a real
environment infeasible.
Protocols for secret sharing and key distribution, which provide the basis for
secure protocols, are yet not able to efficiently cope with dynamic group changes,
i.e., merging, splitting, node admission and node departure. Directions for the
development of secret sharing and key distribution protocols that facilitate dynamic
group changes are given in Section 8.2.3. Protocols that are highly influenced by
the network topology such as cluster, routing and revocation algorithms have thus
been designed to the best of the designers’ knowledge, but lack security proofs in
a meaningful adversary model. To this end, we propose the development of an
adversary model to provide provable security in these models in Section 8.2.4.
8.2.1 Improving MANET mobility models
In Section 3.1.1 we have introduced CMM, our group mobility model for MANETs.
While CMM allows the simulation of complex group movements, as can be seen in
our simulation scenarios in Chapter 3, the configuration required for these scenarios
is considerable. In this section we discuss an extension of our model that: facili-
tates the automatic collision avoidance with other nodes and obstacles; allows more
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dynamic group changes; and thus allows the creation of complex mobility patterns
with less configuration effort than with CMM.
Additional mobility functionalities Williams and Huang [142] recently pro-
posed a mobility model that uses repelling forces to avoid collisions between nodes
and with obstacles. We believe that the incorporation of forces is a promising ap-
proach to facilitate the creation of very complex mobility scenarios, while keeping
the configuration overhead to a minimum. Repelling forces, as already proposed
by Williams and Huang, can be used to avoid collisions with other nodes and ob-
stacles. In a group mobility model, forces could additionally be used to organise
group formations. We believe that developing a group mobility model solely based
on forces facilitates the creation of highly accurate mobility scenarios with minimum
configuration overhead.
Imagine for example the formation of a “wedge”, as shown in Figure 8.1, that
spans preferably an angle of 90◦ (see also the earlier example in Figure 3.1). A
street in a city might be too narrow to keep this formation, i.e., the nodes have to
decrease the distances between each other or change their formation to a “wedge”
with a smaller angle. If implemented in CMM, this more narrow formation needs
to be defined as a separate formation and an explicit formation change needs to be
performed. If implemented by a system of forces, the group in formation “wedge”
would be automatically squeezed to a more narrow “wedge” as the housewalls get
closer. Thus, the formation change would happen automatically and more smoothly.
A
B
C
D
Figure 8.1: A group of nodes in formation “wedge”.
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To realise formations such as the “wedge” by a force model, nodes can attract or
repel each other as they exceed, or fall, below a certain distance. In Figure 8.1 node
B could be “attached” by forces to node A as part of the formation, i.e., B should
be in an equilibrium if it is located at a certain distance left behind A. Similar
techniques are well known in swarm intelligence to model movements of bird flocks.
In swarm intelligence, each bird (node) follows simple rules such as holding a certain
distance from the birds in front of it and avoiding collisions with nodes to the left
and to the right. The bird in front of the flock guides the movement of the whole
flock. Following these quite simplistic rules, the bird in front can guide the flock to
avoid obstacles and make abrupt direction changes.
Due to the reduction of the configuration complexity and results from swarm-
intelligence, we believe that a force model would be well suited to simulate group
movements in MANETs.
8.2.2 Increasing our propagation model’s accuracy
In Section 3.1.2 we have described the design, implementation and evaluation of a
resource-constrained signal propagation model, which demonstrates good fidelity to
theoretical and experimental data for our targeted application areas. These include
the improvement of routing protocols, which can incorporate situational information
such as terrain data and information. The remainder of this section is devoted to
discussions of the inclusion of additional factors in our model.
The model described in Section 3.1.2.2 considers transmission via direct line-
of-sight, as well as the effects of reflection and deflection. Further factors which
can have an appreciable influence on simulation calculations are scattering due to
vegetation and absorption by rain. We briefly describe our current analysis and
planned implementation steps for these parameters.
189
8.2 Directions for future work
Vegetation objects, such as trees or shrubs, form a considerable proportion of
topographic objects in many simulation scenarios. In order to describe the scattering
of waves caused by vegetation in a ray-optical model, very small polyhedra would
need to be used to describe the leaves of trees. However, this naive approach is
not feasible, since the polyhedra are assumed to be large compared to the modelled
wavelength and because of the computational costs involved. Within the constraints
of the ray-optical model, all vegetation objects could also be described by polyhedra
with large surfaces. An almost circular shrub, for example, could be described similar
to buildings, as a square or hexagon base with an additional parameter for its height.
A ray impinging on such a vegetation object would not change its direction, and the
power transmitted by the ray would be attenuated, depending on the object size.
Following this approach, absorption by vegetation would be taken into consideration,
whereas reflection and deflection on vegetation objects would be ignored.
8.2.3 Cryptographic protocols for dynamic MANETs
In Chapter 5 we have introduced our scheme for non-interactive hierarchical key
distribution, which facilitates each pair in a group to non-interactively compute a
shared secret. A more comprehensive technique for group management is provided
by group access control schemes, which we introduced in Section 2.5.2. Schemes
for group access control, as proposed by Saxena et al. [53, 54], are based on secret
sharing, where each node in a group is equipped with one secret share. Based on
these secret shares, nodes can not only perform distributed computations, but also
use their secret share as a private key in public key protocols, and non-interactively
compute pairwise shared secrets. The drawback of secret sharing schemes is their
robustness against only a threshold number of compromised nodes in the group.
Our non-interactive scheme for key distribution is secure against any number of
compromised nodes, if the group is organised in a flat hierarchy.
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A challenging task in MANETs is to dynamically organise groups by key distri-
bution or secret sharing schemes, while avoiding a complete re-keying of the group.
The support of dynamic group changes is of particular interest in military applica-
tions. These changes include node admission, node departure, splitting of groups
and merging of groups. First approaches in this line of research include node admis-
sion, which can be performed efficiently in secret sharing schemes. Node revocation
requires a complete re-keying; the same holds for splitting and merging of groups,
which have not gained much attention in the research community so far.
We believe that an extended pre-configuration facilitates the development of
more flexible schemes for group organisation. For example, instead of distributing
one value, or one polynomial representing the secret share of a node, a set of values
or polynomials could be distributed to each node. If, for example, the polynomials
span the space of polynomials, then one broadcast could be sufficient to configure
all nodes to use a new polynomial as secret share. We believe that such ways of
extended pre-configuration can provide more flexible schemes for group organisation.
8.2.4 Adversary model for network protocols
In recent years, game theory has begun to gain attention in the design of crypto-
graphic protocols. [46]. A major benefit of developing protocols in a game theoretic
security model is the incorporation of incentive and punishment. Although the nodes
in a military MANET usually follow a common mission, they still have to act ra-
tionally in their own interest, i.e., selfishly. However, an adversary will delegate his
nodes to optimise his overall position, i.e., even sacrifice single nodes if necessary.
This makes the design of secure network protocols (such as routing algorithms, clus-
ter algorithms and revocation schemes) for MANETs extremely challenging, since
the adversary might use the protocol to his own benefit. We explain the importance
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of incentive and punishment in the example of revocation schemes. The problem
formulation for revocation schemes is easier than for cluster and routing algorithms,
since the decision to make is binary (revoke/do not revoke).
Incentive-based revocation schemes To date, one of the most widely cited
methods for achieving revocation in MANETs has been the use of quorum-based
decision making, using k-out-of-n threshold signatures [112, 10]. In these schemes,
nodes accuse other nodes of malicious behaviour by casting negative votes against
a perceived offender. Once a predetermined threshold k + 1 of negative votes is
achieved, a signature can be reconstructed and the offending node will be consid-
ered revoked by other members of the network. Setting this threshold parameter
high, whilst intuitively an astute security decision, may inadvertently result in a
malicious node never being revoked (as the network density may not support the re-
quired level of collaboration). Setting it too low may result in a malicious adversary
compromising a relatively small fraction of the total number of nodes and gaining
control of the network by being able to revoke at will [34].
To avoid the shortcomings of quorum-based revocation, the concept of node sui-
cide was recently introduced by Clulow et al. [38]. Motivated by the observation
that many biological systems exhibit behaviour in which individual members of a
group are willing to sacrifice themselves to protect the collective (e.g., honeybees
sting in response to a perceived threat against the hive), their scheme proposes that
a single node can unilaterally revoke another node at the cost of being revoked it-
self. Unfortunately, for the type of heterogeneous coalition networks envisaged in
future military or emergency response scenarios, it may be unreasonable to assume
that each node will value the network’s utility more than its own. Without suffi-
cient incentive, selfish1 (rational) nodes will always defer revocation responsibility
1Whilst nodes themselves are not capable of higher cognitive processing, we assume nodes are
programmed to to maximise their personal utility (or the utility of their group) over a set of
constraints.
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to others. As was shown in the game-theoretic revocation model in [112], this in
turn may result in malicious nodes never being revoked. We believe that designing a
revocation scheme in a game-theoretical adversary model enforces the incorporation
of incentives to revoke other nodes, yielding a revocation scheme where honest nodes
quickly revoke malicious nodes.
Game theoretic security framework The example of revocation has shown the
importance of incentive based schemes to minimise the drawback of node selfishness,
or put in a positive way, to exploit selfishness. While cryptographic protocols are
usually proven to be secure in a specific security model, there exist no such commonly
used security models for network protocols such as routing, clustering and node
revocation. We see the potential to exploit game theory to build a security framework
for network protocols. Protocols that are developed in such a model or framework
will automatically incorporate defence mechanisms against attacks and incentivise
their use. Investigating the development of a game theoretic security framework or
model can therefore help to design more prudent and thus more secure protocols.
8.3 Conclusions
MANETs have the potential to be applicable to a large range of applications that
are currently conducted in more traditional networks. In military missions, these
applications can provide more comprehensive and reliable information to soldiers,
thus helping to minimise risks.
However, communication over a wireless channel opens many possibilities for
interception and manipulation. Therefore, the protocols used in military MANETs
need to be secure against a wide range of attacks. In this thesis we focused on the
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development of secure protocols for MANETs that can be run on power-constrained
devices such as handhelds. To provide robustness against compromised nodes, we
investigated possibilities to distribute the power for performing security critical com-
putations in a MANET. While protocols for specific applications were introduced
in this thesis, the development of secure distributed protocols for a wide range of
applications for MANETs is a major task for future research.
Nevertheless, there remain a number of significant obstacles to the widespread
use of MANETs. Addressing these challenges is therefore a high priority for future
research. Many challenges to the successful large-scale use of MANETs remain.
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